

Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism in Canada

A Mackenzie Institute Occasional Paper

- John C. Thompson & Joe Turlej

- June 2003

The Mackenzie Institute

Founded in 1986 to provide research and commentary on matters related to organized violence and political instability, the Institute normally concerns itself with such diverse subjects as terrorism, organized crime, political extremism, warfare and similar matters. It hopes to provoke informed debate, but does not shy away from controversy.

The Institute derives its funding from contributions by individuals, charitable foundations and other private bodies. It does not accept government funding.

The Institute may be reached at:

P.O. Box 338, Adelaide Station
Toronto, Ontario
M5C 2J4

416-686-4063

mackenzieinstitute@compuserve.com

www.mackenzieinstitute.com

The Authors

John C. Thompson has been with the Mackenzie Institute since 1990, and is currently its president. Previously, he was with the Canadian Forces and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Joe Turlej worked with the Institute as a research associate from 1994 to 2002. He had to cut his links with this project after accepting an invitation from a major Canadian police force to serve as an intelligence analyst.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| Foreword | iv |
| | |
| Chapter 1. On the Nature and Characteristics of Terrorism | |
| The Canadian Contribution | 1 |
| The Failure of Definition | 3 |
| The Characteristics of Terrorism | 6 |
| On Motivation | 9 |
| Characteristics of Modern Terrorist Groups | 13 |
| Remolding Culture | 19 |
| Can we Stand? | 23 |
| | |
| Chapter 2. Terrorist Groups with a Presence in Canada | |
| Terrorism in Canada's History | 24 |
| Groups in the World Today | 26 |
| Sikh Terrorist Groups | 34 |
| Sri Lankan Tamils | 40 |
| Islamic Fundamentalism | 48 |
| | |
| Chapter 3: Terrorist Supporters and Politics | |
| On Front Organizations | 56 |
| The Art of Networking | 58 |
| Cultivating Politicians | 66 |
| | |
| Chapter 4: Open Money, Open Power | |
| Saps and Sugar Daddies | 71 |
| War Taxes and Donation Systems | 73 |
| Public Funding for Private Wars | 77 |
| Passing the Bucket Again | 85 |
| | |
| Chapter 5: Terrorism and Crime | |
| A Natural Partnership | 87 |
| Narcotics and Terrorism | 89 |
| Human Trafficking and People Smuggling | 94 |
| Prostitution and War | 99 |
| Frauds and Scams | 101 |
| Intimidation | 106 |
| Robbery and Auto Theft | 107 |
| Blackmail and Protection Rackets | 108 |

Chapter Six: Veterans of Other People's Wars

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-----|
| Someone to Worry About? | 110 |
| Soldiers versus Warriors | 111 |
| The Unending War | 112 |
| Manufacturing Suicide Attackers | 114 |
| Street Gangs as a Legacy of Violence | 117 |

Chapter Seven: The Security of the Nation

| | |
|---|-----|
| The Will to Defence | 120 |
| International Obligations and Canadian Laws | 121 |
| Securing our Borders | 125 |
| Assets and Liabilities | 128 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Appendix: A List of Canadian Terrorists | 132 |
|--|-----|

Foreword

“Terrorism in Canada? It can’t happen here.”

This is a commonly held sentiment and a mistake. On the surface, Canada appears to be a peaceful country – provided that one never reads the smaller stories buried in our newspapers or examines the sanguinary aspects of our history. For a country that was conceived, gestated, born and matured because of conflict and warfare, comparatively little political violence occurs here.

Our constitutional document, the *British North American Act*, pledges itself to the pursuit of “peace, order, and good government.” While no Canadian is ever really prepared to accept our various levels of governments as being good, compared to those of many other peoples, they are. We have built a decent society.

Canada has a long cosmopolitan history and in many ways is still a frontier society. Both of these are traits that encourage immigration and we welcome newcomers – provided that they are prepared to live peaceful, quiet, and mannerly Canadian lives. But things have changed over the last 25 years while we were not paying attention.

As we opened our gates wider than ever, tolerance became a public virtue rather than a commonly-held private one, which means that it became rude to publicly express any concerns about some of the people flowing into Canada, and somehow impure to listen to such complaints. All seemed well in the peaceable kingdom, and that was all most of us wanted to know.

We conditioned ourselves too well: Canadian Sikhs started to fall prey to violent terrorists who wanted to change their practices and draw off their prosperity to fuel a war in the Punjab, and most of us barely blinked. Even the 1985 Air India bombing was seen by most Canadians as really having nothing to do with us. A year later, Sri Lankan Tamils started to arrive in numbers, and hardly anyone recognized that this was an entire community under the control of the supporters of a homeland terrorist campaign.

In 1994, Ahmed Ressam was just another refugee claimant with just another fraudulent entry document who came to Canada and dropped out of sight – like thousands of others. Again, it was nothing to be alarmed about. The extraordinary had become ordinary, and it was rude to draw conclusions. Who knew that he would next come to our attention as an al Qaeda terrorist?

That peaceful, civil, and cosmopolitan society we want has not vanished, nor is it really endangered – provided that we become intolerant about one particular point. We must become absolutely intolerant of those who come here to perpetuate other people’s wars and prey on our citizens who share their background. Our future depends on it.

-- John Thompson

Chapter 1. On the Nature and Characteristics of Terrorism

The Canadian Contribution

Somewhere, perhaps today, in Sri Lanka, a 33-year-old woman is preparing her vest pack of high-grade military plastic explosives interlaced with nails for fragmentation effects. She is not married, and she has no children. Instead, she dedicated her life to a cause and its leader. If it suits the leader to break the ceasefire and send her running into a crowded schoolhouse and detonate her bomb, she will do it without hesitation. Such an act will complete her life and prove her love to the leader.

Deep in Southern Colombia, a guerrilla is watching the approach of a National Police patrol through the night vision scope on his sniper rifle. Their sergeant is unaware of the "death dot" laser that is playing over his genitals, heart, and head -- only the guerrilla can see the infrared laser pointer that shows where his bullet will go when he finally decides to pull the trigger. The head would be quick and clean, but a shot in the genitals would mean a painful death or a maimed life of humiliating pity. Either way, the other National Police will think twice about patrolling this village again.

A teenager's attention span can be quite short, but not today. He is paying close heed to the older man who tells him how close to get to the café before detonating his explosive and ball-bearing impregnated vest. The bomb vest is heavy, uncomfortable, and chafes, but to the boy it is an instrument of glorious achievement. Until he decided on martyrdom, a life of emptiness and frustration loomed before him. Now he can fulfill his duty and become a hero to his peers in his West Bank town. The man has also promised that a martyr's family will be taken care of, and the family home will remain secure.

The money has arrived today and so have new papers proving that a new job awaits him after his flight across the Atlantic. The *Takfiri* always know how to move money, find travel documents and live in the heart of the Enemy's world. The training is finished and he has proven his worthiness by completing it after keeping his faith intact in a world of temptation. Now it is time to live quietly and unobtrusively -- perhaps for years -- until another *Takfir* brings him the chemicals and the target for the hydrogen cyanide gas bomb he will make with them.

To most Canadians, the stories encapsulated above are exotic, remote, and somebody else's problem. Unfortunately, this is untrue as all of these stories could easily have Canadian connections. Diverting money from government grants to an immigration agency in Toronto may have paid for the suicide bomber's plastic explosives. Proceeds from the sales of cocaine in Edmonton might have been used to purchase the high-tech sniper rifle in Florida. The aspiring martyr in the West Bank could have been indoctrinated in a school paid for by a Muslim Charity operating in Montreal. The Islamic Fundamentalist with plans for a poison gas attack is perhaps coming to live in Halifax.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

Canada is connected with the rest of the world; it is our market, our supplier, and our vacation site. We have citizens who have come from virtually every nation on the planet. As a result, this means that problems elsewhere in the world are our problems too. They are not something we can ignore. Additionally, as a trading nation with a cosmopolitan population, we have a responsibility to other nations. We owe them security and protection from internal problems, and this is a responsibility that sovereign nations owe each other.

Notwithstanding the desires and fond beliefs of some of our citizenry, the rest of the World does not necessarily love us, for Canada is a Western nation and a part of what some might consider as the “Anglo Saxon Mafia”. While many Canadians may feel that our purported reputation as Peacekeepers (a fantasy that does not withstand objective scrutiny) or as a multicultural country may exempt us from hatred by others, we remain a democratic society with the same background and vitality as other Western nations. This vitality has attracted spiteful and envious hatred.

Also, as may be apparent in an examination of the nature and motivation of terrorism, being a tolerant and cosmopolitan society does not mitigate against risk. In fact, it is more likely to increase it. While Canada is capable of generating some terrorism of its own, the most severe danger has been imported as potential terrorists and terrorist supporters creep in almost unnoticed with the tide of newcomers arriving here every year.

If there is one lesson to learn from the attacks of September 11th, 2001, it is that instability on the other side of the world can be a problem for stable sovereign nations. This also means that our security and stability are dependent upon the security and stability of other countries and regions; it is in our best interests to look after their interests.

Since the end of the Cold War, the most dangerous conflicts around the world have been internal ones. The State vs. State violence that most Canadians think of as “war” has become rare, and is replaced almost entirely with conflicts where one or more of the participants are non-state actors such as guerrillas, tribal militias, armed political factions, vigilantes, mobs, organized criminal societies, and terrorists.

These forces, trivial and remote though they may seem, are at once both a problem in themselves, and a symptom of other problems. Nor are they necessarily small and weak. If left to their own devices they can generate civil conflicts that can kill hundreds of thousands of people, destabilize whole regions, and bankrupt nations. With intimidation of officials and police and the money from illegal enterprises such as narcotics or diamond smuggling, for example, they can corrupt institutions, buy weapons and equipment, and sustain themselves for decades – often long after the conditions that created them have gone.

More to the point for Canada, these non-state actors have moved into our country to take advantages of opportunities we present to them. The members of some groups come here when the price on their heads is too high at home. Others come to generate new followers among their countrymen and co-religionists from home, or to define and enforce a new system of beliefs among them. Canada can be a market for the black or gray market activities that feed their movements; to collect money openly and legally, or to quietly live until the time is right to resume the struggle.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

The Failure of Definition

Terrorism is just one form of violent human behavior. It has escaped easy definition by the UN, as well as by governments. While most North Americans can recognize that the hijacking of an aircraft by armed militants, or the bombing of an office by some shadowy group, as “terrorism”, nothing is ever quite what it seems, and the problem of identifying terrorism remains.

The distinguished American analyst Walter Laqueur, in the first paragraph of *The New Terrorism*, begins by mentioning that terrorism is violence, but not all violence is terrorism.¹ He goes on to say that terrorism is difficult to define precisely, but should not be mixed up with activities undertaken in the course of civil war, banditry, or guerrilla warfare. Unfortunately, terrorism is often undertaken by those who hope to provoke a civil war, or plan to pay for their terrorism through the use of banditry. Moreover, many guerrilla movements arose out of terrorism and still practice it.

Bruce Hoffman, a former director of research on terrorism at RAND, and one of the formidable scholars and intellects at the University of Saint Andrew's Centre of Terrorism and Political Violence, has also grown reluctant to define terrorism. However, he does settle on the admittedly imprecise description of terrorism as “*violence – or equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.*”² However, almost all violence committed by groups of people (and, arguable, even by some individuals) is political in nature, except for straightforward criminal activity in pursuit of profit, and even this distinction is often inaccurate.

Dozens of other commentators have likewise failed to adequately describe terrorism.

*“Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually to influence an audience.”*³

[Terrorism is] “*A term used to describe the method or theory behind the method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systemic use of violence. Terroristic acts are directed against persons who as individual agents or representatives of authority interfere with the consummation of the objectives of such a group.*”⁴

*“The phenomenon of terrorism can be defined as a strategy whereby violence is used to produce certain effects in a group of people so as to attain some political ends.”*⁵

There have been other definitions of terrorism – many of which contribute to the problem. During the French Revolution, Robespierre opined that terrorism was an “emanation of virtue.” Marxist theorists have been able to rationalize terrorism as an

¹ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*; Oxford University Press; New York; 1999

² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1998. pg. 15

³ Terrorist Group Profiles 1988; US Government Printing Office, pg. vii.

⁴ Edwin R.A. Sidigman, ed. *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol.. 13, Macmillan co., New York, 1934.

⁵ Naunihal Singh, *The World of Terrorism*; South Asia Publishers, New Delhi, 1988.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

expression of class warfare – and threw a spanner in the works by differentiating between wholesome heroic freedom fighters (e.g. those who used terrorism for 'progressive' reasons) and those base reactionary villains who used terrorism for 'non-progressive' reasons. There is also the eternal confusion generated by those who would distinguish terrorism from killers whose causes they support by defining their favorite terrorists as freedom fighters, who are somehow exempt from the censure that their actions deserve.

This distinction has also been blurred by the activities of Second World War Resistance fighters, many of whom engaged in acts that could easily be described as terrorism nowadays – although only a deep-dyed apologist with an unbalanced sense of judgment might describe the Israeli Army in the West Bank or the British Army in Ulster as behaving like the Nazis. If they were, the Palestinians would have been shattered long ago, as would the IRA.

The main consensus is that terrorism is a form of political violence – an observation that is far too general to be useful.

What distinguishes the terrorist from the soldier are such elements as accountability, conduct, and lawful authority. The soldier is ultimately accountable to his superiors, to the military laws, codes and courts of his organization, and to the country that he serves. The terrorist can sometimes be accountable to his superiors, who might have created a code of sorts, but neither the terrorist nor his leaders answer to any recognizable government – although some governments (usually described as "Rogue Nations" by US authorities) may use terrorists as their proxy agents on occasion.

Again, these characteristics seldom delineate the terrorist from the guerrilla or the revolutionary. Nor, at times, do they distinguish this trio from the organized criminal when the latter strives to seek political influence through the use of violence (instead of his usual tactic of corruption).

Military writers tend to define revolutionary or terrorist violence on another scale. The American military theorist Colonel T.N. Dupuy is one of the leading scholars who has attempted to treat violence as a science that can be modeled, and much of his work has been very influential. To Dupuy, terrorism is one of several forms of internal violence conducted at a scale and intensity short of overt warfare – this being the stage where battles are openly waged between large identifiable armed bodies whose intention is to achieve decision through combat.⁶

Classifying terrorism and related forms of conflict (insurgency, revolutionary war, tribal uprisings, etc.) as internal warfare that is limited in scale is a way of neatly pigeonholing the entire concept. It also means that counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency is an internal problem, which is not always true. For example, since the 1970s, the Provisional Wing of the IRA has launched attacks on British targets in Belgium, Germany, and Gibraltar. It provided bomb-making expertise to the Basque ETA in return for a supply

⁶ Trevor N. Dupuy; *Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat*; Paragon House, New York, 1987. A truncated version of Dupuy's model can be found in that invaluable reference book, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History (Fourth Edition)*; R.E Dupuy & T.N. Dupuy; Harper-Collins, New York, 1993.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

of handguns, and sent its members for training in Yemen, Libya and Lebanon.⁷ The militant Sikhs' war against India to control the Punjab resulted in acts of terrorism staged in Britain and Canada, including the 1985 Air India bombing that killed 329 people. Indeed, all of the major terrorist groups in the world today operate on an international scale, and thus should not be seen as someone else's internal problem.

Also, Dupuy's distinctions about scales of violence are misleading. India and Pakistan have been formally at war on four occasions; they periodically exchange shots over the frontier and sometimes sponsor terrorism and unrest inside each other's countries. However, the most intensive Muslim-Hindu violence occurred during the Partition Riots of 1946-47, when approximately 800,000 people were killed. The savage massacres in Rwanda in 1994 over a four-month period resulted in an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 deaths. Violence on this scale exceeds most conventional wars between nation states, and the pace of killing in these two episodes rival that of the First World War.

Also, few wars are as deadly as internal terrorism where a government uses terror as a tool to control its own population. It is worth remembering that the word "terrorist" began as a descriptor for the agents of the French Revolutionary Government, and not those who fought against it. However, terror by governments against their own citizens—'democide' according to R.J. Rummel, one of the world's leading scholars of mass murder – is outside the purview of this study.

Assuming that terrorism and insurgency are limited in scale and area is a mistake too – but one important point remains. Conventional warfare usually reflects specific discernible goals: Air Force bombing campaigns are undertaken to physically destroy industrial and economic capacity; naval fleets seek to control ocean space and deny passage; conventional armies engage in battle to take and hold ground while inflicting physical damage on each other. By way of comparison, terrorists and insurgents normally pursue political goals by directing violence at symbolic targets and often their violence is undertaken for its own sake. An army would fight to achieve definable results using tactical instruments to achieve operational plans designed in support of strategic objectives, while a terrorist might bomb a target to prove something that he might not even be able to consciously rationalize.

In the early 19th Century, Hegel mentioned in his *Philosophy of History* that the driving force in history, and all other human affairs was man's need for respect and his struggle for status among his peers. In essence, all human beings have some desire for recognition and a yearning for influence. The differences among us mean that this hunger or need varies from individual to individual, according to gender, background, upbringing, opportunity, and so on.

Sociologists and criminologists recognize this need. The American sociologist Abraham H. Maslow outlined a hierarchy of needs in his famous theory of self-actualization. People first operate to achieve basic physiological needs: air, food, water, and protection from immediate hazards. Then they need safety and a secure environment. Third are the needs in the sphere of love, companionship and sex. The

⁷. For more on the international aspect of terrorism in the 1970s and early 1980s, see Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network*; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1981; and the annual publication *Patterns of Global Terrorism* from the US State Department.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

fourth tier involves the need for self-esteem and respect. Fifth comes the need for self-actualization and self-identity – to become all that you are capable of being, or to be who you think you should be.⁸

While the literature on sociology and criminology is rich in theory and study, the British journalist Colin M. Wilson did an end run around much of it in a survey of crime. A simple but accurate assessment of criminal motivation is that it represents a childish shortcut for gratification of a simple need.⁹ He is partly right; a man who might otherwise be harmless will – if drowning – submerge another to stand on him and gain another lungful of air before death. A hungry person might throw a rock through the window of a bakery. Even taking aspects of domination and humiliation into account, rape is still a shortcut for sexual gratification.

Terrorists and insurgents – especially in today's world – are often motivated by Maslow's fourth and fifth tier needs (but street gangs and terrorists are also capable of recruiting people who are in need of companionship too.) As needs are fulfilled, the commitment to the organization is likely to strengthen bonds and reinforce belief, often to a point of "no return" where no other existence seems possible.

Between Wilson and Maslow, a disturbing thought emerges. Most crime in human history has been to achieve the primary tiers of the hierarchy – almost all of the crime detectable in historical accounts of, for example, Shakespeare's or Johnson's London or Pre-Revolutionary France reflects issues of survival, shelter and sometimes the need for companionship and sex. The modern serial killer or sexual predator can only really be found in history among those whose survival was almost assured due to their high status in society (men like the Emperor Caligula, or Pope Alexander VI and his son Cesare Borgia). However, in modern society, survival becomes less of a problem for all of its members and makes it more likely that criminal behavior in response to fourth and fifth tier needs will become more common. In short, prosperity may bring more terrorism, not less.

In the end, terrorism remains almost impossible to accurately define. But its essential characteristics can be described.

The Characteristics of Terrorism

Terror can be and often is used in war, as a means of governance; and as the chosen conflict method of small groups – who are described as terrorists. These styles of conflict also show how terrorism is inherently indiscriminate in its effects, and how potential victims have no way of ensuring their safety, even when they completely submit to all that is demanded of them.

⁸. Maslow's theory evolved over his professional life, but the final presentation (mostly concerned with explaining Self Actualization) can be found in his last book *Motivation and Personality*. Although Maslow's theories have long been overtaken by continuing work on motivational behavior, it has the virtue (to the author) of being simple and has been widely taught for many years.

⁹. Colin M. Wilson; *A Criminal History of Mankind*; Grafton; London; 1984

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

A film of Hitler's 1940 victory in France was shown to audiences in Europe's remaining neutral countries to spread fear and defeatism across the continent. Stalin's terror through the NKVD (later the KGB) and the Purges atomized Soviet society, destroying even the very thought of opposition. Contemporary terrorists often appear as shadowy figures of hidden purpose and terrible power. This is not new. An ancient Chinese adage advises: "*Kill one, frighten ten thousand.*" According to turn-of-the-century anarchists, terrorism is "*Propaganda by deed*", while for American analyst Brian Jenkins, "*Terrorism is theater.*"

Almost invariably, terrorist action involves violence or the threat of violence that lies outside the accepted norms of behavior. Deliberately killing civilians in war is forbidden by Canon Law, the Geneva Conventions, and the rest of the body of work that comprise the laws of war for Western Civilization even if, as Hitler so frequently demonstrated, these laws are often more honored in the breach than the observance.

Stalin, Pol Pot, and Saddam Hussein ruled without legal restraint of any kind; and modern terrorist groups wage a form of war that is equally lawless. Note too that the victims of terror sometimes adopt similar methods in response. Before the end of World War II, Allied air forces targeted civilians. Nations threatened by Communist insurgency have sometimes resorted to terroristic suppression. Moreover, it is not unknown for excessive counter-terrorist methods to eventually seduce police and military into resembling the enemy that they are fighting. As Friedrich Nietzsche observed: "*He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze overlong into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you.*" Terrorists know this is true, and often work to achieve this transition in the society they attack.

These then are the essential characteristics of terrorism:

- It can be used in war, in governance, and as a free-standing form of conflict.
- It generally seeks an audience far wider than its actual circle of victims, and the constant message is "*Be afraid!*"
- It sanctions violence that knows no laws or limits save those set by the perpetrators, and it invites a copy-cat response.
- Terrorist violence is inherently indiscriminate in its effects.

In addition to these four essentials that are common to all terror, the small group conflict method (terrorism proper) has some more characteristics of its own:

- Because they operate outside the law, terrorist groups are covert. Members conceal their allegiance or, if they are known to the authorities, they evade arrest.
- It uses violence against individuals, small groups, communities and states to advance a quasi-political agenda such as religious extremism, nationalism, minority grievances, single-issues (such as animal rights), or a radical ideology.
- By their small size and covert nature, terror groups present few visible assets other than their own members' lives. In contrast, a targeted society offers endless assets as potential targets for the terrorists. This asymmetry makes it

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

very difficult for governments which are constrained by the rule of law to establish a strategy of deterrence against terrorism, and it tends to push the authorities onto the defensive. For terrorists, success sometimes invites vulnerability, for as they grow in power, they tend to accumulate resources and sites that finally do offer targets for response.

- Authorities within nations that subject themselves to the rule of law are politically and legally accountable. Terrorists are not. The latter make their own justifications, reject the law and conventional morality. Nevertheless, to satisfy their supporters, they might set their own flexible codes of “legitimate targets.”
- To enable a covert group to propagate its political message, terrorists often establish front organizations that operate within the law. Some terrorists may belong to overt fronts, as well as the covert “military” wing. Such a partnership is characterized by the relationship between the Provisional Wing of the IRA and Sinn Fein.
- In the course of spreading fear beyond the actual victims, terrorists often select symbolic targets like cultural sites or high ranking individuals (such as Lord Louis Mountbatten, murdered along with several family members in 1979 by the IRA), or a representative asset such as the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Indeed, a target’s symbolic worth to the terrorist may be far greater than its real political or material value.
- Terrorists typically use the media to portray themselves as “Robin Hood” heroes or their modern day incarnations such as Pretty Boy Floyd or John Dillinger, to magnify the impact of their operations, to demonstrate their invincibility, and to spread a “climate of collapse” in society. Consequently, operations are often planned for their news value. This is not a cynical exercise, as terrorists usually see themselves as heroic figures armed with a vision and courage which is lacking among the poor plodding masses. Many of them are acting out a heroic fantasy.

These characteristics provide only a general guide. Confusion over what is and what is not terrorism continues.¹⁰ Insurgent groups often have formed standing bodies of guerrillas, and thus can sometimes have their rights defined under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and other portions of contemporary Western Military Law. However, if such a group still practices small group terrorism, it is – for the purposes of this study – still considered to be a terrorist group. The US State Department, in its annual report “*Patterns of Global Terrorism*” includes several groups that maintain guerrilla forces but also practice terrorism.

¹⁰ These characteristics of terrorism were first published by John C. Thompson and Maurice Tugwell in “The Character of Terrorism”, Mackenzie Institute, 1996.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

On Motivation

Terrorists and insurgents – especially in today's world – are usually motivated by Maslow's fourth and fifth tier needs. The literature on criminology, sociology and motivation in terrorism is impressive, vast, and contradictory; and there is no standard "type" of terrorist. Many commentators have noticed that a majority of terrorists (of those that have been studied) have symptoms of inadequacy, which leads them to be attracted to causes that can meet their needs or let them fulfill dreams of leadership and heroism.¹¹

There have been commonly held public assumptions and assertions about terrorism, and who is attracted to it, but few of these stand up to scrutiny. For a start, few terrorists are psychopathic or mentally ill. Terrorist groups and organized criminal societies alike both need their members to be able to rely on each other in order to function. A psychopath is unlikely to accept orders, live under discipline, or refrain from acting independently according to the impulse of the moment. Also, as a number of writers have indicated, ordinary men and women are perfectly capable of conditioning themselves to kill and we still don't really understand why; it may be that Barbara Ehrenreich's musings in *Blood Rites* are more accurate than most.¹²

It should be noted that while ordinary terrorists seldom exhibit psychopathic traits, the founders and leaders of some terrorist groups certainly have been known to behave this way. Velupillai Prabhakaran (of the LTTE) has been known to arrange the destruction of his senior commanders for suspected treason, and has been described by some outside observers as a megalomaniac. Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK has been described as secretive, enigmatic (a term also assigned to the LTTE leader), uncomfortable around others, and is likewise known to kill followers who question his will.¹³

While terrorists do seem to be action-oriented there are people in other trades who could share these characteristics – fire fighters, police officers and soldiers for example. But why do some people gravitate toward being coyotes and others toward being sheep dogs? Maslow's points on motivation apply equally to both, especially in a world where most of us are sheep. However, the main difference must lie with a predilection towards an ideology of some kind.

The self-taught philosopher and longshoreman Eric Hoffer, whose 1951 classic *The True Believer* has been republished yet again, goes on at length about the motivations of those attracted to strong ideologies: "*They see their lives and the present as spoiled beyond remedy and they are ready to wreck and waste both; hence their recklessness and will to chaos and anarchy. They also crave to dissolve their spoiled, meaningless selves in some soul-stirring spectacular communal undertaking...*"¹⁴ This could describe the

¹¹ See chapter 3 of Stephan Segaller's *Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s*; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1987.

¹² Barbara Ehrenreich; *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War*, (Metropolitan Books, New York, 1997)

¹³ Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why*; Library of Congress, Washington, 1999.

¹⁴ Eric Hoffer; *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*; HarperCollins, New York, 1966; pgs 24-25.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

rank and file (as well as the leadership) of many terrorist groups. It is hard to imagine any Police Force or Fire Department seeking to hire such people, although a few armies have done so over the centuries.

It might be an over-simplification, but the sheep dogs (firefighters, police, soldiers and such) might be individuals who seek authority and validation, but they also have an ethic of service, and an impulse to protect. This is something that seldom can be said about coyotes or terrorists.

The attraction towards a strong ideology also lies with internal characteristics. The world of terrorism is rife with *'histories of childhood deprivation and narcissistic wounds ... with a deficient sense of self-esteem, and inadequately integrated personalities ... loners, alienated individuals who did not fit ... extreme extroverts – the self centered individual with little regard for the feelings of others ... neurotic hostility ... projecting the person's own hostility onto the social environment.'*¹⁵

The one sure lesson to draw from this is that the cause a terrorist espouses has little to do with the need to commit violence, but the cause they adopt will certainly shape the violence that they undertake. A terrorist is someone already predisposed to violence and the cause is secondary to its use as a justification. For example, among those who have attacked Israelis with terrorism, a full spectrum of ideologies from nationalist, Marxist, leftist, radical right and religious sources have been pressed into service to shape and justify their attacks.

Admittedly, some terrorists do have causes that might justify violence, although they usually first eliminated or suppressed all those who recommended a non-violent approach to the cause. Others have had to create a cause or adapt an existing ideology to excuse their intended behavior. It is not so much that the ends justify the means for a terrorist, it is rather that the means are attractive enough to require the invention of an end.

Hoffer discusses the mutability of belief in his book on ideologues and pointed out – for example – that in the early 1930s, German Nazis and Communists regarded each other as an excellent source of recruits.¹⁶ The ability of Al-Qaeda to recruit Hoffer's "misfits" in Western Society should not go unmentioned either, as they have recruited criminals and aimless youths from non-Muslim backgrounds in Britain, France and the United States, as can be evinced from John Walker Lindh (aka Abdul Hamid), the Courtailler brothers, Jose Padilla (aka Abdullah al-Muhajir) and Richard Reid.

In the aftermath of the World Trade Centre bombing, Western attitudes and responses to it have largely gelled into the traditional camps that endlessly debated strategy and approaches to previous ideological enemies in the 1930s and the Cold War. Those who

¹⁴. Dr Jerrold Post, as cited in *Invisible Armies* (pg. 82) Dr Post is a psychologist whose papers on individual and group dynamics in terrorism between 1985 and 1990 have attracted much attention. Also see his paper "Individual and Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior" In *World Congress of Psychiatry, Psychiatry: The State of the Art*, 6, New York, Plenum, 1985; or "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces", Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism; Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

¹⁶ This relationship is also well illustrated by contemporary accounts from SA members – see Kurt Massmann's anecdote "A meeting hall brawl" in George Mossel's *Nazi Culture*; Grosset & Dunlap, New York, 1966.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

could be characterized as liberals, with their fundamental belief that perfection of human nature is possible, looked for external causes for Islamic fundamentalist terrorism – blaming poverty and implying, somehow, that cultural misunderstandings are also at fault. The conservative camp relies on experience, history, and a pessimistic view of human behavior: When it comes to dealing with external threats, they are right to point out that poverty has little to do with generating terrorism. Hungry people might steal, but they don't hijack airliners to use in suicide attacks.

The conservative view on the motives behind Islamic fundamentalism has been championed by Daniel Pipes when he pointed out that most of those who lead fundamentalist groups are well-to-do, often well educated, and likely to be quite familiar with the West.¹⁷ In fact, prosperity, education and Western acculturation appear to make it more likely that an ordinary Muslim might support the fundamentalist cause, thus underscoring the value of self-actualization and issues of self-identity as the prime attraction for ideologies that employ terrorism.

One of the main sub-texts in Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld* concerns the violence that often erupts when people feel that their identity is threatened, or lacks the recognition they feel it deserves.¹⁸ What makes matters worse, of course, is that those who favor a militant defence of romanticized concepts of their identity (Jihad) must resort to using the instruments and products of the global economy (McWorld) to carry out their struggle. What Barber might not have considered is how this contradiction can result in a cycle of accelerating frustration for those who are predisposed to violence and crave leadership. This contradiction also means that such people must develop a separate internal reality to justify their actions. Once that reality is created, it can be – as Eric Hoffer and Arthur Koestler indicate – impossible to dispense with.

It is worth mentioning that the literature created by and for the supporters of terrorist groups is almost invariably filled with heroic and utopian images – often of a totally impossible quality. The xeroxed 'zines and newsletters supporting the Animal Liberation Front and radical environmentalists dwell on a wonderful future when, divorced from technology, we live at one in the woods with Brother Wolf and Sister Deer. Al Qaeda videos cassettes project images of stalwart hardened fighters unshakeable in resolve and unbeatable in battle – reflecting both the Muslim World's thirst for heroes and the usual fantasy framework that terrorists construct for themselves. Other groups have similar dreams, and against these lovely fantasies, any amount of mundane reality can be easily dispensed with.

The flip side of these images lies with the resentments that lie in the heart of documents like the "*Convent of Hamas, Islamic Resistance Movement*", the 1998 al Qaeda "*World Islamic Front Statement*", the IRA's 1919 "*Declaration of Independence*", the 1995 ETA Manifesto to the Basque Country, or George Rockwell's 1965 American Nazi Manifesto. Even more perfect is the classic 1970 FLQ Manifesto – a long diatribe against the owners of companies and political figures who smoke cigars and take vacations in Florida. The FLQ Manifesto was purportedly on behalf of the "guys" who worked in the factories that

¹⁵. Daniel Pipes; *Militant Islam Reaches America*; W.W. Norton and Company, New York. 2002 (See pgs. 54-61)

¹⁶. Benjamin R. Barber; *Jihad vs. McWorld*; Ballantine Books, New York, 1995.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

made this lifestyle possible. In all of these documents, it is possible to feel the rage of the terrorist because the world is not as he feels that it should be, and his own yearning to be a heroic leader.

Because the terrorist's motivation is fundamentally internal, he may continue his "struggle" long after the external conditions that generated the cause have changed. This explains the persistence of groups like the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Basque ETA, or the Provisional Wing of the IRA – all grimly hanging on decades after they were formed.

Maslow's fifth tier of self-actualization needs suggests that many terrorists cannot abandon whatever struggle they have created and sustained because their sense of identity is wrapped around their new 'revolutionary' self-image. For a terrorist, his war gives him influence, respect and fear; he sees himself as the agent of history or the visionary builder of a New Jerusalem. Being a janitor or filing clerk just doesn't carry the same prestige.

The terrorist's cause, grievances or ideology are usually exaggerated or distorted – often to a totally unrealistic extent – to allow violence and confirm the terrorist's heroic view of himself. Lenin once observed that the revolutionary was in pursuit of a "higher truth", and as a result of his pursuit of this truth – lesser "truths" could be abandoned. Ever since this observation, insurgents and terrorists have lied to their followers, to the outside world, and to themselves. The net effect is that their view of their motivating cause and our view of it are often impossibly separate.

Those who have ever tried to counter illogic with logic can understand the futility of trying to debate causes and justification with a terrorist or one of his supporters. If illogic has been allowed to stand long enough to create true believers – absolute partisans of a particular cause who have allowed the tenets of their belief to substitute for argument, self-doubt, or a conscience – then logic will not long penetrate their inner "magical aura" defences.¹⁹ Any unwelcome point that penetrates into these mental defences is re-shaped so that it can be dismissed, perhaps by being "dialectally incorrect," or rendered inaccurate through the marvelous reality that only an embrace of conspiracy theory can make believable.

This habit of belief (which covers for mendacity and self-deception) also extends to the political fronts and fundraising arms of terrorist groups. Because they have no interest in our "truth", there is no reason for a member or core supporter of a terrorist organization to be honest on the witness stand, in front of a media microphone, in an interview with an immigration officer, or when making a welfare application. Nor is there any reason why their word should be accepted at face value under any other circumstances.

It is also common for terrorist or insurgent groups to seek to dominate the community they claim to represent – in order to ensure an unchallenged supremacy of their leadership and message. Typically, the first victims of any terrorist group are moderate leaders from the same background who oppose them and their message; and then any other people who don't want to be dominated by extremists. This point must be

¹⁹ Much of this mental landscape was explored by the essayist Arthur Koestler, particularly in *The Yogi and the Commissar*, or *The Invisible Writing*.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

remembered when a terrorist argues about the “justice” of his cause – he may have started fighting for it by murdering or intimidating those who preferred to pursue the same ends through more peaceful means. In a world that has witnessed Mahatma Gandhi, Lech Walensa, Martin Luther King, the repentant Nelson Mandella and Aung San Suu Kyi, the claim of both heroism and legitimacy by any terrorist should be automatically suspect.

This last collection of true heroes raises another point. Terrorism against a democratic nation cannot ever be justified or excused. Gandhi and King reflect the fundamental point that moral suasion and legitimate protest are enough in themselves to win success – provided that the cause is worthy. Even non-democratic Western nations can be moved without recourse to violence: Mandella (who renounced the violence of his own youth) and Walensa won their political struggles in spite of the violence and intimidation arrayed against them in Apartheid South Africa and Communist Poland.

Characteristics of Modern Terrorist Groups

Normally, terrorism and insurgency are small group forms of warfare, undertaken for political objectives, and usually initiated by leaders who use violence to seek influence, or to express themselves. They know no limitations to the violence they intend to commit – except through the normal limitations of their means and opportunities. Terrorist groups tend to be covert, as long as they are small, and rely heavily on the normal protections for individuals within the law, while operating inside democratic nations.

The relationship between terrorists and the societies they attack is normally described as “asymmetrical”, in that the terrorists might lack the resources and power of a nation-state, but they have a wealth of targets and opportunities at their disposal. By contrast, the frustrated agents of the nation-states are hemmed in by regulations, laws, individual rights, jurisdictions and procedures, and thus have difficulty in applying their power, even when they manage to identify their targets. While the terrorist’s desire to appear heroic is partly filled by the enormous difference in *latent* power between him and a nation-state, in terms of *useable* power, the advantage normally lies with the terrorist – until he is identified and cornered. In short, the terrorist is no hero, rather he is a bully who can only operate because of the inability of his target to fight him effectively.

In the early 1970s, dozens of terrorist groups appeared around the world. Most of them were pitted against a single government, and drew most of their support from inside a single country -- although many of them did draw support from the Soviet Union or its proxies and did cooperate with each other at times. Still, by the early 1990s, groups like the Red Brigades in Italy or Action Direct in France had virtually vanished. The survivors, and the groups that have developed in the 1990s, have assumed additional characteristics. These include:

1. *Flexible organizations and networking*: The rigid cell structure of classical insurgency is too vulnerable to modern police and intelligence agencies. Instead, the most survivable structure consists of a loose “network” style of tenuously

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

connected cells, where individuals with a common background (usually derived from ethnic identity) and some shared experiences can form and reform as required. The al Qaeda network is an example of this, although it rather foolishly developed a central node and a semi-rigid planning structure in Afghanistan under the presumption that the Taliban control of the region guaranteed its safety. Elsewhere in the Middle East, these trends are demonstrated by the rise of groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad which supplanted rigid older groups like the Abu Nidal Organization. These networks use a mélange of semi-independent cells, fronts and sympathetic organizations that communicate with each other and exchange resources. Instead of a rigid pyramidal structure, hierarchies tend to be flatter, or shallower, which results in quicker response time to threats and opportunities. Also, without a definitive leadership structure, gathering intelligence on them becomes much more difficult.

2. *Redundancy in fundraising and political arms*: The strength of any international terrorist group depends on its funding and political fronts, and they must be protected by forming loose networks rather than a single organization. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has one main international front organization – the World Tamil Movement – but it spins off dozens of satellite groups in every host country, and some groups will use names that betray no hint of their origin at all. This allows the illusion of a broad-band of community activism when dozens of social, student, human-rights, religious, and business groups start campaigning for a particular purpose without any overt reference to the main organization. Fundraising is equally dispersed, with dozens of independent legitimate, quasi-legitimate and illegal operations all being used to raise money, rather than one big single entity that might be vulnerable to legal and civil action.
3. *International fundraising techniques*: The terrorist groups of the late 1960s and early 1970s depended heavily on a combination of bank-robbery, hostage taking for ransom, and foreign sponsorship to pay for their activities. However, the first two activities became increasingly risky for the perpetrators (especially given the huge improvements in handling hostage situations that developed in the 1970s). Surviving groups are those that diversified their fundraising activities by taking advantage of their exile/immigrant communities in the Western world, and who turned to organized crime. The larger communities could be used as a base and a protective shield for a plethora of enterprises ranging from human trafficking, narcotics, extortion and “war taxes”, business and immigration fraud, counterfeiting, money laundering, and so on.²⁰ Terrorist groups also utilize these communities to manipulate host governments in the West to provide them with tax dollars to support “cultural” and “social” activities carried out by front organizations. Moreover, by hiding behind cultural, social, and human rights organizations, a terrorist network can deter or delay unwelcome attention from the authorities in a host country.

²⁰ A prescient study on the diversity of Terrorist fundraising techniques was written by James Adams; *The Financing of Terror*; Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

4. *A claim to exclusive representation:* As the terrorist normally craves leadership and influence, it is almost inevitable that he will try to eliminate (literally or otherwise) all rival sources of influence within the community he claims to lead. First to go are usually those who represent more moderate perspectives (and who thus deny the 'legitimacy' of the terrorists' emotional preference for violence); second are potential rival terrorists who refuse to be subordinated. It should be pointed out that this trait existed earlier among 'national liberation' movements; largely as the terrorists were competing for a chance to form a government after winning their struggle. For example, much of the violence attendant in the struggle against Apartheid came out of the rivalry between the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress; and between the ANC and the Zulus – who refused to follow a political movement that they did not lead.
5. *An attraction to organized crime:* As the main purpose of a terrorist group is to confront political authority, raising money is usually – in the early stages – a secondary activity for all its necessity. However, as the terrorist group is already engaged in illegal activities anyway, generating revenues through organized criminal activities means no real additional weight of punishment (the old British expression about how one may as well be hung for stealing a sheep as a lamb comes to mind). Moreover, activities such as trafficking in narcotics and contraband represent an additional means of undermining the authorities. For their part, organized criminals find that insurgents can, in the latter's quest for authority of their own, sometimes shelter their activities. The relationship between terrorism and organized crime can become blurred, and many insurgent groups have slowly evolved into criminal societies with the passage of years.
6. *Geographical dispersion:* The leading terrorist groups in the world today, the Tamil Tigers and the Islamic Fundamentalists, have extensive global networks built up not just in their respective homelands, but also dispersed among immigrant communities throughout the Western World. Whereas the groups of the 1970s usually restricted themselves to one or two countries, the modern terrorist who is fleeing from an outraged authority in one country can hide himself among people with an identical ethno-cultural background in a dozen other nations – a result of new immigration patterns in the aftermath of the Second World War.
7. *Global communications:* The computer age has allowed a revolution in communications, with international direct dialing, e-mail and the web, electronic banking and much more. While shared experience, occasional face to face meetings, and traditional social interactions are still vital, they are no longer essential for the running of a terrorist network. Indeed, given the billions of messages fired around the world every day, it may be that electronic meetings are sometimes safer from the attention of the authorities than physical ones.
8. *Increasingly violent ideologies:* The terrorist groups of the 1970s tended to view undecided populations as a group from which support could be drawn as the inevitable revolution (according to the Marxist theory) approached. In a lesser sense, they often looked for public sympathy, and understood that frightening everyone was at least counter-productive. Contemporary groups tend to be much

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

more bloody-minded, with mindsets that divide the world into the enlightened/destined-for-salvation “us,” and the unenlightened/disposable “them”. Aum Shinri Kyo, Timothy McVeigh, and al Qaeda respectively saw the general population of the Western world as doomed, hopelessly compromised or as the enemy itself.

9. *Expanded target lists*: The essence of terrorism includes its seeming randomness and talent for searching out weakness. The Provisional Wing of the IRA considered “legitimate military targets” to include soldiers on leave in Europe; the wives and children of soldiers; ceremonial parades where tourists are present; a Remembrance Day Ceremony; and recruiting booths at trade fairs. Latin American death squads in countries that had been bedeviled by guerrillas have seldom bothered to hunt armed insurgents in the jungle when there were – for example – unarmed union organizers, schoolteachers, nuns, peasants, or irritating journalists to murder. The Islamic Fundamentalists tend to be even less discriminating.
10. *Assured Identity*: Modern terrorist groups tend to establish a clear modus operandi that precludes the need to send communiqués. Older groups used to send letters to the media to describe why they had committed their actions, placing their deeds in an ideological framework while usually blaming the authorities or the target for the terrorists' actions, and to seek publicity. Modern groups often do not bother because the manner of their actions and selection of targets speaks for itself. Moreover, many of them have no wish to communicate with their target at all. However, in some cases, an insurgent group may be competing for influence and prestige in another audience altogether. For example, sundry Palestinian groups might not bother to send a communiqué to the Israelis after committing an attack, except that status and influence inside much of the Palestinian community depends on a demonstrated ability to harm the Israelis, and it is vitally important to claim credit for an attack to this audience.

Except for a few highly specialized single interest groups (such as the Animal Liberation Front and related “ecotage” groups) virtually all modern terrorists have become international in scope and far more dangerous than the progenitor groups of the late 1960s and ‘70s. They are tougher, more resilient, less likely to be easily confronted, and far more likely to push roots deep into the broader community of their cultural compatriots. There is no easy way to deal with them.

The Marxist and quasi-Marxist mindsets that dominated the terrorists of the 1960s and ‘70s involved a revolutionary endgame in which the terrorists could both provoke a civil war, and then win it. They saw the authorities of their own nations as the government they sought to supplant, and – wherever they grew large enough – sought to create alternate institutions to rival those of the government – e.g. people's courts and schools.

While most contemporary groups are usually (but not always) much less interested in the annoyances of providing responsible government, they still must sometimes provide institutions of their own within the community they wish to lead. Hizbollah and Hamas, for example, provide schools, orphanages, and hospitals in Lebanon and the Palestinian community. Other groups claim to provide such benefits – refugee relief and

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

resettlement is a favorite cover for fundraising activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, while refugee/immigrant services is a major income earner for their front organizations inside Canada.²¹ While fundraising for these seemingly innocuous charitable organizations seems innocent enough in the credulous West, it should be remembered that – for a terrorist group – building a nursery or medical clinic is still a political act whose ultimate purpose is to further a terrorist's cause and cement his hold on a community.

The threat posed by modern groups is also complex and can be difficult to anticipate. There are several levels of activity all of which can be used to develop an attack of some kind, including ones of a purely psychological nature. However, given the different styles of organization and size in modern terrorism, some broad assumptions can be safely made.

| <u>Level of Activity</u> | <u>Threats</u> | <u>Examples and Effects</u> |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| Meta-Network | Well coordinated well planned attacks; with major loss of life and/or destruction; as networks of groups interact. | Al Qaeda: Attacks like those of September 11 th 2001. High risk of attacks with weapons of mass destruction. |
| Network | Extended campaigns of activity – often involving well trained cadres, suicide attackers, and/or sophisticated weaponry. | West Bank Palestinian Groups or the LTTE: Recruitment of suicide bombers, highly specialized cadres of expert bombers, etc. |
| Coordinated Cells | Shared resources and greater risk of significant events. | Groups like the IRA or ETA. Campaigns of attacks with car bombs, military style assaults on key sites, etc. |
| Autonomous Cells | Numerous episodes of low-level activity, such as arson and vandalism, some significant events are possible. | Animal Liberation Front: Typical activities from most terrorists groups around the world. |
| Autonomous Individuals | Lone attacks | Timothy McVeigh: Threats range from minor vandalism to truck bombs. |
| Political Arm | Influence Operations Propaganda Lobbying Lawsuits | Recruitment of supporters, alliances, and new members; Intimidation of politicians and media (especially in multicultural societies); creation of dissonance for neutral audiences. |
| Financial Arm | Criminal activities | Costs and social pathologies associated with narcotics, |

²¹ This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

people smuggling and human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, extortion rackets, etc.

The threat posed by the larger groups are even more considerable when one considers that individual cells, and members within them, are still capable of acting independently, but they have the advantage of the increased training offered by the resources of a larger group. Timothy McVeigh was an anomaly in that his one-man attack in Oklahoma City was the most destructive ever achieved by a lone bomber, but he was a trained (and decorated) soldier who also had access to the literature and experience of the American radical right; most solitary or small group terrorists are far more amateurish. The al Qaeda network has sought to generate hundreds of potential McVeighs with comparable levels of training and more focused motivation. Even if the al Qaeda meta-network is reduced, these autonomous cells and individuals will remain.

In considering the capabilities of terrorist groups, it is hard to consider their political and fundraising arms as being able to present threats in their own right. However, even in the mid-19th Century, Chinese Triads supported the Taiping Rebels against the Manchu Dynasty by becoming involved in the opium trade. They recognized that the trade was both profitable to their cause, and destabilizing to the government: Mao and the Viet Cong copied the tactic with the added refinement that they could point to the social pathologies caused by narcotics and use them for propaganda value (drugs, naturally, were strictly forbidden in territories controlled by Mao's Communists or the VC). Other criminal enterprises can be almost as lucrative as narcotics, but tend not to provide the same propaganda advantage.

The political arm of a terrorist group is vital for a number of purposes, but the development of a multicultural ethos in Western nations has let this element become capable of mounting attacks of its own. Throughout much of the Western World, political leaders and public commentators shy away from appearing to be critical of minority issues; and insurgent/terrorist groups press this advantage as far as they can. Supporters and front organizations for (by way of example) Hezbollah tell Western audiences that they must tolerate the Islamic organization's intolerance. Supporters of the LTTE cling to the skirts of human rights organizations and insist that, in the Western spirit of multiculturalism, they are automatically entitled to our acceptance of their use of violence to create a separate ethnic state in Sri Lanka.

Politicians, journalists, and commentators who persist in their refusal to have flexible standards of toleration and morality can find themselves described as "Racists," get their offices and homes picketed by screaming mobs, and may even be sued for libel. Others find it easy to be flexible, and may then find themselves being rewarded for doing so by being given photo-opportunities, pride of place at cultural events, and campaign volunteers at election time. This might seem like a harmless threat, but it is easy to guess at the effects of a couple of more decades of such conditioning in Western political circles -- we shall be led by nothing but jellyfish if this sort of evolutionary shaping of the political process continues.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

As a last point on the ideological side of a terrorist organization – if their message becomes pervasive enough, it may be that they inspire actions by unconnected individuals. In the late 19th Century, lone assassins were often unconnected with the Anarchist movement, but took their message to heart as they went out to shoot political leaders and captains of industry. The Patriot Militias and other elements of the extreme American Right have, after decades of infiltration by police and private actors, adopted what they call “leaderless resistance,” and expect individuals attracted by their ideological statements to act autonomously when the time comes. Likewise, Islamic Fundamentalism (like the Anarchists or various extreme nationalist groups have done in the past) is capable of getting disturbed individuals to act on their own too – as can be illustrated by Hesham Mohamed Modayet’s attack on people at an El Al ticket lineup in Los Angeles International Airport on July 4^h, 2002.

Remolding Culture

The best-selling British fantasy novelist Terry Pratchett, in a co-operative series of essays with Ian Stewart (Professor of Mathematics at the University of Warwick) and Jack Cohen (a science writer and reproductive biologist), defined mankind not so much as *Homo Sapiens Sapiens*, but as *Pan Narrans* – the story-telling ape.²² Stories shape us, educate us, and define us. Subconsciously or consciously, we tend to think in plotlines and consider people along the lines of archetypes. The stories we tell each other and ourselves define who we are.

If we all tell standard stories, the plot device that terrorists use is quite simple: Heroic band of visionaries take action to redress great wrongs done by monstrous evil power and promises a brave new world for all who follow them. In telling this story, the terrorist is playing to three audiences: Himself first; the audience whom he wishes to woo with his daring prowess and epic vision second; and everyone else (who should be properly terrified and awed by the hero’s audacity) third.

One of the daily problems that *Pans Narrans* must endure is that all the pieces of the plot device do not necessarily fit in their proper places. Some terrorists will go to enormous lengths – both in the internal realm of their own thoughts and world-view, and to the greater audience – to hammer the script into place.

The internal struggle can take years of informal internal conditioning to develop, but most terrorists do begin their campaigns with an intact set of internal beliefs about the world and their role in it. The literature on cognitive dissonance and cognitive theory is also extensive and rich, but the basic theories outlined by pioneering psychologists Leon Festinger and George Kelly in the 1950s have much application here.²³ Essentially, people construct meanings to support interpretations and outcomes in a framework that gives support to their own preferences. While we all do this to a limited extent, those

²² If you must, see Pratchett, Stewart & Cohen; *The Science of Discworld II: The Globe*, London, 2002 – although prior exposure to Pratchett’s Discworld fantasy novels would be extremely helpful.

²³ See Leon Festinger’s *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (first published in 1957) and George Alexander Kelly’s *The Psychology of Personal Constructs* (1955).

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

who want to see a different interpretation of the world from the mainstream will interpret all events and developments differently from the rest of us. The conspiracy-myth addict will cheerfully extrapolate all facts to support his construct of hidden meanings behind events; the ideologue (and revisionist historians) will subordinate everything to his belief system; and the terrorist will do both.

For the terrorist, the construction of a vile de-humanized enemy makes it easier both to convince him or herself of the rightness of the cause, and to commit violence against the demonized authority. Even then, it is perhaps significant to note that the terrorists of 30 years ago sometimes needed to work themselves up to the level where they could commit lethal violence by staging a series of “learning” attacks with simple Molotov cocktails and pipe-bombs hurled at empty offices, and then progressing to time bombs, and finally to becoming psychologically ready to personally deal death to another human being. Today’s terrorist, with his lethal suicide attack, is often the product of a much more sophisticated conditioning system.

It must also be said that suicide bombers are not born; they are manufactured – usually by isolating the impressionable from all outside influences and ceaselessly conditioning them. The LTTE had been the world’s leading group for suicide attacks until recently, but evidently the Palestinian Authority’s education system is equal to the challenge of convincing large numbers of youngsters to immolate themselves.

The terrorist, even as he completes his internal conditioning, will also start working on the second audience of potential supporters, and will try to persuade them to see the world his way. Sometimes, this is fairly easy; but often, some very elaborate mental constructions are required.

Jacques Ellul, in his masterwork on propaganda, essentially described it as a process designed to get people to take a particular action (or inaction) and convince them to get to a condition of self-reinforcement to sustain their new belief system.²⁴ Propaganda tends to fall into three general categories based on the approach that is used: Freudian, Pavlovian, or using a system based on Dewey’s educational theories. For the first two approaches, it is necessary to have a degree of preconditioning to associate people with the symbols and concepts that the propagandist intends to use and manipulate.

Sometimes, the preconditioning phase is very easy. For example, both the Irish Republicans and the Protestant militants in Ulster needed to do very little to familiarize their intended audiences with their symbols and concepts – both sides already had very well developed mythologies and versions of Anglo-Irish history that most of their audiences already knew very well. It is also significant that Sikh militants fell back on the garb of 16-17th Century warriors – who had to defend the emerging Sikh religion against ferocious persecution by Muslim invaders. The inference was that the Punjabi insurgents were again defending the faith. Marxism is a well-defined political philosophy (even if it has been discredited) that can be easily grabbed by any malcontent and pressed into service with only some local refinements.

Other ideologies can be much stranger. Sometimes, as was the case with the Soviets, the collision between reality and their ideological gestalt left people with bifurcated belief

²⁴ E. Ellul, Jacques: *Propaganda: Formation of Mens' Attitudes*, New York; 1965

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

systems where it was possible – even necessary – to hold rival sets of views at the same time. This seems to be the case with the Colombian Guerrilla group FARC, where the daily reality of their existence revolves around narcotics and a brutal war, but the justification for the struggle requires the leadership to earnestly mouth Marxist theory to outside visitors and other Colombians, even though FARC leaders don't appear to accept the ideology in any real sense.

An even stranger ideology appears among the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), where the outside appearances to the world and many supporters is that of a conventional national liberation movement striving for the independence of an oppressed minority (or so the Tigers claim). Within the movement, only occasionally revealed to outsiders, there appears to be a “superman” myth in that some leaders have described the Tamils as a “... race which has achieved perfection much ahead of any country in the world”.²⁵ Pro-Tiger websites also allege that the Tamils (who are mostly Hindus and therefore sometimes defined by the caste system) were really a race of warriors whose true history was suppressed by the jealous British. Even stranger is one suggestive photograph of the LTTE's leader that shows him in his usual fatigues and patented far-off-look-of-destiny expression on his face and his finger on a map, with the caption reading “*Wherever the Sun God points with his finger, surely rays of light will rush to illuminate all of Tamil Eelam.*”²⁶

The world has experienced such things as the 11th Century Old Man of the Mountains sending out assassins on suicide missions, after they had a hashish addled experience of paradise with a bevy of beauties in his garden, and the bizarre but deadly Kingdom of Heavenly Peace Rebellion in 19th Century China (whose revolt led to the deaths of between 30 and 60 million people). A construct like that of a fanatic cult with a deified leader concealed within the cloak of a national liberation movement should not seem all that unusual: Human beings have killed for stranger things than this.

In the modern world, sustaining belief is difficult, and terrorist groups and their supporters have had to go to extraordinary lengths to ensure their messages remain uninterrupted. The political arms of various terrorist groups will run their own media sources, although the unchallenged perspective that Ellul maintains is necessary for effective propaganda is often difficult to maintain. Still, Hizbollah has its own television stations, al Qaeda releases a lot of videocassettes for its supporters, and just about every group around the world has a website of one kind or another. Even for some domestic groups, like the Animal Liberation Front, websites and the ALF-SOG newspaper are where bragging rights for various actions are exercised and new techniques are proposed.

The ideal situation for an insurgent group has nearly been achieved by the LTTE, where their supporters ensure that no rival Tamil perspectives can be presented to overseas Tamil communities. In Toronto, the largest Sri-Lankan Tamil City in the world, four 24-hour radio stations, 10 weekly newspapers and Tamil Language television shows are pro-

²⁵ Remarks by Sam Durisamy (aka Murugesapillai Duraiswamy) President of the Tamil Eelam Society of Canada, as quoted in the *Toronto Sun*, March 3rd 1996, p.12. Similar sentiments were expressed in correspondence sent to the Mackenzie Institute from individual Tamils during a harassment campaign in early 2000

²⁶ Material provided by a union of Tamil educators in Jaffna as part of a brief opposing the recruitment of grade school students by the LTTE.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

Tiger, or else receive no advertising from within the community and risk intimidating violence. There are also controls over Tamil language DVDs and VHS tapes, to limit the effects of films produced in India's Tamil Nadu State. These allow the Tamil leadership to quickly mobilize large numbers of members of the community for protests, and ensure a high degree of solidarity.²⁷

However, the successful transmission of the insurgent's messages still depends upon the voluntary selection of pro-insurgent media by members of the population they hope to lead. Fortunately for the terrorists, Western authorities are usually uninterested in monitoring domestic media in foreign languages, and even more disinterested in sponsoring alternative viewpoints in Arabic, Punjabi, Spanish, or Tamil to compete with the messages that support the insurgents. This reluctance to contest insurgent propaganda on the airwaves may be a profound weakness.

When it comes to conditioning, few slates are so blank as those of children; and many insurgent and ideological groups have eagerly turned to using them.

The Islamist Sudanese government has been waging a brutal civil war against the Nuba, who want a secular and democratic state within that country's borders. Sudan had hosted bin Laden until the late 1990s, only gently expelling them when pressured and bribed to do so. The cruel irony of this type of brutality being unleashed by a radical Islamist regime cannot be overlooked, especially when Islamic fundamentalists around world whine to the media about Western "crusades," and describe themselves as "victims" of the United States and the West. The Sudanese government's fundamentalist military have tried to systematically starve out the Nuba, raped women to "thin their blood line," and destroyed homes and crops. Nuba children are routinely rounded up by the military, with males forced to take up arms against their own people and females forced into sexual slavery.

The situation for children in Sierra Leone is also horrific. There, UNICEF estimates that as many as 5,000 have served in combat and another 5,400 have been conscripted into support roles. Young people were forced into participating in acts such as hacking off the limbs of civilians. Both the rebels and government are guilty of this heinous practice.

One of the world's worst violators when it comes to using children in combat and terrorist operations is the LTTE. It has repeatedly been cited by international organizations for this practice, yet because it is itself an illegitimate organization, no true form of sanction can be applied to it. The LTTE's dirty secret is that the majority of its combat soldiers are children. The Tigers have become very skilled at manipulating Tamil youth into joining its ranks, and begins recruiting them as young as eight years of age. Older children, already serving in its ranks have been known to attend grade schools and show off their assault rifles and talk about the LTTE's "glory".

Other methods include psychological pressures and threats to family members. Loss of loved ones, and the desperate poverty which exists in LTTE-controlled areas also contribute to the pressures to join. As a former Canadian Ambassador, William Bauer

²⁷ Cheran, Prof. R.; *The Sixth Genre: Memory, History and the Tamil Diaspora Imagination*; Marga Institute, 2001

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter One

points out, these children are given cyanide capsules to swallow in the event of capture and the Tigers are especially fond of employing young girls in suicide bomb attacks. An Amnesty International report described how a 15-year-old Tiger took an infant and beat its head against a wall while holding it by its legs. He got extreme satisfaction from this, especially while hearing its mother scream in horror as the grey matter splattered out.²⁸ This type of action was not at all uncommon when the LTTE tried to ethnically cleanse what it claims as a Tamil homeland.

While the practice of employing children as terrorists and soldiers is common in Asia and Africa, it is not totally unheard of in the Middle East and Latin America. The worst offender in Europe is the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), who in 1994 began this revolting endeavor. Special children's regiments were created and by 1998, it was estimated that as many as 3,000 were recruited, including 300 girls, and a child as young as seven years.²⁹

Here is the ultimate tragedy of terrorism.

Can we Stand?

Terrorism has a long history and has been seen in most societies, especially in those that can be characterized as having republican or democratic governments. For the most part, terrorism can be 'tolerated' and handled as a criminal matter by the authorities, as long as the actions of the terrorists are more of a vexation than a serious challenge to an entire society. For example, Britain has easily withstood the attentions of sundry Irish nationalist terrorists for almost 150 years, without serious harm to its institutions and freedoms. Despite the presence of the Basque ETA, Spain has progressed from being an economic backwater under the rule of Francisco Franco, to becoming one of the world's most vital economies and a fully liberal democratic state.

However, unchecked terrorism can be dangerously corrosive, and many of the new international networks and meta-networks are extremely threatening to the stability of whole nations. This is especially true when the terrorists make full use of their political and fundraising arms to add new dimensions to the threat they pose. Such groups are present in Canada, and few Canadians really understand the peril to which we have become exposed.

²⁸ Amnesty International; "Child Soldiers in Asia: Securing Their Rights"; April 22nd, 1998

²⁹ Amnesty International; "Child Soldiers: UK Among Worst Offenders"; October 18th 1999 [AI, for all the valuable work they do, can be a tad obtuse at times – Child Soldiers in the UK involves Cadets and technical training, not conditioning the young towards suicide bombings and assassinations].

Chapter 2. Terrorist Groups with a Presence in Canada

Terrorism in Canada's History

Canada has a reputation as a haven for terrorists from many different backgrounds. This, unfortunately, is somewhat true, but we may not be quite as open to penetration by insurgents as some critics think. This chapter will look at the groups that are active around the world, and then look at some of those with connections within Canada.

Canadians tend to act surprised to learn that terrorism is present in Canada – a point that does confirm suspicions that many of us know little about our own history. Irish Fenians were a concern around the time of Confederation, and Darcy McGee (one of the Fathers of Confederation) was assassinated by one in 1869. Down through the decades after this, there were few problems inside Canada, although the Ku Klux Klan made an appearance between the World Wars and caused some problems.¹ The other major source for occasional acts of terrorism (usually within their own community) were the Doukhobors, the first of the imported or 'émigré' groups to come into Canada. More would be heard from them after the Second World War.

Canadians are perfectly capable of generating terrorism on their own, although most incidents are minor, and narrowly focused within particular communities. Anthony Kellet catalogued 428 incidents of terrorism originating in Canada during a 30-year period between 1960 and 1989.² These were acts by a variety of actors from the radical Left and Right, Quebec Separatists, the Doukhobors (still), and single issue players such as the Animal Liberation Front and anti-Abortion activists. The majority of these actions (some 200 in all) involved Quebec separatists, and 143 involved actions by the Sons of Freedom subset of the Doukhobors.

Quebec separatists provoked the greatest emergency with the FLQ crisis in 1970, when – 101 years after the death of Darcy McGee -- a Quebec cabinet minister became the second Canadian politician to be assassinated. Considerable attention was also generated by the short-lived career of five radical leftists, who went on a spree in 1982-83 that culminated in a clumsy but massive truck-bomb outside the Litton Industries plant in Toronto in October 1983. Truck bombs and assassinations were unusual, as the vast majority of Canadian terrorist attacks involved Molotov cocktails, pipe bombs, and other unsophisticated forms of attack. Kellet's figures only include actual attacks, not threats, by groups that were formed in Canada and attacking targets inside Canada.

¹ Julian Sher, White Hoods: Canada's Ku Klux Klan; New Star Books, Vancouver, 1983.

² See Anthony Kellet, "Terrorism in Canada: 1960-1992", pgs 285-312 in Violence in Canada: Sociopolitical Perspectives; (Jeffrey Ian Ross ed.), Oxford University Press Canada, 1995

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Terrorism inside Canada from international actors is not a new phenomenon either. Kellet also listed 62 incidents of international/émigré terrorism between 1960 and the end of 1989.³ Most of these involved unsophisticated attacks with pipe-bombs and Molotov cocktails on diplomatic sites – with the Cuban Consulate in Montreal receiving much unwelcome attention from Cuban expatriates during the 1960s. There were some attacks on Yugoslavian targets mounted by Canadian Croatians (who also sponsored some terrorist incidents inside Yugoslavia); some prominent Canadian Jews were among the intended targets of a Black September letter bomb campaign in 1971-72. Two Canadian Marxists also stumbled off to Nicaragua for ‘Solidarity Work’ with the Sandinistas in the late 1980s, but had actually been recruited by a Latin American terrorist group and deliberately involved themselves in the kidnapping of a Brazilian multi-millionaire.

Two other sources of terrorism during this time included the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, and the start of Sikh terrorism inside Canada. The Armenian groups lived a short, but spectacular life, assassinating a Turkish military attaché on Ottawa’s prestigious Island Park Drive in a rush-hour drive by shooting, and staging the 1985 takeover of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa – during which a Canadian security guard was shot to death. Sikh terrorism first appeared in 1979, and has been present in Canada ever since, with the Air India bombing (which exploded in mid-air over the Atlantic off Ireland) being responsible for the deaths of 329 people, 154 of who were Canadian citizens.

Deliberate attacks on Canadian targets abroad have been few and far between – so far. The Canadian Embassy in Peru was bombed (with only minor damage) in 1991, and the Air Canada cargo area in Los Angeles International Airport was bombed by an Armenian group in 1982. Canadian diplomats have had to exercise caution in some postings (Sri Lanka, for instance, where there was a terrorist attack on non-Canadian targets just outside the Canadian Chancery in 1992) but so far they do not seem to have been targeted.

The pace of terrorist violence generated inside Canada has not changed much in the 1990s. While the Canadian radical right is too penetrated to easily reform itself after the collapse of the Heritage Front, it has also been incapable of any significant pre-planned and deliberate violence. The Radical left presents occasional threats -- once with a series of parcel bombs, and with the deliberately planned use of firebombs during “protests”. The Animal Liberation Front is still busy, and an Anti-Abortionist engaged in a series of sniper attacks.

While terrorism is not unknown in Canada, most of the groups generated inside the country can be easily handled by Canadian police (if not always being satisfactorily dealt with by our courts). Things are less sure when considering international terrorism, whether generated abroad, or sustained by émigré groups inside Canada.

³ *Ibid.*

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Groups in the World Today

Terrorism is a common phenomenon, and there are numerous groups scattered around the world. Some are nationalist groups with a quasi-Leftist ideology (Marxist, Maoist, or Trotskyite) that claim to be working to advance the fortunes of a particular ethno-cultural group – usually despite having very little support from the people they purport to represent. Other terrorist organizations are (or were) definitively revolutionary in character, hoping to overthrow the government inside a particular country, and supplant it with some kind of brave new society. Most (but not all) of these groups employ Marxist credos of some kind.

The Palestinians created a number of groups in the 1960s and '70s, working for the overthrow of Israel specifically, if not for a larger revolution altogether. Some of these groups are still in existence, nursed by sponsoring governments in the Middle East. Since the 1980s, Islamic Fundamentalism has supplanted these older variations of nationalist/socialist/Marxist thinking as the inspiring ideology for dissent in the Muslim world and dozens of new groups appeared – most of the Sunni Muslim fundamentalists have become laced into the al Qaeda network, except for the newer Palestinian groups.

There are other groups as well, ranging from an apocalyptic Japanese religious cult, to animal rights extremists, to 'right wing' extremists with a predilection for racial warfare. It also appears that the radical left's resurgence in anti-globalization protests has rekindled some vanished groups such as the Italian Red Brigades.

A partial list of existing international terrorist groups in the world today would include:

Palestinian Marxist/Socialist Groups:

The Abu Nidal Organization (aka *Black September*, *Fatah Revolutionary Council*): A dwindling group based in Lebanon, Iraq (where its leader recently died under mysterious circumstances), Sudan, and Syria; it was once one of the most aggressive and feared groups in the world, having killed or injured some 900 people -- including Canadians -- in 20 countries. It is doubtful if they have a presence in Canada, although some members were rumored to be here in 1975 to plan an attack on the Montreal Olympics.⁴ The group is banned in Canada.

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP): Likewise a fading group based in Lebanon, it survives (barely) with Syrian support. A Canadian presence, if any, is unknown

The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF): Another tiny residual group from the 1960s and '70s, it survives with Iraqi support, but has not committed any actions lately. Again, it is doubtful if they are present in Canada.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): Currently 'respectable,' given its presence as the governing authority in the West Bank, Yasser Arafat's bodyguards, police and Militia (especially the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade) still commit acts of terrorism against Israeli targets.

⁴ Newspaper stories in 1975 reported on the speculation about their presence, but no confirmation has ever been made public.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

The group does have a presence in Canada but, as is the case elsewhere, action against it is unlikely as long as the tattered peace process continues – although the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade is banned in Canada.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Another group that was more feared in the past than today, it has been drawing towards a union with the DFLP. It maintained a presence in several Middle Eastern countries, but is most unlikely to have a presence in Canada.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC): A group with a record for innovative and aggressive attacks, it remains active and draws support from Syria and Iran, while maintaining cells in Europe. It seems unlikely that they have a presence in Canada.

Other Marxist/Maoist Groups

Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA): Basque Fatherland and Liberty was formed to fight against the government of Francisco Franco and create a Basque homeland based on Marxist principles. Once a part of the network of European and Middle Eastern Marxist groups of the 1970s and '80s, it remains active, though much reduced in its capabilities. There being only a miniscule Basque population in Canada, a presence here is most unlikely, but the group is banned in Canada anyway.

Grupos de Resistencia Primero de Octubre (GRAPO): A tiny Maoist group in Spain, it has been exceptionally violent for its size – killing over 90 people since 1975. French and Spanish police have arrested several of its leaders since 2000. It is most unlikely that this group has any presence in Canada.

Japanese Red Army: Another holdover from the 1970s, the group now largely consists of a handful of die-hards in Lebanon. There were some grounds for suspicion that the group was planning an action in Canada in the mid-1980s.⁵

Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK): Consisting of Kurds from Turkey, the group hopes to win a homeland based on Marxist principles. Note that Iraqi Kurdish insurgents have occasionally co-operated with the Turkish Army to operate against PKK sanctuaries there. The group is large and has a significant presence inside Europe. There are active and violent PKK supporters in Canada – some of whom may be veteran guerrillas – and the group is banned here.

The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front: A Chilean Marxist group founded in the early 1980s, the group has fractured and lost most of its general support. Some members are at large. It is doubtful that any active supporters are in Canada.

⁵ No open reports of Japanese Red Army activities in Canada have ever been circulated by Canadian police or in the Canadian media, but one of the authors was asked by Japanese diplomats to review information that their Toronto Consul General's House had been reconnoitered – this was shortly before a G-7 Conference in Tokyo that was rocketed by the Japanese Red Army.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (aka The National Liberation Army of Iran, the People's Mujahidin of Iran, National Council of Resistance, and Muslim Iranian Student's Society): Formed in the 1960s as an unusual fusion of Islam and Marxism, surviving members of the group are concentrated in Iraq. It has members and supporters around the Western world, including inside Canada.

National Liberation Front (ELN): A Colombian Marxist group that has recently grounded its arms to take up an overt political presence inside the country. Canadian support, if any, remains unknown. The group is banned in Canada.

New People's Army (NPA): A Communist insurgency in the Philippines, it has dwindled quite markedly through the 1990s, and is now little heard from. It is not known if they have any active supporters in Canada.

Party of Democratic Kampuchea: These are the die-hard members of the Khmer Rouge and, with some 2 million deaths on their account, are unlikely to ever surrender. It would be extremely surprising to learn of any active members outside of Cambodia.

The Red Brigades: This Italian Marxist Group first appeared in the late 1960s, only to vanish almost entirely in the early 1990s. A handful of terrorists staged a comeback for the group with two assassinations in 1999, and the group is active once more. It is doubtful if they have any supporters or members in Canada.

Revolutionary Organization 17 November: This violent group of Greek Marxists has made a number of attacks – often with sophisticated weaponry – against Greek, NATO, and American targets over the years. Its two key leaders were arrested in December 2002, along with a sizeable arsenal. It is doubtful if they have a Canadian presence.

Revolutionary People's Liberation Army (Dev Sol): Urban Turkish Marxists, this group has staged several attacks on Turkish police, military, US, and NATO targets since 1978. In 1996 it also signaled a new willingness to attack business leaders. It is doubtful that they have a Canadian presence.

Revolutionary Proletarian Army: A Communist group in the Philippines that is surviving the conditions that are plaguing the NPA, it is a minor group and unlikely to have any presence in Canada.

Sendero Luminoso: A Peruvian Maoist group that conducted an intensive and brutal insurgency throughout the 1980s, many of its leaders were arrested, and many members took advantage of an amnesty program in the 1990s. The remaining elements of the group remain active (primarily in coca leaf producing areas) where they support the drug trade. A few supporters are in Canada.⁶

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement: A Marxist-Leninist Peruvian Group, it had lost much of its strength and influence before it made a surprising assault during December 1996 on

⁶ See www.csrp.org, the website of the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (Shining Path). The site was among those recommended by *Canadian Dimension* (January 2002 edition pg. 45)

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

the Japanese embassy in Lima – precipitating a hostage situation that lasted for several months before the site was stormed. Since then, the group's presence has been negligible. Any presence by the group in Canada is doubtful.

Al Qaeda Affiliated Islamic Fundamentalist Groups

Abu Sayaf Group: Most active in the Philippines, but with the potential to act elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the group is an outgrowth of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. It is unlikely that they have any Canadian presence, but are banned here anyway.

Al-Badar, another of the plethora of al Qaeda affiliates, the group operates inside Pakistan and might have some presence in Canada.

Al-Gana'at Al-Islamiyya is an Egyptian group that first appeared in the 1970s. While it primarily seeks to overthrow the Egyptian government, it has a global presence. The group is banned in Canada (which suggests they may have some supporters here).

Al-Ithhihad Al-Islami operates from within Somalia, and has some connections to the Aideded Clan. They may have a presence inside Canada and have been banned here.

Al Qaeda is banned in Canada. It has members inside Canada and has killed Canadian citizens in both the Bali Nightclub bombing and the September 11th Attacks. Operating as a network of networks, the group is the most widespread and dangerous one in the world today.⁷

Ansar al-Islam: This group transplanted itself to northern Iraq where it is reported to cooperate with Hussein's regime, it is also reported to have the greatest degree of training in producing chemical and biological weaponry. Members were also involved in the February 2003 production of the biotoxin ricin in Britain. Two of the group's leaders are Canadian and have lived in Toronto.⁸

Armed Islamic Group (GIA): Appearing in 1992, the group has engaged in an exceptionally violent conflict with the Algerian government, but has also operated in France. It has supporters throughout the Algerian expatriate community, including inside Canada. The group has been banned by the Canadian government.

Asbat al-Ansar: Banned in Canada, the group originally operated from Lebanon for the most part, and may have some supporters in Canada.

Bayat al-Iman Group of Jordan: Although an al Qaeda affiliate, it appears doubtful that the group has any presence inside Canada.

Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party: Although affiliated with al Qaeda, the group operates almost entirely inside China on behalf of the oppressed Uighur Muslim communities in the western part of the country. It is extremely unlikely to have any presence in Canada.

⁷ For more on the unique nature of Al Qaeda, see Joe Turlej; "The Threat Matrix: Conceptualizing al Qaeda and its Role in the Wider Islamist Threat Environment", Mackenzie Briefing Note #20, The Mackenzie Institute, January 2003.

⁸ "We find more bodies every day", *Toronto Star*, 4 April 2003, Pg. A10.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (aka *Jihad Group*, *Egyptian Islamic Group*, *Vanguards of Conquest*): Active since the 1970s, the group is apparently becoming factionalized over its future – one wing has firmly tied itself to al Qaeda; the other wing seems to be increasingly preferring peaceful political activities over violence. Members of the group have some presence in Canada, and the group is banned here.

Harakat ul Ansar: Affiliated with al Qaeda, the group is most active in the Kashmir. It does not appear to have any presence in Canada.

Harakat ul Jihad: Another al Qaeda related group active in the Kashmir. Again, it does not seem to be present in Canada.

Harakat ul-Mujahidin: This group is also active in Pakistan and the Kashmir, and might have some presence in Canada – where it is on the list of banned groups. It is the most active of the Kashmiri groups, but has also sworn to attack American targets.

Hezb-I-Islami: A near-ally rather than an affiliate, this is the army of the Afghan Warlord Gullbuddin Hekmatyar, and is practicing terrorism inside Afghanistan to destabilize the post-Taliban government. It is unlikely that they have any supporters inside Canada.

Islamic Army of Aydin: Active in Yemen, it was the front group for al Qaeda's attack on the USS Cole. The group is banned in Canada.

Islamic Movement of Tajikistan: Affiliated with al Qaeda, the group normally operates in Tajikistan, and seems to have no connections with Canada.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Like the Tajik Islamic Fundamentalists, this group is active in the old Central Asian Republics, and drew support through Afghanistan when the country was under Taliban/al Qaeda control. It seems to have no connections with Canada, but is banned here anyway.

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami: Their presence is concentrated in Pakistan and it is doubtful if they have any foothold inside Canada.

Jemmah Islamiyyah: Active in Southeast Asia, a Canadian al Qaeda member has been associated with the group. The group is banned in Canada.

Jayesh-e-Mohammed: Another al Qaeda affiliate active in India, the group has been banned in Canada and may have some small presence here.

Jihad Movement of Bangladesh: This al Qaeda affiliate seems to have no presence in Canada.

Jihad Movement of Jordan: as above.

Jihad Group of Yemen: as above.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba: Another al Qaeda affiliate with no known Canadian presence, but it is banned here.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Laskar Jihad: Active in Indonesia, particularly in attacks on Chinese and Christians, the group seems unlikely to have any connections to Canada.

Laskar Jundullah: Another al Qaeda affiliate operating in Indonesia and, again, unlikely to have any presence in Canada.

Lebanese Partisans League: Like so many other Sunni-oriented Islamic Fundamentalists groups, this group signed the 1998 Fatwah issued by Osama bin Laden. It is possible that they have some presence in Canada.

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group: After sending volunteers to fight in Afghanistan, Colonel Khaddafi was hoisted by his own petard when they returned after a thorough indoctrination in Islamic Fundamentalist thought. After their attempted revolt inside Libya failed, members have dispersed elsewhere within the al Qaeda network.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Active entirely within the Southern Philippines, the group has engaged in a long war against the Philippine government. It is unlikely to be active within Canada.

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group: The Moroccan franchise for al Qaeda; they are not believed to have any presence inside Canada.

Muslim Brotherhood (aka *Ikwhan*): An older group that may have formed in the 1940s, it is not known if they have a Canadian presence.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad: An aggressive Fundamentalist group based in the Gaza Strip, and the only Palestinian group to affiliate itself with al Qaeda, it maintains a strong presence in some American and European universities within Islamic students Associations. There are grounds to believe the organization may be active on some Canadian campuses too, and the group is banned in Canada.

The Partisans Movement: Active in Pakistan and the Kashmir, it is doubtful if the group has any Canadian presence.

Salafist Group for Call and Combat: Another group arising out of North Africa, perhaps in the late 19th Century, the group may be used by al Qaeda to separate GIA members from the more ignominious deeds of their parent group (the GIA has killed tens of thousands of Muslim Algerians). Members of the group have been active in Canada and the group is banned here.

Takfir wal Hirja: Known as "Anathema and Exile" it may be a prestige group within al Qaeda – seemingly devoted to implanting long term ' sleeper ' cells. They may also be one of the oldest Islamic Fundamentalist organizations, possibly with antecedents inside 19th Century Egypt. Some Canadian fundamentalists may be associated with it.⁹

⁹ See Emerson Vermaat; "Bin Laden's Terror Networks in Europe", a Mackenzie Institute Occasional Paper, May 2002; pg 7.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Tunisian Combatant Group: Associated with the Salafist Group, it seeks to create an Islamic regime in Tunis. Two members assassinated the legendary Afghan war hero Ahmed Shah Massoud in early September 2001.

Ulema Union of Afghanistan: Formed as an Afghan al Qaeda affiliate, the current status of the group is unknown, and it is doubtful that a Canadian presence is maintained.

Other Islamic Fundamentalist Oriented Groups

Hamas: An Islamic Fundamentalist group, it (like Palestinian Islamic Jihad) often seeks to undermine the Palestinian Authority as much as it can by competing with it for prestige by attacking Israeli targets, undermining progress – when such occurs – in the peace process, and challenging the PLO by creating rival institutions. The group has a presence in Canada and is banned here.

Hizbollah (aka *Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine*, etc): A radical Shi'ite group based in southern Lebanon, it has made numerous attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets throughout the world, and is present inside the US. It is supported at times by Iran, but increasingly became involved in criminal enterprises. It has an active presence in Canada – where it was finally banned in January 2003.

Jamaat ul Fuqra: An amalgam of Pakistani backing and Black Muslim militants from the Caribbean and US, they are united in a hatred for Hindus, and have staged numerous attacks on Indian communities throughout the world. They have a presence in Canada, and they attempted some attacks here in the early 1990s.

Qibla and People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (aka *Muslims Against Global Oppression and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders*): Originally a South African vigilante group, they seek to impose Muslim government in South Africa and to attack Western targets. It is extremely active, staging hundreds of attacks in any given year and now rules some Muslim neighborhoods. A Canadian presence is extremely unlikely.

Al Ummah: A Muslim group based in Southern India, most of its membership was arrested in 1998. The existence of a Canadian presence is extremely doubtful.

Zviadists: A faction of Islamic Fundamentalists/Georgian Nationalists, they are violently opposed to the current Georgian government and operate from bases inside Southern Russia, where they cooperate with Chechen guerrillas. It is unlikely that they have a presence in Canada.

Ulster Related Groups:

The long conflict between the Provisional Wing of the IRA, and both British authorities and extremist Ulster Protestant Factions is not yet over. What is clear is that too many former IRA members cannot relinquish the conflict that has defined their existence, while the Protestant

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Paramilitaries will not give up their arms as long as the IRA's splinter factions (or the political aspirations of the Sinn Fein Party) remain active.

Both the IRA and Ulster Paramilitaries have had some connections to Canada over the years, both to acquire arms (a dubious proposition at best), acquire token funding, or – apparently – to retire from the conflict by assuming a new life in Canada. Current groups include:

The Continuity Irish Republican Army: Formed in 1994 and currently has less than 50 members.

The Irish Republican Army (also known as *The Provisional Wing of the IRA, the Provos*): Operations have largely ceased and some stocks of weapons have been turned over. It once had connections to a number of Middle Eastern countries, and to the Basque ETA. Currently, its longtime objectives might be best reached through its political partner, the Sinn Fein Party.

Loyalist Volunteer Force: Has a larger cadre than the Continuity Irish Republican Army and is much more murderous, but is maintaining a self-declared ceasefire, and will match IRA weapons surrenders with token surrenders of their own.

The Real IRA: Formed in early 1998 from more IRA hardliners, and may have about 70 members. It committed to a ceasefire after a murderous car bomb attack in Omagh, but may be waiting on further developments.

Red Hand Defenders: A very small group of ultra-extreme Protestant paramilitary members who hope to use violence against Catholics to provoke the IRA to abandon its ceasefire.

Ulster Defence Association: Another Protestant paramilitary group, it is perpetuating itself in the expectation that the IRA will eventually break its ceasefire.

Other Groups

The Animal Liberation Front: A prolific group, based on a shared ideology of extreme animal rights, whose philosophy and techniques are shared through obscure web sites and newsletters. Ultimately without any form of organization, all 'members' are autonomous self-actors. The ALF appears throughout the Western World, and has active adherents in Canada who have committed numerous acts here.

Aum Shinri Kyo: A frightening cult created by their Guru, the jailed Shoko Asahara, it has an apocalyptic obsession and hoped to trigger Armageddon by committing attacks with weapons of mass destruction. It made several attacks with biological and chemical weapons in Japan – including the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack in March 1995 that killed 12 and injured 6,000. A hard core of members still operate (seemingly peacefully) in Japan, Australia, Britain, and the US, some members have apparently tried to enter Canada. The group is banned here.

Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International: Sikh extremists in pursuit of an independent Sikh dominated Punjab, the group is now largely based in overseas Sikh Communities (including Canada). Members of the group from within Canada are responsible for the deadliest single incident of aviation terrorism before the 9-11 attacks: The Air India bombing that killed 329

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

people, among which were 154 Canadian citizens. The group (under both names) was recently banned in Canada.

International Sikh Youth Federation: Sikh militants who also have worked towards an independent Punjab. Members of the group are active in Canada, and have committed acts of terrorism here. The group is banned here.

Kach (aka *Kahane Chai*): A Jewish Ultranationalist group whose intended goal is to restore the Biblical state of Israel, it is very small and has been declared a terrorist group by both the Israeli and American governments. It is believed to draw some support from sympathizers in Europe and North America.

Khalistan Commando Force: Another Sikh militant group, it does have supporters in Canada – who have recently begun to work closely with the International Sikh Youth Federation and Babbar Khalsa.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: One of the most sophisticated groups in the world, its violence is almost entirely confined to Sri Lanka (although a ceasefire between it and the Sri Lankan government has been in effect since February 2002). The scope and complexity of its fundraising and political operations around the world are disturbing, and the group has an enormous presence within Canada. The group is extensively discussed elsewhere in this report.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC): Ostensibly Marxist, FARC controls some 40% of the Colombian countryside, and is active in another 40%. It has never attempted to launch the final phase of classical Marxist insurgency theory, and seems content to concentrate on its heavy involvement in narcotics production. FARC has no real presence in Canada, apart from some visiting members of its slightly estranged political front, but has dedicated Canadian political supporters – most of whom are associated with the remains of the Communist Party of Canada. FARC does benefit from domestic Canadian consumption of cocaine and related products. The group is banned in Canada.

United Self Defence Forces of Colombia: A paramilitary force active in areas where FARC is present, the groups has been implicated in acts of terrorism against potential FARC supporters. No Canadian presence is likely, but the group is banned here.

Of the 80 terrorist groups listed above, 15 certainly have a presence in Canada (while a number of others may be here), but not all of them are among the 30 groups that have been banned by the Canadian government.

Of the groups that are present in Canada, three deserve special mention.

While not alone among émigré terrorism by new Canadians, Sikh militants have had a deadly presence in Canada, and have killed more Canadian citizens than the combined total of the rest of the groups outlined above. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have an enormous presence in the country and, while offering no direct threat to any Canadian targets, present an indirect threat through their fundraising and political fronts. Al Qaeda and its networks of

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Islamic Fundamentalists have an implacable hatred for the Western World, and would cheerfully surpass the total wrought by the Babbar Khalsa if they could. Moreover, the economic fallout wrought by the September 11th attacks have done more harm to Canada than we can easily calculate.

Before discussing the impact of these three groups, it would be useful to examine how they began and developed.

Sikh Terrorist Groups

Sikhism is one of the world's newest faiths. It was born in the 15th century in what is now northern India and eastern Pakistan. For a brief period, between 1799 and 1849, Sikhs were able to fend off aggressors and maintain a state of their own. This came to an end when the British moved to end instability in the Punjab and occupied it after two hard-fought wars. Impressed by the Sikh's martial characteristics, the British promptly raised troops there and seldom regretted doing so.

In colonial times, demands for a separate state were made upon the British. Later, Sikh leaders attempted to negotiate an improved status for their followers with India on the basis of their religious and cultural uniqueness. In 1964, the Indian government made a concession to the Sikh leadership and created the Punjab state, which was however based on the Punjabi language (spoken by most Sikhs,) but not the Sikh faith; thus leaving the Sikhs as a minority in the new state.

The most recent violence in the name of a Sikh homeland emerged not from an escalation of this legitimate political struggle, but rather the *realpolitik* played by New Delhi and the Congress Party, then under Indira Gandhi, and the opportunism of small groups of radicals within the Sikh community who were willing to use violence in support of their cause. Once they became involved, previous negotiations for a democratic and inclusive Sikh state were displaced by demands for a militant and fundamentalist-only state.

In 1975, Gandhi was convicted of corruption and defied the opposition who demanded her resignation. After another 18 months of emergency rule, she was soundly defeated in a national election. To return to power, she needed to shake up the political landscape of India. One of her first targets was the alliance that emerged between the Akali Dal (AD), the dominant party representing Sikh interests, and a Hindu party in the Punjab, the state where most Sikhs are concentrated.

The Akali Dal had the backing of the Shiromani Gurdawara Pradbandhk Committee (SGPC), which oversaw the finances of Sikh temples, giving them access to these vast financial resources. Gandhi's political strategists decided to mount a political assault on the AD by quietly supporting and promoting an alternative Sikh voice, one which would be radically fundamentalist and uncompromising in Sikh politics. The ultimate objective of the Congress Party was to embarrass the AD by using their pawn to expose them as "frauds" and "soft supporters" of Sikh ideals.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

The man chosen to fulfill this role was the now infamous Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, then a moderately popular and charismatic religious leader. Behind the scenes, Congress Party handlers helped promote a new Punjab-based Sikh party, the Dal Khalsa ("party of the pure") for him. Even at this early stage, Bhindranwale was known to be both prone to religious violence, and a strong advocate of an independent Sikh state.¹⁰

In a remarkably short period of time, Bhindranwale was able to manipulate the teachings of Sikhism's original gurus, and create for himself an armed and dedicated following using the Dal Khalsa (DK). By 1981, he had already been implicated in murdering two gurus of the Nirankari sect of Sikhism (whom many Sikhs view as "heretics"). In 1978, he led a violent confrontation at one of their events, in which three Nirankaris and twelve DK members were killed. By this point it was readily apparent that the Congress Party had lost control of their pawn.

Bhindranwale established training camps at various temples and recruited more followers. One of the most important strategic alliances he forged was with the All-India Sikh Student's Federation. It also had a history of separatist-inspired violence in the Punjab, including robbery and murder.

In 1983, India's military intelligence, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) unsuccessfully tried to infiltrate Bhindranwale's organization, and over 100 intelligence officers died in these attempts.¹¹ Later that year, the killing of police officials escalated to the point where the central government stepped in and took control of the Punjab. The state's policing operations were severely hampered by the massive network developed by Bhindranwale's followers that could easily target any individual or police officer who acted against them. Through a combination of both intimidation and the rallying of pro-Sikh emotions, Bhindranwale moved into the Golden Temple, the religion's holiest site, heavily fortified it, and made it his base of operations.

Security forces surrounded the Golden Temple, claiming a fear that Bhindranwale would declare an independent Khalistan (the name of the Sikh state they wanted to create) and concerns that India's arch-rival Pakistan might be helping to foment ethnic unrest. Bhindranwale refused to surrender, and by June 6, 1984, security forces assaulted the temple in what was then called Operation Blue Star. Bhindranwale was killed in the engagement.

The political and emotional fall-out caused by the action was far-reaching within the Sikh communities in India and abroad. Many were disgusted that the final assault occurred on the date Sikhs celebrate the martyrdom of Guru Arjun. Hundreds of innocent pilgrims were at the temple at the time celebrating the event. While official death tolls were not believed, the number killed is estimated to be in the low thousands.

The assault on the Golden Temple offered radicals an instant legitimacy within a wider segment of the Punjab's population; more than they could have ever attained had it not occurred. Ethnic tensions were further inflamed when, on October 31, 1984, two of Indira Gandhi's Sikh

¹⁰ Yaeger, Carl "Sikh Terrorism in the Struggle for Khalistan" in *Terrorism an International Journal* Vol. 14, No. 4 Oct. -Dec. 1991 p. 223.

¹¹ Yeager, 1991.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

bodyguards gunned her down in revenge for the desecration of the Golden Temple. Anti-Sikh rioting ensued throughout India, forcing thousands of Sikhs to flee to the Punjab, where they felt safe.

Until Operation Blue Star in 1984, Bhindranwale's Dal Khalsa was the dominant pro-separatist terrorist organization in the Punjab. His death in the raid allowed for other groups to rise in the chaotic aftermath. An analysis of the post-1984 period reveals the presence of numerous guerilla/terrorist groups; all of which were unable to unite, or even to refrain, from engaging in operations against each other. This prevented the development of an effective anti-government campaign.

For a brief period of time, Operation Blue Star galvanized a substantial amount of political and financial support from the Sikh population in India and internationally. However, because numerous organizations existed, each with their own philosophical goals and methods of achieving an independent state, none of the momentum generated was ever fully harnessed by any. The overwhelming presence of strictly armed groups also pushed away any potential political options. This infighting was transposed into the international arms of these organizations, and the internecine violence continued in countries such as Canada.

Babbar Khalsa (BK): The Babbar Khalsa was founded in India in 1978. Originally, its founder, Sukhdev Singh Dasuwal was a follower of Bhindranwale, but broke away to form his own group and later tried to kill Bhindranwale.¹² Within several years, branches of the BK were established in a number of western countries, being most active in Canada and Britain. Outside India they operate as the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)¹³. The BK was present at the Golden Temple in June of 1984 with Bhindranwale and his armed followers. A number of Babbars left only days before the assault on the holy complex, putting inter-group rivalries above the defence of the temple.¹⁴

Philosophically, the Babbars concentrated on changing, or more accurately controlling the lifestyles of individual Sikhs,¹⁵ and were never hesitant about using violence and murder as a way of enforcing a strict fundamentalist code of discipline. So strict are they in the interpretation of Sikh doctrine and practices, observers have often noted their similarity to a religious cult.¹⁶ By the early 1990s, the Canadian-based Talwinder Singh Parmar had broken away from the BKI and formed the Azad Babbar Khalsa ("Independent Babbar Khalsa").

Khalistan Command Force (KCF): A new Panthic Committee (a united front of mostly militant organizations) was established in the chaos after Operation Blue Star. The Khalistan

¹² Pettigrew, Joyce, *The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence* (New Jersey Zed Books 1995) p. 71.

¹³ For clarity, the term Babbar Khalsa or BK will always refer to the Indian-based parent organization and its members. Conversely, the Babbar Khalsa International or BKI will be used in reference to the international arm of the organization, operating in countries such as Canada.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ *ibid.* p.73.

¹⁶ Mahmood, Cynthia *Fighting for Faith and Nation* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) p. 156.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Commando Force was inaugurated as its military wing¹⁷. At this time, the KCF had approximately 400 fighters.¹⁸ In North America, they operate as the Council of Khalistan¹⁹. The BK were not participants in this coalition.

By early 1987, internal differences and egos split the newly created group. Gurbachan Singh Manochanal, one of the five original Panthic Committee members broke away and formed the **Bhindranwale Tiger Force for Khalistan (BTFK)**. In 1988, members of the Bhindranwale family convinced another member of the new Panthic Committee to join them and form the **Car Juhujharu Jathebande (CJJ)**. Another breakaway group, the **Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF)**, joined the CJJ after the death of its leader.²⁰

The majority of the breakaway groups from the KCF fell under the influence of the BK. The KCF, and its remaining sub-groups, was the main armed coalition that offered an alternative to the BK. The over-arching objective of the KCF was to mount an assault upon the Indian state, as opposed to the more religiously inspired campaign of the BK.

All-India Sikh Student's Federation (AISSF): The AISSF was originally the student's wing of the Akali Dal Party, but had broken off in the 1970s. Several years prior to Operation Blue Star, Bhindranwale had made contact with its leader Amrik Singh, who was the son of his own teacher while he studied for the priesthood.²¹ The organization had already established a reputation for robbery, assassination, and bombings in the name of Khalistan. While cooperating with Bhindranwale, the AISSF also made inroads into Pakistan.

Amrik Singh died with Bhindranwale in the Golden Temple during Operation Blue Star. Since then, the organization has fragmented into two major groups: one headed by Daljit Singh Bittoo, and the other by Manjit (or Lal) Singh. The Singh-led faction posed the most problems for security forces in India, due to their propensity for violence in the pursuit of a separate state.

Indian authorities have always believed that Manjit Singh had some involvement in the 1985 Air India attacks. In 1992, he was tracked down and arrested by Indian's counter-terrorist police unit. Singh was charged with conspiracy to kidnap the granddaughter of Prime Minister Rao. At the time he was also a high-ranking member of the KLF.²² After weeks of interrogation he allegedly confessed to having lived in Canada while the bomb that brought down Air India 182 was being assembled in British Columbia.²³ He is also reported to have lived illegally in Canada from 1984 to 1988.²⁴

International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF): The ISYF is the international arm of the All-India Sikh Student's federation.²⁵ It was born in Britain in 1984, and soon expanded into

¹⁷ Pettigrew p.82.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ Tatla p. 117.

²⁰ *ibid.* p.83.

²¹ Yaeger pp. 224 and 227.

²² *Toronto Sun*, July 31, 1992.

²³ *Toronto Sun*, July 7, 1992.

²⁴ *Toronto Sun*, July 31, 1992.

²⁵ Mahmood, p. 157.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Canada under Lakbir Singh Brar, who had family ties to Bhindranwale.²⁶ It became plagued by intense divisions in 1988. Currently, there are two significant factions of the ISYF, one led by Satinder Pal Singh, and the other by Jasbin Singh Rode. Rode's faction included Brar, then under considerable pressure from Canadian immigration authorities. Competition between the two camps has been fierce over the control of both temples and Sikh community newspapers in Canada.

As early as 1983, Indian intelligence suspected Pakistani involvement in supporting the terrorist groups. The Punjab shares a border with Pakistan of some 555 kilometres. Due north of the border lies the disputed region of Jammu-Kashmir, where Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Al-Qaeda have been providing support for Muslim militants for years. An interesting statistic emerges within the violent pro-Khalistan movement; 70% of its hard-core support came from only 220 of the Punjab's 13,000 villages. The vast majority of these are located close to the Punjab-Pakistan border.²⁷

With the protection of a massive army presence, a Congress government was elected in 1992 in the Punjab. There were protests, although violence and intimidation still kept many voters from going to the polls. The presence of the Congress Party was taken as a direct challenge to the militants, who set out on a massive campaign in 1992 of assassinating anyone representing the central government.

The militant violence was countered by a reorganization of the security services and an increased role for the military in the region. Aggressive counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations yielded dramatic results, including the elimination of Canadian Talwinder Singh Parmar, a prominent figure in the BKI, who was killed at the Indo-Pakistani border.

Although seriously constrained, members of several terrorist groups have been able to mount limited operations against the Indian government. In 1995, the BK assassinated the Chief Minister of the Punjab, the closely related KLF also claimed responsibility.²⁸ A bombing campaign was foiled in 1999 when a BK member was arrested with several detonators and 18 kgs of RDX, -- a plastic explosive. Indian authorities allege that the intended targets were both administrative buildings and officials in the Punjab. The BK suspect, according to police, confessed to having ties to the **Khalistan-Kashmir Jihad Force**.²⁹

Sikh Terrorist Activities in Canada Since 1985

Punjab-based individuals and organizations are still listed in the organizations and individuals deemed as "targets" in the CSIS Counter-Terrorism Program.³⁰ Unfortunately, Canada continues to be a destination of choice for the violent radicals who still carry on the armed

²⁶ Tatla, Darshan Singh *The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999) p. 119.

²⁷ Joshi, Manoj, "Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis" in *Conflict Studies* No. 261. p. 17.

²⁸ US State Department, *1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism*.

²⁹ Express News Service, June 18, 1999.

³⁰ Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, "Terrorism: the Threat to Canada": May 3, 2000.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

conflict in the Punjab. Although heavy-handed Indian security has lessened in the past decade, the potential for further terrorist acts with a Canadian connection still exists, as the flow of terrorists into this country continues.

In May 1995, a DK member convicted of hijacking an Air India flight entered Canada using a false name and claimed refugee status. He subsequently became the subject of a CSIS investigation, and eventually a deportation order was issued for him.³¹ A Babbar Khalsa terrorist was ordered deported from Canada in 1998. He admitted he was present when killings were planned while he was still in India and that he acted as a courier for the organization.³² In February of 1999 a refugee claimant admitted to a Canadian immigration officer that he was a member of the BK, and that he would assist the organization with non-combat related activities here in Canada (e.g. fund raising). Once deportation proceedings began, he changed his story, claiming that he hoped that the admission would strengthen his refugee claim, and that in reality he was not a member. A Federal Court justice upheld the original deportation order back to India.³³ As recently as December 19, 2000 another active member of the Babbar Khalsa entered Canada without documentation and upon questioning admitted to his participation with the terrorist organization. He then became the subject of immigration proceedings.³⁴

In the struggle against Sikh terrorism in Canada, the greatest credit belongs to Canadian Sikhs themselves – many of who have withstood intimidation and violence by the militants in order to counter their attempts to wrest control of temple funds or indoctrinate their children. Men and women such as the late Tara Singh Hayer, the publisher of the *Indo-Canadian Times* who became a paraplegic after a 1988 attack and was murdered in 1998 for his stand against the terrorists, deserve our highest approbation.

Sri Lankan Tamils

Sri Lanka is an island state located in the Indian Ocean off the southern tip of India, with a population of over 19 million people. The majority are Sinhalese, who are largely Buddhist, and comprise approximately 75% of the population. The next largest community is the Tamils, whose ancestors arrived in the island before the Colonial era; they represent approximately 13% of the population. They trace their ancestry to the Dravidians of southern India and, like the majority of Indians, are Hindus. Between 5 to 6% of the population are Indian Tamils descended from laborers brought to the island under British colonial rule to work on the tea plantations. The Northern and Eastern provinces are primarily Tamil speaking. For centuries, the island has also been home to a Muslim population, descendants of traders, who had been

³¹ Federal Court of Canada, *Tejinder Singh Pal v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*, December 22, 1997.

³² *Reflex*, issue 108, February 3, 1999.

³³ Federal Court of Canada, *Davinder Pal Bhalru v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*, January 12, 2000.

³⁴ Federal Court of Canada, *Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Harjinder Singh Patwal*, June 3, 2001.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

equally comfortable in either Sinhalese or Tamil regions of the country. They represent about 7% of the country's inhabitants.

Independence from British rule was granted in 1948, and a parliamentary system was established. At independence, most Tamils voted with the Sinhalese for non-ethnic, nationalist political parties. In 1949, a portion of the Tamil speaking elite, who had felt uncomfortable with the Sinhalese majority, created the Tamil Federal Party (FP). Previous disputes between the two were resolved by the British, whom most Tamils saw as being impartial. The FP linked territory to language, it wanted to create a separate province composed of the Northern and Eastern provinces. They also advanced the policy of granting citizenship and voting rights to the Indian Tamils as a means of partially off-setting the numeric superiority of the Sinhalese. In 1976, the FP joined with several parties to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). In the 1977 elections, they formed the Official Opposition. Throughout this period the FP, and later the TULF, adhered to political means and non-violent protests to advance their agenda and express their concerns.

In 1956, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), who harnessed the discontent of a segment of the Sinhalese, introduced legislation to make Sinhalese the island's official language.³⁵ However, after backing down from the policy of "Sinhalese" of national politics, the Prime Minister was assassinated by two radical Buddhist monks in 1959. His policies were continued by his widow, who assumed leadership of the SLFP. Civil disobedience campaigns were launched by Tamils over the next several years, and culminated in a state of emergency being declared in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The responses by the mostly Sinhalese security forces to peaceful protests were, to say the least, excessive.

The political uncertainty allowed several relatively unsophisticated armed groups to emerge in Tamil dominated areas. **The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)** began, more or less, as a street gang. Vellupillai Prabhakaran, its "supreme," consolidated his hold over the organization by proving his machismo and assassinating the Tamil mayor of Jaffna -- who was a member of the United National Party, a federal party that drew members from all ethnic groups on the island. This senseless violence against a Tamil in mainstream politics was a small sample of what was yet to be unleashed upon those who opposed the Tigers, either within or outside the democratic process.

The Tigers slowly grew from the handful of thugs around Prabhakaran into a terrorist group, and slowly laid the foundations for their emergence as a full-blown guerrilla force.

Sensing an opportunity to play *realpolitik*, and assert its claim as a regional power, India began training and funding the Tamil insurgents in the early 1980s. Prior to this, the LTTE had received some training by Palestinian terrorist groups. All major Tamil guerrilla groups received military training and logistical support from India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). This training took place in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where ethnic, linguistic, and trade ties exist

³⁵ During colonial times and after independence, Tamils have been over-represented (based on population) in well-paying civil service jobs. This was mostly due to their willingness to learn English and to embrace educational opportunities.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

between the Tamils of India and Sri Lanka. Within a short period of time, the first roving gangs of criminals turned into an insurgent movement capable of challenging the security forces of Sri Lanka and eventually controlling territory in Tamil areas.

Even in the early 1980s, unity between Tamil insurgent groups did not exist. In 1983, the LTTE began targeting the **People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE)**,³⁶ and the **Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)**, assassinating its newest leader. In 1986, the LTTE began another series of assaults on TELO positions in Jaffna. Almost 100 of their guerillas were killed by the LTTE, who then issued demands that all insurgents follow them. In December of 1986, the LTTE turned its attention to the **Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)**³⁷, killing several hundred of their members. Fighting between the LTTE, the EPRLF, and PLOTE continued over the next several months. The Tigers' sheer brutality was successful in devastating their rivals for supremacy. It was not uncommon for surrendering fighters, who were promised safety if they surrendered to the LTTE, to be massacred immediately.

Although active since the early 1970s, a bout of anti-Tamil rioting by Sinhalese Sri Lankans led to the LTTE's transition from a small terrorist group to a major insurgency. As is common in terrorism, the rioting was triggered by the insurgents themselves.

On July 23, 1983, LTTE guerillas ambushed troops in the Jaffna area. A remote controlled mine was detonated, and was followed up by grenades and heavy automatic weapons fire, killing a total of 15 soldiers. In response, Sri Lankan soldiers stationed in the Jaffna area went on what can only be called a rampage, destroying property owned by Tamils. Many Tamils civilians were badly beaten by troops, and several died from the assaults. Rumors about the LTTE's ambush quickly spread into Colombo, and Sinhalese mobs went "berserk" on the night of July 24 in Tamil areas. Many Tamils were beaten or hacked to death, while others who were accused of being Tigers were burned alive.

This senseless violence continued for several days while police and military personnel did little to protect Tamil civilians. The violence displaced many Tamils. In Colombo alone, 50,000 were left homeless, while as many as 100,000 were forced to flee their homes all across the island.³⁸ Many of these unfortunate Tamils moved into Tamil speaking provinces, away from the mobs, where the presence of armed Tamil insurgents offered a false sense of security.

For the LTTE, the massacre of Tamil civilians was a victory, and their small-scale armed attacks began to have the intended devastating political effects of polarizing the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. This was clearly a textbook example of what the Brazilian Marxist Carlos Mergella advocated in the *Mini-manual of the Urban Guerilla*, "the small engine starting the larger engine". Previous attacks had provoked similar, although much smaller reactions by the security forces, which included the 1981 torching of the Jaffna library -- a cultural treasure of

³⁶ A former Tiger who preferred a more Marxist and internationalist approach to insurgency was the creator of PLOTE. Its founder was also of the land owning caste, and therefore higher in status than Prabhakaran.

³⁷ The EPRLF drew its support mostly from Tamils in the Eastern Province, whereas the Tigers were dominant in the Jaffna region.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-6.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

the Sri Lankan Tamils. The consequences of the government's indifference to the fate of thousands of innocent Tamils rapidly escalated the status of the LTTE into a position where they could claim to be the "defenders" of the Tamil people.

In 1987, talks between Sri Lanka, India, and all the Tamil insurgent groups resulted in a peace accord being signed. India acted as its guarantor, and deployed troops to Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Provinces. The only holdout was Prabhakaran. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was tasked to disarm the insurgents and destroy the LTTE. The seemingly simple task of defeating the small insurgent organization proved to be too much for the IPKF, who sustained heavy losses, even as their most elite units were repeatedly repelled in advances against the LTTE in its stronghold of Jaffna. Moreover, the presence of Indian troops on the island triggered fears within the JVP (a Sinhalese Maoist group) who took up arms for a second time.³⁹ The lack of success, and the discomfort felt by many Sri Lankans over the massive Indian presence, caused the withdrawal of the force in 1990.

In 1991, fighting resumed between the LTTE and the island's security forces. That year, Prabhakaran also sent a young female suicide bomber to successfully assassinate India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (by approaching him with a garland of flowers while wearing an explosive vest-pack – the first known use of this as a terrorist tactic). The LTTE feared that he might have redeployed Indian troops against them. LTTE Suicide bombers also took the life of Sri Lankan President Premadasa in 1993 and nearly got Prime Minister Sirima Bandanaraike with a suicide bomber in 2000.

The LTTE also launched a series of suicide and military attacks in 1995, while sitting at the peace table with the Sri Lankan government. A revived military was able to respond by pushing most Tiger units out of the Jaffna region. Many of the gains made in 1995 by the island's security forces have since been lost with the latest series of Tamil offensives, and another ceasefire went into place in late 2001, although it remains to be seen if this one will hold. While the Sri Lankan government is expressing confidence with the progress of the current talks, it is unknown what Prabhakaran actually thinks he can get out of them.

The LTTE's battlefield successes, and its ability to recover considerably from the reverses inflicted on it in 1995, are due to its organizational complexity and the ruthlessness with which it is run both in combat and support operations. No effort (or Tamil, for that matter) has been spared in tearing the Northern and Eastern Provinces from the island state.

Modern terrorist organizations must be able to operate on a global scale. To an organization such as the LTTE, this does not mean being able to execute combat operations across the planet, but instead it carries out a diverse set of vital support functions such as raising funds, procuring weapons and ammunition, lobbying foreign governments, and carrying out a vast array of criminal activities designed to raise cash to support military and political activities. To the LTTE, winning a sovereign territory of their own in Sri Lanka is their declared objective.

³⁹ The JVP were a rural Sinhalese insurgent organization with a quasi-Maoist strategy that took up arms in 1971. The short but bloody fighting resulted in an estimated 25,000 dead. The fighting between the Buddhist insurgents and the mostly Buddhist security forces has always been considerably more intense than that which transpired between government forces and the LTTE.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Therefore, their global network is designed to funnel resources back to their cadres on the island, but also to support the "alternate authority" the group needs to generate.

At the top of the LTTE structure is Prabhakaran, who heads both the political and military wings of the Tigers, although the military wing is dominant over the political. Falling under the military wing are the regional commands which control the activities of the LTTE's 5,000 ground troops; the Sea Tigers, a "brown water" navy capable of launching massive amphibious assaults and devastating suicide operations; police (in LTTE controlled areas); and the infamous Black Tigers, an elite suicide force. Under the LTTE political wing are the Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization (TEEDOR) and its "justice" apparatus.

In Sri Lanka, the LTTE usually operates in the northern regions of the island as a sophisticated and ruthless guerilla insurgency, capable of mounting devastating attacks against government military bases. In the southern areas of the island, the LTTE usually employed a massive and sustained terrorist campaign with suicide bombings that targeted the island's civilian population, as well as its political and cultural institutions.

Since its foundation, the LTTE also engaged in a systematic assassination campaign directed against any Tamil group or prominent individual who did not acknowledge the Tigers' leading place in Tamil affairs, or the supremacy of Prabhakaran himself. The LTTE had turned their attention towards the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a political party which represented Tamil interests. Fearing their legitimacy, Prabhakaran turned on them and ordered the assassination of its leader in July of 1989. Up until that point, the TULF had more or less been spared the brutal murders that befell countless hundreds of Tamils who occupied positions in the island's government, including regional administrators and judges. Of particular concern to the LTTE were democratic organizations that were willing to accept some form of Tamil autonomy within a federal state, as opposed to domination by the LTTE.⁴⁰ With the current peace talks, it seems that this is the very arrangement that the Tigers are willing to accept anyway.

The LTTE's international apparatus has three primary functions: Political representation/propaganda; fund raising; and weapons procurement⁴¹. The entire Tiger international network of front groups, "human rights organizations," "development agencies," and a criminal network is controlled by the intelligence branch headquartered in Tiger-occupied Northern Sri Lanka. The intimate link between the combat elements of the LTTE and its international political arm is further reinforced by its leadership. The International Secretariat, Lawrence Thaligar (until 1996) was revealed to have been a militarily trained cadre. His replacement was another militarily trained LTTE member, Sivagnanam Gopalathinam, alias "Karikalan".⁴²

To carry out these tasks, the Tigers maintain offices throughout the world. Presently, they staff offices in approximately 40 countries. In most western countries, the LTTE must operate behind a front group, such as the World Tamil Movement, Tamil Coordinating Committee,

⁴⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 31, 1995.

⁴¹ Anthony Davis, Tamil Tiger International, Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1, 1996.

⁴² Gunaratna, 1998, pp. 144-145 and 223.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

United Organization of Tamils, or Tamil Confederation.⁴³ In Denmark, for example, the Tigers operate under their true identity. Each LTTE front office is in contact with the Sri Lankan headquarters of the movement through either fax, phone, satellite phone or the Internet, receiving up-to-the-minute reports of the fighting to relay to Tamils. London (until recently) also served as the international headquarters for operations outside of Sri Lanka.⁴⁴

The advantage this network has given the LTTE has been invaluable. First, it kept the international Tamil community politicized and focused on their version of events, and thus more or less willing to pour huge sums into its war chest. Second, by circulating reports of human rights violations by police and soldiers, the LTTE has been able to maintain the negative image that the island's government took on during the 1980s. Despite the resettlement of large numbers of Tamils in the Colombo area, decreased inter-racial tensions and vastly increased professionalism in the security forces, LTTE activists were still able, through western human rights groups, to convey a negative impression of the Sri Lankan government. Even after the Tamil Tigers were declared a terrorist organization in 1995 by the United States, weapons still could not be sold by the US to the Sri Lankan government because of this perception.

In Europe and North America, the LTTE operates on two distinct levels. Tiger operatives overtly engage in propaganda and lobbying activities, as well as coordinating a myriad of fronts and charities to raise – usually legally -- cash for the war. Another group of operatives run criminal enterprises including refugee smuggling, narcotics trafficking, sophisticated frauds, and extortion rings to deliver funds to feed the LTTE.

Throughout the Indian sub-continent, a host of illegal activities divert funds into Tiger coffers. Most notable and socially destructive are LTTE ties to heroin produced from the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan and Pakistan). Since the early 1980s, Tamils with ties to the LTTE have been apprehended at alarming rates in Western Europe and Canada, acting as drug couriers.⁴⁵

Cash-poor Eastern European states also became targets of dubious Tiger diplomacy. Corruption, coupled with an arms manufacturing industry which can no longer count on huge purchases through the former Soviet Bloc, have made Eastern European governments more willing to deal with anyone able to put up hard cash. One example of these purchases, 50 tons of TNT and 10 tons of RDX, were purchased from Ukraine and used for a number of deadly terrorist attacks in the Colombo area and elsewhere in southern Sri Lanka.

The KP Branch

The most secretive LTTE international operation is the procurement of weapons, explosives, and “dual use” technologies to sustain military and terrorist operations. This side of the LTTE is given the nickname of the “KP Branch”, taking on the initials of its highest level operative, Kumaran Padmanathan. Members of this branch are not drawn from the fighting wing of the LTTE, as their identities would have been recorded and available to law enforcement and

⁴³ Gunaratna, 1998, p. 371.

⁴⁴ Anthony Davis, *Janes Intelligence Review*, October 1, 1996.

⁴⁵ See “Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and their Criminal Activities in Canada and the Western World”, Mackenzie Briefing Notes, December, 1995.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

counter-intelligence agencies by India's RAW, who had helped train many Tiger Cadres in the early 1980s. For further security, the KP Branch operates completely independently from all other sections of the LTTE, and hands the arms shipments to a small, highly trusted team in the Sea Tigers for final delivery into LTTE dominated areas.

To facilitate the activities of this clandestine international arms trafficking network, the LTTE owns and operates its own fleet of ocean-going vessels. This fleet only operates directly for the LTTE less than five percent of the time, the remainder of their time is spent transporting legitimate goods and raising hard cash for the purchase of weapons.⁴⁶ Initially, the Tigers maintained a shipping base in Myanmar, until diplomatic pressure forced them to leave. A new base has been established on Phuket, a Thai island.⁴⁷ LTTE ships are also known to transport heroin from the Golden Triangle to markets around the globe. Identifying the exact ownership of the vessels operating for the LTTE is a daunting task: registrations are constantly changed, holding companies are always being set up, and ships can be renamed several times on a single voyage. However, analysts are however confident that the real controller of the fleet is Padmanathan.

Probably the most skilled operation mounted by the KP Branch was the 1997 theft of 32,400 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition purchased from Tanzania for the Sri Lankan Army.⁴⁸ The LTTE was aware of the purchase of 35,000 mortar bombs, made a bid to the manufacturer through a numbered company to have one of their own vessels pick up the load, and then – once the bombs were loaded – switched the name and registration of their ship. Instead of transporting the cargo to its intended destination, it was taken to Tiger-held territory in Sri Lanka's north. The Sri Lankan army eventually received the mortar bombs, one salvo at a time from LTTE mortars.⁴⁹ It is difficult to imagine any of the old-style European groups, such as the Red Army Faction or the Red Brigades, operating with this much sophistication or verve.

For the KP Branch, the West is their money-raising territory. Profits from donations made to various front groups and through criminal enterprises are transferred into bank accounts. Money can then be transferred to the accounts of a weapons broker, or, be taken by KP operatives themselves.

What becomes painfully apparent is that the LTTE war effort relies heavily on the civilian Tamil population in Sri Lanka and abroad. Currently, one quarter of all Tamils reside outside of Sri Lanka, most having left in the past decade, making this one of the most massive shifts of any single group since the Second World War. There is no coincidence between the movement of Tamils and the LTTE's need for resources -- it is the backbone of their international strategy. In 1995, when the LTTE lost Jaffna, their international operatives were ordered to increase, by a massive 50%, the amount raised from Tamils outside of the island.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Gunaratna, 1997, p.28.

⁴⁷ David Osler, *The Tiger Shipping Empire*, *The Sunday Island*, March 28, 2000.

⁴⁸ See *Time*, February 9, 1998.

⁴⁹ See Mike Winchester's article "Ship of Fools" *Tamil Tiger's Heist of the Century* in *Soldier of Fortune*, August 1998.

⁵⁰ Gunaratna, 1997, pp.23-24.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

The LTTE and Tamils in Canada

Canada's Sri Lankan community was a small one until 1984, when the first of a wave of Tamil refugees arrived by way of Europe. Typically, most were genuine in their desire to escape the fighting on the island, but it already seems that the LTTE was planning on establishing a Diaspora community as a support mechanism. This is a new wrinkle in the history of insurgent movements; while the use of overseas communities for support is an old story, deliberately encouraging the creation of such a community is not. In any event, 20 years after Tiger-supported immigration to Canada began, Toronto has become the World's largest Sri Lankan Tamil city, with as many as 200,000 here, and another 50,000 or so in other cities. Estimates on how many are here vary, and are at odds with census data – suggesting much illegal immigration.

While the LTTE is very much present in Canada, it is almost invariably manifested through a pair of front organizations: The **World Tamil Movement (WTM)**, which has spun off dozens of subordinate groups in other communities, and among Tamil students; and the **Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT)**. Both groups have been described by the annual US State Department Report *Patterns of Global Terrorism* as fronts for the LTTE since 1995.

The LTTE has almost never presented violence to anybody outside of Sri Lanka and southern India, and it has been a matter of policy to avoid deliberately targeting foreigners. This has meant that the risk of Tiger violence inside Canada is low – except to dissenting Tamils. A trio of low key incidents are all that can be easily categorized: A drive-by shooting at the home of a Tamil language broadcaster who refused to run pro-Tiger ads; the beating of a distributor of David Jeyaraj's independent Tamil language newspaper *Muncharie*, and the torching of his van; and the firebombing of a Tamil cultural centre whose director opined that perhaps both sides in the war in Sri Lanka were guilty of human rights abuses. None of these incidents were lethal, and no more have been reported since 1996.⁵¹

However, the Tamil community in Toronto is certainly not free of violence. Two rival Tamil gangs, the pro-Tiger VVT and the anti-Tiger AK Kanon, have engaged in dozens of violent incidents including mass armed brawls, gunfights, drive by shootings, armed robberies, and murders throughout the Toronto area since 1994 (and perhaps earlier still). Gang members have been convicted of offences relating to heroin and weapons trafficking, armed robberies, credit card fraud, and extortion.⁵² It is not clear if the VVT is raising money for the LTTE, while AK Kanon certainly is not. The violence between the gangs represents an embarrassment to FACT and the WTM, and is a vexation to ordinary Tamils themselves. FACT and the WTM have cooperated with the Metropolitan Toronto Police and officers from other Canadian police

⁵¹ Toronto Sun, February 19, 1996

⁵² A host of newspaper stories have covered the activities of both gangs, most typically in the *Toronto Sun* and the *Toronto Star*. The articles carried in both papers on March 14th, 1997 (after a series of arrests of gang members) carry a litany of charges and background information on typical members.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

forces in working to reduce the gang violence – albeit with the strict proviso that they do not use joint platforms to further espouse their main cause.⁵³

The political side of the LTTE's support structure can be witnessed by the demonstration mounted by 650 demonstrators from a full spread of their front groups outside the offices of the *Toronto Sun* on February 12th, 2000.⁵⁴ The campaign (along with a coordinated bombardment of e-mails and phone calls) subsequently proved successful in intimidating the *Sun* for some months. Interestingly, the demonstrators considered any story describing criminal activities in the paper to be discriminatory. The same campaign was also directed against the Mackenzie Institute, but circumstances restricted the Tiger's supporters to jamming the phone lines. Usually eight to 10 callers would start ringing through at the start of every hour, mostly from unlisted phone numbers and payphones. Callers almost invariably followed an identical script; and the one quiet hour during the first day of the campaign appears to have been designed to allow a Liberal MP (who has many connections to the Tamil community) to get through.

The Toronto police have also been “roasted” in community meetings, particularly after a senior Police officer reported that the Tigers extracted \$1 million a year out of Toronto (a conservative estimate). Police officials were invited to a community meeting hosted by the Tamil Eelam Society, but walked out after the nature of the meeting became clear.⁵⁵

Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the mass Tamil migration to Canada is that, under other circumstances, Sri Lankan Tamils would have made ideal immigrants to the country. Educated, hard working, innovative, and entrepreneurial, many of their gifts and much of their energy has been subordinated to the needs of the Tigers – whose deceitful and atrocious nature has poisoned the ethics of so many of their own people.

Islamic Fundamentalism

In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, and with the cascade of threats arising out of Islamic Fundamentalism, much effort has been spent in trying to describe the origins of this threat. There are no simple answers, but there are a number of factors to consider.

There is the nature of Islam itself: Although there have been apologists without number for Islam since the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, the Islamic faith is undeniably the most violent of the World's universal religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and (arguably) Judaism. Buddha was a wealthy prince who renounced his life of ease and luxury to live and die as an impoverished mystic, telling others how to achieve enlightenment. The infant Christ was a political refugee who matured as a carpenter before going forth to preach a message of toleration and peace. Mohammed was a trader, and then he became a successful warlord who sent his followers out to bring fire and sword to all who denied his message.

⁵³ Author's interviews with Canadian police officers.

⁵⁴ Some of the details are available in the *Toronto Sun*, 13 February 2000,.

⁵⁵ *Toronto Star*, March 3rd, 1996.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

The first couple of centuries after the death of a founder usually mark a religion's attempt to shape itself into an enduring form, finalize the core of its doctrine, and establish its institutions. If it is to translate beyond its founding culture, as only the universal religions have, it must proselytize elsewhere. Buddhism and Christianity marked themselves as peaceful religions (it was almost three centuries after Christ's death before followers took up arms in his name); and their initial spread was entirely through peaceful missionary work – often while undergoing persecution. In the three centuries after Mohammed's death, Islam spread itself almost entirely by the sword, offering conversion or death to pagans, and higher taxes and second-class status to conquered Christians and Jews.

This is not to say that all Buddhists and Christians are peaceful and all Muslims are not; a distressing number of examples prove otherwise. However, a Buddhist or Christian who takes up arms for religious reasons is doing so contrary to the teachings and examples of Buddha and Christ. This cannot be said for a Muslim, notwithstanding the hundreds of millions of kindly, peaceful, and decent people who belong to the faith.

The other problem that Muslims must face is that Buddhism and Christianity remain faiths that are focused on the individual and his or her ultimate fate. Islam remains partially oriented on society, and its use of clerical jurists, who are bound by both written precedent and community consensus, has meant that Muslim societies are innately conservative and inflexible. As a result, both the rise of Modern Europe and the global technological revolution have presented enormous challenges to Muslim society, and they are having considerable difficulty meeting it.⁵⁶

One school of thought in Islam holds that all of the problems their civilization faces result from a series of confrontations with Christian societies/Western civilization -- many Muslims do not really distinguish between the two. It can be argued that extremism arose out of frustration with the long history of blocked expansion, as the West first checked Islamic conquest and then reversed it in the Middle Ages; and out of shock when the backward bumptious barbarians surged again out of Europe around 1500, and then imposed their rule on much of the Islamic world in the 19th and early 20th Centuries.

Certainly, members of Islamic cultures and Western ones think differently. A Westerner is like to identify himself (or anyone else) primarily by his nation-state. Muslims tend to have dual allegiances that supercede the nation-state, these being their religion, and then their family/clan/tribe or ethnic group. A Westerner, when he or she thinks of religion at all, tends to compartmentalize it as a separate activity from government, law, and other institutions. A Muslim living in a Muslim society has enormous difficulty doing this. While Canadians might be blasé about violence directed against the United States or Christians in Indonesia as being their problem and nothing to do with us, many Muslims simply cannot feel this way about any violence directed by Westerners against any Islamic countries or peoples.

⁵⁶ Much in this section is drawn from or inspired by Ibn Warrig's *Why I am not a Muslim* (Prometheus Books, London, 1995) and Bernard Lewis' *What Went Wrong?* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002). Yossef Bodansky's *Bin Laden: The Man Who Attacked America* (Prima Publishing, New York, 1999) is also a masterly history of Fundamentalist thinking and the origins of the movement..

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Beyond this general background, a number of factors contributed to the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. These include the resurgence of Arab nationalism, the rapid growth rate of Muslim populations in the last few decades, the moribund nature of many of their governments, and a cascade of somewhat interrelated political events.

In the aftermath of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalism began to appear along with the appearance of the first Arab nation-states: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, and Iraq. Persia and Turkey (both distinctly non-Arab entities) also began to modernize and developed a greater sense of self-identity. After the Second World War, Egypt and Morocco shed their protectorate status, Syria and Lebanon became independent (more or less peacefully) while Algerian Muslims ignited an insurgency to achieve their own independence from France.

A sore point with the emerging Arab nationalists was Jewish settlement in Palestine. The seminal conference on Arab nationalism in September 1937 in Syria was specifically concerned with Palestine. When the UN Partition of Palestine gave birth to Israel, war became inevitable and the infant state was immediately attacked by all of its neighbors. The triumph of Israeli arms in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 did nothing to endear the Jewish state to the Muslim World, particularly as two of these wars resulted in the creation of large numbers of displaced Palestinian Arabs -- whose cause was championed by many Arab states, though none of them were particularly willing to offer them new homes in their own territories if they could help it.

The repeated failure to defeat Israel undermined the authority of the various secular Nationalist-Socialist-Militarist parties that ruled many Arab nations, and encouraged the development of Fundamentalist-oriented groups. These emerging groups found it easy to conclude that these repeated defeats were the product of inept or corrupt governments who had refused to tackle Israel with all the zeal they could muster.

Naturally, particularly as oil wealth percolated throughout the Middle East in the 1970s, large numbers of Muslims felt that their collective identity was under threat in a world run by Western technology and financial structures, and constantly subjected to Western political ideals, concepts, and cultural influences. Drawing on groups and concepts that originated in the Pan-Arabist/Nationalist movements that appeared in the aftermath of the First World War, Fundamentalist thinkers started to articulate their position.

It was self-evident to the Fundamentalists that Islam was in danger and needed to be reformed so that it could compete with the Western world. However, it was also clear that the Turkish concept of state-secularism first espoused by Kemal Ataturk was a dead end proposition (although it works well for the Turks) -- so too was the nationalist-socialism practiced by the Ba'ath Parties in Syria and Iraq, and by Nasser's heirs in Egypt. Moreover, the Fundamentalists were without political power and, like all ideologues, earnestly sought it.

Coupled with their seeming prosperity from oil revenues; the populations in Middle Eastern nations have been among the fastest growing in the world in recent years.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Figures from the International Institute of Strategic Studies' annual report "The Military Balance", (IISS, London, 1979 and 1995 respectively).

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

| Nation | 1979 Population | 1995 Population |
|---------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Algeria | 19.07 million | 28.14 million |
| Egypt | 40.46 million | 57.74 million |
| Iraq | 12.73 million | 21.04 million |
| Pakistan | 80.17 million | 129.70 million |
| Saudi Arabia | 7.984 million (plus migrants) | 12.84 million (plus migrants) |

These figures don't reflect emigration into the Western World, and the problems of extensive political violence in Algeria (and much more so in Iraq) don't seem to have put much of a dent into population growth. When a society has a population growth rate that is this dramatic, has put money into its education systems, but cannot match opportunities to expectations, one certain consequence is increased restlessness among the young males. Anxious about their futures, and uncertain that their own society has much to offer them, they are ready to receive any ideology that assigns blame and offers a plan for action.

Islamic Fundamentalism fits the bill, and its leaders recruit heavily among young Muslims. Within Egypt's universities in the 1980s and '90s, Fundamentalists played an aggressive role among the student bodies – in much the same way that Leftist groups function inside Western universities. There were also student-run campaigns to remove liberal professors from Egyptian faculties, and so assure that the fundamentalist perspective received a stronger footing inside the lecture halls.

While many well to do Muslim families place a high value on getting a professional education for their children (explaining the plethora of talented Muslim physicians and engineers who have arrived in the Western world in recent decades); the lesser prize for younger sons and less-well off families would be placement in a religious academy. Numbers of these schools have been funded in recent decades, particularly in Pakistan, by the Saudis – with the expectation that strict Wahhabist doctrines would be taught. Being religious institutions, most of these schools are not supervised by state authorities, and the Fundamentalists have a strong presence within them.⁵⁸

A faithful Muslim has five duties: prayer, charity, fasting (particularly during Ramadan), and making a pilgrimage to Mecca at some time in his or her life. The fifth duty is Jihad, or striving.⁵⁹ While apologists for Islam mention that Jihad can mean an internal striving – much as a Christian or Buddhist might engage in – the most frequent interpretations about Jihad in Islamic literature and jurisprudence refer to the use of violence to spread the faith, protect Muslims from outside aggression, and to punish backsliders. The Fundamentalists quickly turned to Jihad, electing to use it in its violent sense.

⁵⁸ Authors Interview.

⁵⁹ Richard V. Weekes, ed. *Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey*; Greenwood Press, London, 1978 xxii—xxviii.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

1979 was a pivotal year for Fundamentalists. Firstly, the Iranian Revolution had resulted in an Islamic government after widespread popular opposition to the Shah kicked off widespread unrest. During the political struggles of January 1979, the Mullahs proved to be better organized and more ruthless than the Left, and power consolidated in the hands of their chosen leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini. Secondly, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and turned the civil war against a quasi-Communist government into resistance against a foreign invader. The Revolution was an inspiration while Afghanistan promised to become a training ground.

As an aside, while Islamic Fundamentalists often claim victory in Afghanistan against the Soviets, it was a most hollow one. The Soviets were ruthless in an already savage civil war, and about 1.5 million Afghans were killed in the decade the Soviets were there – while the Soviets lost 15,000 dead. While the guerrillas were a constant vexation, they couldn't prevent the Soviet military from going wherever it wanted to. As it was, the prime cause behind the Soviet pullout in 1989 was the pending political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union.

Through the 1980s, Islamic Fundamentalists became a growing threat. Egypt's leader, Anwar Sadat, was assassinated while watching a military parade in 1981 (the specific cited cause for the attack by the Egyptian Fundamentalists was the relaxing of traditional restrictions on Egypt's Coptic Christians). The 1983 suicide truck bombings of a French and a US Marine barracks in Beirut was a shock, but also introduced a brand new tactic to the terrorist's inventory. Meanwhile, in Iran's repulse of an Iraqi invasion, teenaged boys with 40-year old bolt-action rifles and plastic keys to the gates of Heaven charged into Iraqi artillery barrages; while Afghan guerrillas took appalling casualties to inflict pinprick losses on the Soviets.

With the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, cadres of ex-guerrillas, many of whom were volunteers from a number of Islamic nations, were now crouched ready for employment. They had often been thoroughly imbued with Islamic Fundamentalist doctrine when in the frontier regions of northwest Pakistan, particularly as Saudi money that helped pay for these guerrillas had also come with fiery Wahhabi clerics from the Saudi kingdom.

Wahhabism is the final component to the explosive mix of Islamic Fundamentalism. Left to their own devices, many Muslims have strayed from the exacting path defined in the early years of Islam. For example, Bosnian Muslims used to raise pigs, drank plum brandy, and their women were neither sheltered nor veiled. Similar degrees of laxity were noticed in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and among the Persians by explorers and anthropologists. However, in 18th Century Arabia, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab created a new Sunni sect that has proven to be as intolerant, zealous, and destructive as the worst of Europe's 16th Century Calvinists and Puritans were.

The Wahhabis, with the backing of the House of Ibn Saud (the Saudi Royal Family) seek to impose the strictest interpretations of Islam among believers. Their interpretations of the Hadith and Sharia Laws are on the narrowest possible limits -- with dire results for women, cultural artifacts that predate the arrival of Islamic society, and toleration for non-Muslims within Muslim-dominated societies. From here, it was not impossible for some Wahhabis to also dream of a return to Islam's "days of glory" and the days when Islam was spread by fire and sword among the unbelievers... enter Osama Bin Laden.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

The Rise of al Qaeda

There were a number of Islamic Fundamentalist groups in existence by the mid-1980s. Hizbollah was active in southern Lebanon, Hamas was starting to appear in the Israeli occupied West Bank (albeit as more of an Islamic aid group than a terrorist organization), and Sunni Fundamentalism was on the rise in Egypt – both in reaction to the crisis among the young, but also because of Anwar Sadat's liberal policies toward the Christian Coptic community and his making peace with Israel.⁶⁰

Worse still, the excitement of the Arab world had been kindled by the short lived takeover of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979, by an improvised force of 1,300 or so Muslims who rejected both the Communist/Secular influences among the existing Middle Eastern insurgents of the time, and the American/Western connections of the Saudi Royal Family. The leader of the group, an adventurer named Juhayman ibn-Muhammad ibn-Sayf al-Utabi, did not survive the incident (in which well over a thousand other people were killed), but he did touch a cord with many restive Muslims.⁶¹

However, all the elements that created al Qaeda and the explosion in Islamic Insurgent movements really fused together in the 1980s in Afghanistan. Volunteers from throughout the Muslim world gathered together in the base camps that supported Afghan Guerrillas in Pakistan's often wild and un-policed North West Frontier districts. This is where they connected with Saudi money, were exposed to Islamic Fundamentalist organizers like Sheikh AbdAllah Yussuf Azzam, and received arms and training sponsored by Pakistan's security forces (who had been supporting terrorist groups operating in India since the 1970s).

Osama bin Laden, the restless younger son of an enormously wealthy Saudi construction magnate (and a billionaire in his own right) was among those who flocked to the camps and he reinvented himself there. Few of the foreign volunteers spent much time deep inside Afghanistan, and so were only exposed to enough of the fighting to whet their interest in it without running the serious risk of being killed. However, as they waited in the camps inside Pakistan, there was ample time for political conditioning, and the Islamic Fundamentalists had the monopoly in this market.

The cluster of Fundamentalist state supporters, radicalized individuals, terrorist groups, and their infrastructures gradually evolved into what it is today. Bin Laden himself was first exposed to the violent Fundamentalist cause when he participated in the Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s. There, he met with another significant figure in modern Islamist extremism, Sheikh AbdAllah Yussuf Azzam. Azzam left the Palestinian struggle, disgusted at its secular nationalism, and found himself drawn to the Jihad in Afghanistan. There he found an outlet for

⁶⁰ Some of the material in this section is also available in Joe Turlej's "*The Threat Matrix: Conceptualizing al Qaeda and its Role in the Wider Islamist Threat Environment*" Mackenzie Institute Briefing Notes #20, January 2003.

⁶¹ Bodansky, pg 6-7. For a number of reasons, the incident has received less attention than it deserves and other accounts are not generally available.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

his radical beliefs: “*Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences and no dialogues.*”⁶² He established training camps for the arriving Mujahideen in neighboring Pakistan. With Azzam’s zeal and bin Laden’s cash, the two created the Mujahideen Services Bureau (*mekhtab al khidemat* or MAK), which recruited Muslims from its international offices in over 50 countries for the anti-Soviet Jihad.

According to Rohan Gunaratna, it was in the latter stages of the Afghan Jihad that Azzam first conceptualized al Qaeda. He visualized a cohesive, self-sacrificing Islamic Fundamentalist vanguard that would, by means of an armed struggle, create a greater Islamic state. Elements of MAK’s infrastructure, by this time significant, began to evolve into what is now known as al Qaeda, yet the two still remained separate entities. MAK was also an efficient conduit for cash generated in the Middle East, and from Western sources to train and support volunteers fighting the Soviets. Azzam was concerned that without an organization such as al Qaeda, the massive Mujahideen force then fighting the Soviets could be corrupted.

In 1988, a dispute erupted between bin Laden and Azzam over the direction in which the fledgling al Qaeda would proceed. Bin Laden wanted it to become a global terrorist organization, but Azzam opposed this. In 1989, Azzam was killed by a car bomb. Gunaratna argues that it was the Egyptian Mujahideen, (with ties to terrorists in that country) who allied themselves with bin Laden, who actually carried out the assassination.⁶³ Even after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, al Qaeda still maintained a presence in Pakistan.

During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, bin Laden became openly enraged at the Saudi government’s decision to allow American and European troops to be stationed there. The Saudi Royal Family rejected his plan for a Mujahideen force as an alternative to the Coalition invasion of Kuwait. In the eyes of bin Laden and other Fundamentalists, it was sacrilege to allow Western Christians (infidels and ‘Crusaders’) to guard the holy sites of Islam – which is the role the Saudi Royal family is supposed to fill. The Saudi royals forced bin Laden into exile.

Bin Laden was then drawn to Sudan, and into the orbit of its spiritual leader Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, who offered the fig leaf of legitimacy to a brutal Islamic Fundamentalist military dictatorship. Al-Turabi had ambitions to create a wider Islamic revolution beyond his own country, and placed both Sudan’s wealth and territory behind this objective. In the early 1990s, extensive efforts were undertaken in that country to build a support infrastructure by numerous terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. Al-Turabi, a Sunni Fundamentalist, formed an alliance with Tehran, the primary Shi’ite sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East. The significance of this new alliance, consisting of the two major factions within Islamist terrorism, cannot be understated -- the resources of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbollah were brought together with the “Arab Afghans” and the emerging al Qaeda organization.

⁶² Bodansky, p. 11.

⁶³ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, pp. 22-23.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Sudan offered a safe haven for these terrorist organizations to train, plan and organize. Soon, another state sponsor, Pakistan and the Fundamentalist terrorist groups trained and run by its Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI), joined the alliance and offered their existing training camps and expertise to the equation. They also used their influence and presence in Afghanistan to open even more facilities. Numerous other insurgent and terrorist organizations joined, including Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front. The brutal Taliban, after winning the civil war in Afghanistan, immediately embraced bin Laden and his associates. Within several years, the foundations were laid for a massive network of terrorists to generate and launder cash, train and deploy terrorists, and strike around the globe. Bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization became rising stars in this endeavor. His expertise in international business and construction, as well as his experience as a veteran of the Afghan conflict, made him indispensable in the formation stages. Over time, his organizational successes allowed him to attain a position of authority and prominence.

Al Qaeda in Canada

The first al Qaeda terrorist to be noticed in Canada was Ahmed Ressam. He was a former member of the GIA in Algeria, fled to France in 1993, and arrived in Canada (with a bogus French passport) to make a refugee claim in 1994 – by which time he was already tied into a Salafist cell in France. As the French unraveled this cell, they noticed a number of ties to a similar cell in Montreal, and increasingly urged Canadian authorities to investigate it. By the time the RCMP launched themselves on Ressam's trail, he was already preparing to cross the US border with a car trunk full of explosives and sophisticated bomb timers.

There are many other Canadian connections to al Qaeda. Perhaps the most senior member is Ahmad Sa'id Al-Kadr (the Canadian): Born in Egypt, and a long-time Canadian resident, he left his family behind in Toronto and went to Afghanistan to act as the regional coordinator for Human Concern International.⁶⁴ While there, he took up a friendship with Osama bin Laden and is reported to have become one of his aides as well as security coordinator. In 1995, the Pakistanis held him in detention in connection with the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad. He was released after Prime Minister Chrétien personally raised his case with then Prime Minister Benizir Bhutto. His whereabouts are currently unknown, but he is probably somewhere near Osama bin Laden. Al Kadr has had two sons picked up by Coalition troops in Afghanistan. One was just 16 when taken prisoner shortly after mortally wounding a US Army medic with a grenade.

All told, some 25 Canadian residents/citizens have been publicly identified as members of al Qaeda and its subsets, and the Canadian government has banned 15 of its member organizations so far. It is possible that there are dozens of other members who are yet to be identified. We have been used as source for recruits and fundraising. While it is unlikely that Canadians will directly experience the full force of an al Qaeda attack like that of 9-11, or the 1998 African Embassy bombings, we are not immune to their threat.

⁶⁴ Human Concern International was quick to sever its connections with Al-Kadr in 1995 and remains a reputable Canadian-based charity that dispenses aid in a number of Muslim countries. In the initial edition of this report, we stated that it was a banned charity that had diverted money to al Qaeda – these statements were in error and we regret the harm they may have caused.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Two

Chapter 3: Terrorist Supporters and Politics

On Front Organizations

Mao Zedong once said that guerrillas were fish swimming in a sea of the people. Terrorists must do the same thing, but they usually have to work hard to ensure that the water is just right. There was a time when fear and secrecy alone could let a terrorist group thrive inside the sea of a larger population; but the groups that relied on these techniques alone have largely vanished. The current situation is much more complicated.

An embryonic terrorist group must still conceal itself, but if it is to grow it must proselytize and recruit without bringing fatal attention from the authorities. The usual technique is to utilize co-believers and sympathizers, who share the same cause but who are not prepared to personally engage in violence, to undertake these activities for them. There can be something of a chicken and egg argument here, because the terrorist can also easily develop from the most dedicated supporters of an existing campaign.

By way of example; the IRA and the Irish Republican political ideology had a long history in 20th Century Ireland, and when civil unrest in Ulster in the 1960s spiraled into the confrontational situation that currently exists, it was easy for those Catholic Republicans, who were predisposed towards violence, to drift towards the IRA (from which they separated to become the Provisional Wing of the IRA when the tentative hesitancy of the 'Old' IRA failed to meet their needs), and those disposed towards activism went on to revitalize Sinn Fein. Some of the interviews in Peter Taylor's *Behind the Mask*, illustrate this point.¹ On the other side of the issue, there was no shortage of historical examples of Protestant misbehavior to inspire the Orange Paramilitaries.

Another well known model can be seen in a number of cases: A group engages in protest and confrontation, but as society or the authorities fail to agree with them (usually for excellent reasons), the extreme end hives off to form a separate group of their own. The sporadic violence coming from the Anti-Abortion/Pro-Life movement is one example, as more agitated members occasionally decide that action must be taken – James Charles Kopp, the gunman who sniped at a number of physicians who purportedly provided abortions is a case in point. The mimeographed notes of the Animal Liberation Front and Dave Foreman's field guide for Earth First! are 'how-to' guides for those who have tired of talk and wish to turn to what is styled as 'Direct Action'.² One of the more salient points within these guides is the instruction that the real militant must drop out of the protest group for about six months or so before embarking on a career of terrorism in order to deceive the police. The same process may be at work in the Anti-globalization

¹ Peter Taylor; *Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein*; TV Books, New York, 1997

² Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood – editors; *Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching*; (Second edition); A Ned Ludd Book, Tucson Arizona. The Animal Liberation Front instruction guide contains no details about its authors and producers, but seems to have come from the United Kingdom sometime in the early 1980s.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

movement, where the more violent extremists are believed to be generating a terrorist group of their own.

Among the terrorist groups that have created themselves first, and then spawned a political front, are the Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Their founder, Veliupillai Prabhakaran, arose out of a politicized criminal underworld inside Sri Lanka, and made a transition from being a *Kappan* Collector (an extortionist) to the founder of his own terrorist group in 1972-73. Thereafter, the political front and the guerrilla force were constructed as the need arose.³

As an aside: Until the September 11th attacks, some commentators on terrorism considered the LTTE to be the most dangerous terrorist group in the world. This was not because of their lethal intentions and violent skills -- the primacy of al Qaeda was already recognized in this regard and the Tigers have never yet attacked Western targets -- but because the LTTE was setting new standards for sophistication and audacity in terms of its political and propaganda activities. As a result, much of this chapter will concern them.

Regardless of how a political front for a terrorist group is generated, it ends up serving a number of vital roles.

The political front is at its most effective as a legal organization that can openly operate within the targeted society (like Sinn Fein does). Failing that, it must then be able to freely operate abroad -- usually within a country that contains expatriates from the homeland society that the terrorists are actively engaging. In order to gain credibility and further the cause, it must undertake its own separate activities that are often entirely apart from the activities of the terrorists. Some fronts are bona fide political parties, others are community groups that run charitable institutions, and others are activists in their own respect.

Less effective, but still useful, are disassociated fronts where it is almost impossible to trace a connection between the terrorist and his supporters. In the current case of al Qaeda, some supporters have been known to recruit for the organization and openly preach a hard political line by calling for the destruction of Jews, Americans, and other Western people from inside our own societies. For example, some Muslims Britons have warned British authorities about clerics in London area Mosques such as Syrian-born Sheik Omar Bakri Mohammed and the Palestinian-born Sheik Omar Abu Omar (aka Abu Umr al-Taqfiri).⁴ But there are other Fundamentalist clerics who preach similar messages without ever openly affiliating themselves with any existing terrorist group.

Other groups are next to impossible to identify. The prescient Steven Emerson, who spent much of the 1990s as a lone voice in America trying to warn about the growing presence of Islamic Fundamentalists within the country, pointed out that Palestinian Islamic Jihad was active (through the Islamic Concern Project/Islamic Committee for

³ This is discussed in “*Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of Tami Eelam and their Criminal Activities in Canada and the Western World*”; Mackenzie Briefing Notes, December 1995. See also C.H.S. Jayewardene and H. Jayewardene; *The Battle for Eelam*; Crimcare, Ottawa, 1987; and Kirthie Abeyesekera; *The Underworld of Sex, Crime and Drugs*; Lakehouse, Colombo, 1991.

⁴ “Radicals Recruit Members in British Mosques”, *National Post*, 29 December 2001, & Emerson Vermaat, “*Bin Laden’s Terror Networks in Europe*”, Mackenzie Institute Occasional Paper, May2002, pg 7.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

Palestine) in some American Universities among the Muslim student associations.⁵ At the time he was releasing warnings, hardly anybody in the police or intelligence communities was interested, but he was able to develop an incredible amount of information. Trying to deduce if the same group is (or is not) present in Concordia University in Montreal – a hotbed of Fundamentalist Palestinian extremism -- in the post 9-11 environment was an unachievable task.

Moreover, for their own protection, front organizations may have a layered organization where some people (even leaders within the group) are kept compartmentalized away from any knowledge about links between the front and the terrorist group. Such people can then, with the utmost sincerity of expression, expressly deny that the front is a companion to the terrorist group.

The use of terrorist violence inevitably draws condemnation from horrified neutral observers. The political front can draw the sting of disapproval away from the cause and re-direct it against the state or institution that the terrorists are attacking. The standard statement can usually be scripted as something like this: “We condemn/do not approve of/are shocked by this act of violence, but we understand why it happened.” Then the usual message of the group is regurgitated, and the message delivered by the terrorist is thus amplified by an earnest and confident media spokesperson instead of a faceless attacker. Moreover, the spokespersons for a front group can sometimes literally add insult to injury by blaming the target for what happened, and declaring that the victims, in a broad sense, actually caused the attack they received.

It does not automatically mean that any group that delivers a message of this sort is a front organization for a terrorist group, but if they share the same ideological world view and work on “consciousness raising” (to use the old 1960s term) to support the same cause, then they still work – however indirectly – on the terrorists’ behalf. Lenin called such people “useful idiots,” which is an appropriate description.

The political front can also engage in a number of activities that increase the legitimacy of the cause both to neutral audiences and to political figures. If new allies and supporters cannot be won over, then at least the situation could be sufficiently muddied in order to mitigate any concerted and focused action being taken against the terrorist group. It should be noted that many contemporary front organizations take full advantage of Western concerns about racism and cultural insensitivity. In short, the North American and Western European publics are expected to tolerate the intolerance of radicalized Muslim clerics, terrorist front organizations, and seasoned ideologues. It is easy to guess at what the end result of this imbalance might be.

The Art of Networking

In modern pressure politics, networking is the key to successful campaigning. For an activist, it is vital to make a ripple in society seem like a tidal wave. In today’s world, it

⁵ Steven Emerson; *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us*; The Free Press, New York, 2002. See pgs. 109-125

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

is vital for a cause to be represented by dozens of different organizations and seemingly endorsed by dozens more.

For example, one woman with an Ontario Animal Rights group in the early 1990s was in a leadership role with at least five different major Animal Rights organizations, and would write separate letters for all of them (each using different letterheads and formatting) when pressuring municipal governments. Additionally, she would describe herself as belonging to local committees of larger organizations, thus making it look as if groups like ARK-II and the International Wildlife Coalition had local chapters in the cities that her organization was targeting. One can imagine the effect of a dozen such activists, each presenting themselves as representing a dozen separate groups, on a credulous municipal clerk or member of a provincial legislature.⁶

The Toronto Disarmament Network would practice the same tactic in its lobby to get a “nuclear weapons free zone” in Toronto (as part of a larger campaign) in the late 1980s. A handful of members could easily represent dozens of groups between them, ranging from ‘Parkdale for Peace’, The Toronto Chapter of Psychiatrists for Social Responsibility, Kids for Peace, ad infinitum; and with additional letters being written by activists from major trade unions or Canadian Churches that often claimed to represent the entire parent organization. For 10 years (and with the signal help of at least once city councilor), the Peace Movement in Toronto was able to maintain a presence that belied the slender numbers of actual supporters that it really had.⁷

With these examples, is it any wonder that the supporters of the Tamil Tigers adopted the same tactics? In the 20 years since supporters and organizers for the LTTE started to arrive in Canada, they have created numerous organizations to add credibility to their cause and strengthen their hold on the Sri Lankan Tamil community here. These groups include:

Academy of Tamil Arts and Technology. Set up in 1990 by the World Tamil Movement (WTM), it was founded by the treasurer of the Tamil Eelam Society of Canada (TESC).⁸ Seemingly a cultural and immigration support organization, this group shares office space with TESC in two of its six Toronto-area locations. Its banner also appeared at an October 1997 protest against the jailing of Manickavasagem Suresh, a coordinator for the World Tamil Movement. The group’s main activities include teaching computer skills, English-as-a-second-language, and linking Tamils to their culture.

Appayan Temple. Subjected to a visit by Stewart Bell of the *National Post* (one of the stable of excellent reporters there, and has repeatedly drawn the ire of the Tiger’s front organizations), he noticed that a number of Tiger-related items were on sale in the temple and that a Tiger logo was on the door of a building on its grounds.⁹

Canadian Alert on Sri Lanka. One of the first groups to surface in Canada, it appeared in 1987 and established linkages with the Toronto ‘progressive’ community to sell the LTTE’s bona fides as a national liberation organization. There seems to be little sign of it in the 1990s.

⁶ “The Animal Rights Movement in Canada”; Mackenzie Advisory, October 1991.

⁷ “Swapping Peace for the Environment”, Mackenzie Advisory, August 1993.

⁸ *Toronto Star*, 27 January 2003

⁹ *National Post*, 6 September 2001, Pg. A17.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

Canadian Foundation for Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation. A registered charity and supporting member of the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT).

Canadian Tamil Congress. A new group established in October 2000 “to represent the interests of the Canadian Tamil community.” It may be an attempt to generate a new umbrella organization free of the bad press that some existing Tamil groups have attracted. Their key spokesman – so far – has a solid history of involvement in Tamil student activism at the University of Toronto and the Canadian Tamil Youth Development Centre against the *National Post*, the *Toronto Sun*, and the Mackenzie Institute.

Canadian Tamil Women's Community Services. This might not be all that closely affiliated with the main Tamil groups, as its purpose is to improve the lot of Tamil women within their own community. It has also condemned the abduction of Tamil girls by Tamil gang members.

Canadian Tamil Youth Development Centre. Although created with the help of the Tamil Eelam Society of Canada in 1998, one of its major purposes is to reduce the gang violence among young Tamils – which has been a source of great embarrassment (and loss of life) to the community. In 2000, it received \$50,000 from the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention to produce a study entitled “Toronto Tamil Youth: The Realities.” In 2002, they received \$90,000 from the same organization for similar studies, and \$6,000 from the City of Toronto under their “Breaking the Cycle of Violence” grants program. Members of the group have supported the LTTE's front organizations and the Tiger cause in several demonstrations.

Eelam Tamil Association of British Columbia & Eelam Tamil Association of Quebec. There is little publicly available information on these organizations, but both were designated by CSIS in December 2000 as fronts for the LTTE.

Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT). It has been repeatedly listed by the annual US State Department report “Patterns of Global Terrorism” as a front organization for the LTTE and one of its leaders, Manickavasagam Suresh, has been fighting a deportation effort on a National Security Certificate since 1995. The group has sought to intimidate some of those who describe it as a terrorist front through demonstrations and threatened law suits – it sued the *National Post* for \$13 million in October 2000. This is the main umbrella organization for pro-LTTE organizations in Canada.

It has shared premises with the WTM for many years and has a close working relationship with TESC – again sharing space and telephone numbers from time to time.

Society for the Aid of Ceylon Minorities (SACEM). The group became prominent outside the Tamil community in 1986 when 155 Tamil refugee claimants landed from lifeboats in Nova Scotia. Toronto initially received 61 of these, and SACEM played a noticeable role in getting them settled and raising funds for their aid – soliciting funds from the general public and offering tax-deductible charitable receipts.¹⁰ SACEM does not appear in Toronto phonebooks until 2001. In August 2001, their president described SACEM as an agency specifically serving the Tamil community in Toronto and elsewhere in Canada.

¹⁰ *Toronto Star*, 16 August 1986.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

Their title is a bit hypocritical, as the LTTE has been known to massacre Muslims (Sri Lanka's second minority after Tamils) who lived in the areas that the LTTE claimed for its envisioned state.

Tamil Anti-Racism Committee. Established in 1993 by TESC, the group has served to interact with Human Rights and Anti-Racism groups in Toronto. It has received funding from Toronto multicultural grants programs to host a series of community conferences. The group has started some of its meetings by singing both the Canadian national anthem and the LTTE's chosen anthem for an independent Tamil homeland.¹¹ The irony of a Tamil front organization clinging to the skirts of anti-racism in Canada while supporting the violent pursuit of a single ethnic state in Sri Lanka seems to have escaped most outside observers.

Tamil Cooperative Homes Inc. This is one of over 150 subsidized co-operative housing projects in the greater Toronto area. This group's high-rise apartment co-op was created in the late 1980s with 129 units. Most co-ops in Ontario pride themselves on the diversity of their occupants, and none seem quite as ethnically specific as this one. Funding for construction was obtained from the Ontario government through the Ministry of Housing. Between 1990 and 1993, the organization received \$4,939,919 in grants from the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Affordable Housing to recondition an existing co-op for about \$34,000 per unit. Altogether, government subsidies to 2000 have amounted to over \$84,000 per unit.¹²

With an unknown number of Tamils dependent on Ontario's social services, there is some need for social housing – although co-ops have been an expensive solution to this. It is easy to theorize (and impossible to prove) that the co-op mainly benefits people of value to the World Tamil Movement.

Tamil Co-ordinating Committee of Canada. Its office is located in downtown Ottawa, and the group was designated by CSIS in 2000 as a terrorist front. The group is a supporting member of FACT. Among other activities, the group supported a demonstration by the Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade against the National Capital Air Show in 1998 (a seemingly strange activity, but was probably a way of maintaining some bona fides with the local 'progressive' community). Their women's wing, the Ottawa Tamil Women's Association, promotes the LTTE's perspectives of their sisters in Sri Lanka.

Tamil Cultural Centre of Scarborough. The centre ran in the mid 1990s and offered lessons in Tamil dance, the Tamil language, and the violin. In the case of a cultural centre, the presumption of innocence should prevail, and the group may be innocent of political content. However, the Centre made extensive use of local high school facilities for evening events, and some of the same schools have been used to host fundraising events for the LTTE. It is also hard to imagine that a major cultural group could be allowed to operate without the sanction of the LTTE's fronts.

Tamil Eelam Association of British Columbia. After being listed by CSIS as a terrorist front organization in December 2000, the group was cut off by the BC Gaming

¹¹ *Toronto Sun*, 12 March 12, 2000, pg. 10.

¹² Records from the annual reports of the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

Commission from the receipt of proceeds from charity games and casinos -- although it did receive \$45,000 in donations in 1999.¹³ The group was carried on FACT letterhead in early 1996.

Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization. The group appears to be a showcase and networking point for the community in Canada and only the use of 'Tamil Eelam' in its name suggests its political alignment. They held a 'high tech expo' in Toronto in 2001.

Tamil Eelam Society of Canada. Incorporated as non-profit organization in 1978, it was originally given office space by the United Church of Canada. The group now has six different office locations in the Greater Toronto area as of the spring of 2002. In 1996, one of the group's spokesmen declared that they were the Canadian affiliate of the LTTE.¹⁴ The group has received millions of dollars in federal, provincial and municipal grants since its inception. Much of this money has come for immigrant services (including for language and resettlement programs, but also citizenship multicultural grants – which provide core funding and let the group run some of its other activities). It received about \$2 million in Federal funding in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001, and has received \$11 million overall since 1994.¹⁵

The Society has staged meetings to denounce critics of the LTTE, such as the meeting of the Tamil-Canadian Race Relations Conference that the invited Toronto police representative walked out of after realizing the true purpose of the meeting was to denounce a police report that the LTTE was receiving \$12 million a year out of Toronto. This was also the meeting where the Society's President let slip that "*We [Tamils] are a race that has achieved perfection much ahead of any country in the world.*"¹⁶ In a September 2001 interview with an Australian TV journalist, their president Sitta Sittampalam said "*We do support the LTTE.*" Perhaps they are not the best vehicle to provide settlement services for new Canadians.

In 2000, Sitta Sittampalam and a delegation from FACT consulted with Raymond Chan, Canadian Secretary of State for the Asia Pacific Region, as guests of the Canadian government.¹⁷

As an aside, a profile of the Tamil people produced by the Society for Toronto's 2002 Caravan Festival (a major celebration of the diversity of the city) claims that "the Tamil civilization is over 5,000 years old," and appropriates the legacy of the ancient Dravidian cities of the Indus Valley entirely to the Tamils. One might be reminded of other hyper-nationalistic ideologues that made similar romantic constructions – White supremacists, for example, or the Japanese militarists of the 1930s.

Tamil Eelam Society of Mississauga. The group does not appear to be an active one, and might only serve as another of the Potemkin organizations that usually add the illusion of weight to activist networks of any kind – except that it shares the address of the Tamil registered charity *Motherland and Child Care of Sri Lanka* in office space now run by the

¹³ *National Post*; 12 December 2000, pg A8.

¹⁴ *Now Magazine*; 16 August 1990, pg 17.

¹⁵ Tamil Eelam Society of Canada Annual Report 2000/2001, Ottawa Citizen, 4 October 2001

¹⁶ *Toronto Sun*, 3 March 1996, pg. 12.

¹⁷ *National Post*; 31 October 2000

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

Academy of Tamil Arts and Technology.

The Tamil Refugee Aid Society of Ottawa. A registered charity -- also known as the Tamil (Sri Lanka) Refugee Aid Society of Ottawa -- their filings show very meager donations. These are usually under \$5,000, and are dispersed in Canada and Sri Lanka.

Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation. Another vague organization about whom little is known; but an earlier group called Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation of Canada operated out of the same address as the main office of the Tamil Eelam Society of Canada and the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils. As a consideration, the *Sri Lanka News* (Canadian edition) reported that similar organizations in Great Britain were used as 'employment banks' and to provide housing for LTTE activists.¹⁸ The *Sri Lanka News* is a periodical published by the Sri Lankan government.

Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (Canada). From the mid-1990s until 2002, they were lodged in the same building as FACT, but now have office space of their own. Established in 1985 in northeastern Sri Lanka, the organization is part of a network in 15 countries and was designated as a terrorist front by CSIS in December 2000. In 1998, the President of FACT said that the group sent \$300,000 a year back to northeastern Sri Lanka.¹⁹

Tamil Relief Organization. This group also shares office space with the Tamil Elam Society of Canada and the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils. The group's British branch was a registered charity that has been accused of transferring millions of Pounds to the hands of the LTTE.²⁰

Tamil Resource Centre: This group was active in the 1990s in endorsing protests by the Toronto Coalition Against Racism (a cause other Tamil groups have espoused), but was firebombed in 1995 after its board of directors opined that perhaps both sides of the war in Sri Lanka were guilty of human rights abuses.²¹

Tamil Seniors Centre. Its spokesman was an external advisor to the Trillium Foundation of Canada in 1996/7 (the group which dispenses largess from Ontario lotteries), despite not having a discernable phone number at the time. It does exist now through public funding from two levels of government. The group is an affiliate of FACT

Tamil Students Association, Ryerson. This is a student group. There are also Tamil Students Associations at the University of Ottawa, University of Windsor, the University of Waterloo, Community Colleges in the Toronto area, and even at several high schools.

Tamil Students Association, University of Toronto. First noticed after a 1993 shooting incident (one of many in the Tamil community about which little remains known) on the UofT Campus, the group also coordinated the February 2000 demonstration against the *Toronto Sun*.

Tamil Students Association of York University. Cited in the *Socialist Worker*, one of the

¹⁸ *Sri Lanka News* (Canadian Edition) September 2000, pg. 6

¹⁹ *Toronto Star*, 10 November, 1998 pgs. B1

²⁰ *Sri Lanka News*, September 2000. The Canadian Senate Committee for Security and Intelligence made note of the fact in October 2000.

²¹ *Globe and Mail*, 17 June 1995.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

surviving dialectical epistles of Canada's Marxist leftovers, describing one of the authors of this report as "Right-Wing" and "Racist" for daring to condemn the LTTE's activities in Canada. It should be noted that the use of these pejoratives is common nowadays for any criticism of a contemporary terrorist or organized criminal group drawn from a narrow ethnic base; only the most credulous tend to take such remarks seriously.

Thamilar Oli Association Inc. Little is known about this Montreal-based group. It is a supporting member of FACT, and was a supporting member of the campaign to free Suresh.

Women Organization of World Tamil Movement A group that makes occasional appearances at International Women's Days events.

World Tamil Movement. Listed by "Patterns of Global Terrorism" as a front for the LTTE, the group has been similarly described by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service.²² It also has a presence in Western Europe and Australia. The Canadian offices of the WTM often share office space and phone numbers with FACT. They have received public funding over the years to pay for outreach and staffing purposes.

World Tamil Movement – Ontario. It first surfaced in 1989 and quickly aligned itself with sundry anti-racism groups. It also received funding from the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship to hire a co-coordinator in 1993. The group is a member of FACT.

World Tamil Movement – Quebec. Another member of FACT.

There are several other organizations in Canada's Sri Lankan Tamil community, and one might wonder whether LTTE supporters have taken control of them. One complaint does stand out from an international conference on Tamil Culture held at the Metro Convention Centre in Toronto, where one of the delegates accused the LTTE of trying to turn the gathering into a fundraising event.²³

There is a long and noble tradition of self-help organizations from particular communities assisting newcomers with settlement in Canada, and some of these groups have carried grievances towards the governments back in their homeland -- this was especially true of our Eastern European compatriots who arrived in the 1940s and '50s. In many respects, the Tamil community is perpetuating the self-help tradition, although lavish government funding was not as available to earlier groups as it is today. But using the front groups for a terrorist organization to spearhead settlement and cultural life is a definite and unwelcome precedent.

In Jacques Ellul's classic study *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes* he observed that propaganda had to be 'total' and universal if it was to succeed. One can imagine the effect for a Sri Lankan Tamil family that has arrived in Canada (almost invariably in the Toronto area), and finds that supporters of the LTTE run all of the services designed to facilitate their transition here. The family's breadwinner finds that English language training, new job skills, and employment services are run through LTTE-support groups. As the parents receive training to settle them, FACT-approved

²² *Toronto Sun*, 26 March 1998 p.20.

²³ *Globe and Mail*, 26 August, 1996, p A3.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

child minders are baby-sitting their children. From there, the LTTE's supporters will be running events at the cultural centres or staffing tables at the temple.

If this family looks for Tamil commentary in the media, they will find no shortage of newspapers, radio programs and television shows. These are, at best, neutral (by not mentioning the conflict at home) or else pro-Tiger. The consequences for taking a counter-LTTE line are illustrated by a pair of events – a 1992 drive-by shooting at the home of a Tamil language broadcaster who refused to play pro-Tiger ads on his show, and the 1995 persecution of the distributors and advertisers in David Jeyaraj's newspaper *Muncharie*. Nobody was hurt in the first case, although three bullets were fired through a front door.²⁴ Jeyaraj was forced out of business, especially after the distributor of his paper had his leg broken and van set on fire.²⁵

There are also some controls over Tamil language DVDs and VHS tapes, to limit the effects of films produced in India's Tamil Nadu State – although the demand for Tamil language films and videos from India is voracious.²⁶ A series of visits to the video racks in some stores in the Tamil neighborhoods in Toronto was undertaken in the course of this study; while 'Bollywood' entertainment movies were easily available, some LTTE-related videos were on display in a locked case. Requests for copies of these were turned down (it should be pointed out that these attempts were not made by people of Dravidian/South Asian appearance).

Propaganda, in order to be successful, requires the intended audience to be willing to receive the propagandist's message. There are ample signs that a great many Canadian Tamils, despite the wide net cast by the LTTE's supporters, are not all that willing to accept all of their messages. While the 30-year conflict (if one uses Prabhakaran's 1972 murder of a Tamil politician as the starting point) has entered its third ceasefire in February of 2002, there is no necessary guarantee that the peace process will work out this time either. After all, the LTTE is still drafting children and acquiring arms.²⁷ The senior leadership of the LTTE has invested too much in the struggle, and after 30 years, war has become business to them. Still, the vast majority of Tamils both in Sri Lanka and in Canada are tired of the whole business. It might not be easy to rekindle their interest and re-ignite their loyalty if the war resumes.

The LTTE's support network has also worked on forming linkages outside the Tamil Community. Their groups played an active role in "Anti-Racism" causes in the early 1990s, and linked in with Toronto's Anti-Racist Action (a group that usually prides itself on brawling with white supremacists – although the latter have been furtive and rare in recent years), the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, and with similar groups.

They have sought connections with Canada's 'Progressive' Left by presenting themselves as a national liberation struggle. This has earned them some sympathy from a

²⁴ *Toronto Sun*; 25 May 1992. There were also the murders of Dr. Dhian Thanpar (February 1992) and Prithvi Raj Vij (March 1991), both of whom also had media links, but these have never been solved or traced to LTTE supporters.

²⁵ *Globe and Mail*; 19 February, 1996. Pg A6.

²⁶ Cheran, p. 15

²⁷ *Globe and Mail*; 7 January 2003, p. A10.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

few prominent Canadian lawyers – Clayton Ruby initially represented the suit against the *National Post*, and Nancy Jackman has guided Suresh through eight years of legal battles to delay his deportation. Presumably, this appeal to the Left might have helped in dealing with Ontario's NDP government in 1990-95. However, fooling the Canadian Left is both easy and pointless, as they don't carry much weight anymore. Networking with political parties that hold power is much more useful.

There are other networks that support other terrorist groups in Canada, but few operate as openly or as universally as the Tamils do. Militant Sikhs from the Babbar Khalsa and International Sikh Youth Organization have never been able to dominate Canadian Sikh community life, although they did try to do so in the 1980s. There are a number of Muslim/Arab groups that will be defensive about Islamic issues, and who certainly do not love Israel, but the Canadian Muslim community is too diverse to be easily united, let alone controlled. But FACT and the World Tamil Movement have shown what is possible, and one should fear those that attempt to follow their example.

Cultivating Politicians

If democratic societies have one real weakness, it is that popularity usually carries more weight than principle. Political figures, at all levels of government, have to work hard if they want to be re-elected; and those that keep their seats have usually put in long hours of work for their constituents. It is easy to be contemptuous of a city councilor, a Provincial MLA, or a Federal MP (especially if you disagree with them on most issues), but most of them really do deserve more respect than they usually receive. Yet their greatest handicap remains the need to secure re-election.

Margins of victory at election time can be quite thin. Few of Canada's provincial or federal representatives win their seats with more than 50% of the popular vote, and Elections Canada results show that only PC-Alliance vote splitting has let the Federal Liberals win their three consecutive majority governments. One result of this fragility is that most representatives are careful around ethnic/cultural issues, especially if they have a large bloc of people from the same background in their riding – and the militants, activists, and self-appointed community leaders in Canada know it.

No politician can afford to have a number of his constituents angry with him, particularly in a public forum, and especially if their leaders really can deliver a large bloc of votes. Over the past 30 years, it has also become difficult to avoid encountering ethnic blocs in all federal ridings, especially during nomination battles, when it is easy for organizers to scoop up huge numbers of new members by canvassing cultural organizations and community groups.

Some politicians can embrace a particular group without reservations: The NDP Windsor area MP Joe Comartin is appealing for support from Muslim Canadians (and has posed in front of a poster of Saddam Hussein for a photo on his website), and has attracted numerous new members and contributions for his campaign chest from the

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

Muslim community.²⁸ One can compare him to the Liberal MP Derek Lee (Scarborough Rouge River), who has run into flak from both the Tamils and Muslims in his riding over his government's actions to reduce terrorism. Lee, at a time when Ottawa was contemplating placing restrictions on the activities of the Tamil Tigers, had Canadian Tamils on his own riding association executive and had to face angry Tamil constituents over the issue. *"I think I am going to soon have to ask them if they want to be Canadians first or Tamils first."*²⁹ The results from the next elections in these two ridings will yield illuminating results.

In Canadian politics several things carry weight with candidates: contributions, volunteers, supporters, and positive press and community endorsements.

Contributions to political parties and campaigns are tax deductible; they also don't always have to be reported. Elections Canada will (grudgingly and with some expense) provide copies of campaign contributions only after an election, or will release records of contributions to national political parties between elections.

Donation records to riding associations between elections – when they are most appreciated – and to leadership campaigns are only available when an individual candidate or riding association chooses to release them. This seldom happens, and the result is that there is no clear and efficient way to determine if front groups or leadings figures within them are making donations to political parties. Researchers for this report spent considerable time examining the Elections Canada campaign reports, but as donor addresses are not carried on the list, there was no way to verify the identities of suspected donors with ties to terrorist front groups.

While riding associations are required to file reports listing their executive members with Elections Canada, these reports are not made available to the public. Moreover, they are only required during elections. Again, this makes it difficult to determine if front organizations are entering into Party riding associations.

This lack of transparency in our political process is dangerous.

Anecdotal information is of no use when charging that Front Groups for terrorist organizations are systematically supporting particular political parties with volunteers and campaign workers. Two interview subjects for this study alleged that the LTTE's front groups have ensured that there is a plentiful supply of eager young Tamil volunteers to help out in particular ridings (with the implication that the most important criteria is that the candidate belongs to the party most likely to form a government at the federal or provincial level); but their remarks could not be confirmed and for all we know, the Tamils could have been motivated by wholesome civic-mindedness.

There are some facts that can be worked with. Civic events that draw media coverage, and give a politician exposure and photo-ops, are much appreciated. The Hindu New Year's Party in a city that now has hundreds of thousands of Hindus would be a valuable function for a politician to attend. Unfortunately, too many attended the 2000 New Years Party hosted by FACT – the open front group for the LTTE. Among the municipal,

²⁸ National Post; 14 December 2002 p. A5

²⁹ *Toronto Star*; 6 January 2003. and a conversation between Derek Lee and the author in November 2001.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

provincial and federal political figures in attendance at the event were two Liberal cabinet ministers, Paul Martin and Maria Minna.³⁰

The two ministers (or their staffers, whose job requires them to vet the appointments of their ministers) should have known better. Ottawa had already spent five years trying to deport Suresh, a FACT leader, for reasons of National Security. The RCMP and CSIS were well aware of the group's nature, and the latter had published an open report on the group that described it as a front organization, and mentioned that it raises money from often unwilling Canadian Tamils to support the LTTE's insurgency.³¹ The two ministers did not react at all well to those who informed them that they had dined with a terrorist group, and called their critics "un-Canadian".

Other representatives at various levels of government are often only too happy to raise an issue for their constituents when they perceive an injustice is happening. Often they really do not have the time to look at things closely. This was presumably the case for Marlene Catterall, a Liberal MP from Ottawa West (where there are some Tamils, but not the decisive concentration of them that can be found in Toronto's Scarborough area). The initial defence (long since dismissed in several hearings) for Suresh was that repatriation to Sri Lanka would result in his torture and/or death. Marlene Catterall introduced a petition in April 1996 to the House of Commons, calling for Ottawa to remain neutral towards Sri Lanka, and demanding the release of Suresh.³²

Jim Brown was a member of the Conservative government of Mike Harris in his first term from 1995 to 1999, but the Scarborough area representative was unable to be nominated for the next election. During the first Harris government, he was appointed as the Head of Ontario's Crime Commission, a group that was tasked with looking for new ideas and suggestions for tackling crime in the Province. Suggestions that dealt with the Tamil Tigers were shot down or ignored. It later turned out that his assistant, Anton Phillip, was on an RCMP affidavit listing dozens of Canadian Tamils who had occupied senior leadership positions with the LTTE in Sri Lanka.³³ In a 1997 telephone conversation with one of the authors, Brown observed that all the talk about the LTTE was "Sri Lankan propaganda" – which is one of a number of common responses that FACT and the WTM make when criticized.

Phillip has also worked as the event coordinator for the Tamil Anti-Racism Committee in 2001, and represented the Tamil Eelam Society in the Metro Toronto Community Advisory Committee on Anti-Hate and Anti-Racism in 1996.³⁴ One of the authors was also told by an Alliance Party member that Phillip had briefly worked with the Stockwell Day leadership campaign in 2000, but this has not been substantiated.

The LTTE's front organizations will react quickly to criticism of their groups and their cause. They will hold demonstrations, such as the major rally in front of the Don Jail

³⁰ *National Post* 6 May 2000.

³¹ Peter Chalk; "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organization and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis"; CSIS Commentary No. 77, Winter 1999.

³² *Hansard*; Monday April 22, 1996, (30)

³³ *Now Magazine*; 29 October – 4 November 1998 Edition, Pg. 30 An RCMP officer confirmed to one of the authors that Phillips had worked as a propagandist for the LTTE in Madras.

³⁴ *Scarborough Mirror*, 28 March 2001, pg. 3

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

when Suresh was imprisoned there, and have tried to intimidate the *Toronto Sun* in February 2000 (which seems to have worked for a few months), and the *National Post*. Avalanches of phone calls, e-mails, and letters can also beleaguer their critics –although many of these come from unidentifiable sources and some can be threatening.

During the February 2000 phone-jamming offensive on the Mackenzie Institute, there was one-hour pause during the blitz – when a call came in from Jim Karygiannis, the Liberal MP for Scarborough Agincourt, who offered to mediate in the dispute we had seemingly generated. There is room to wonder about all the implications of this call.

At the gathering of Tamil University students in Toronto on January 13th, 2002, Derek Lee was pressed to speak and chose to defend the Government's security legislation – in the face of an audience that might have been best regarded as carefully neutral. He was then roped into presenting an award for a Pro-Tiger journalist. By contrast, Karygiannis was warmly received, particularly when he chose to attack his own government's Post 9-11 counter-terrorism bills. But then, the LTTE front organizations have described him as an "ardent supporter" of their cause.³⁵

Nor are the Tigers the only beneficiaries of intervention by government figures. The Sikh community, especially in British Columbia, has long been roughly divided into factions based on feelings about the Babbar Khalsa. Generally, pro-BKI Sikhs tend to gravitate towards the Federal Liberals, while more moderate Sikhs have emerged in the Alliance and the NDP. Overall, the Sikh community tends to be an activist one with a level of political involvement far beyond that of the general Canadian population.

Currently, Herb Dhaliwal and David Kilgour (Dhaliwal is a cabinet minister and Kilgour is a junior one) have joined the lobby that is attempting to keep a Khalistan Commando Force member in Surrey BC from being repatriated to India to face capital charges for a 1993 terror bombing.³⁶ As a part of this campaign, a delegation – which included two members of the ISYF (now a banned terrorist organization) -- traveled to Ottawa and met with the Prime Minister and three other senior cabinet ministers. The terrorist delegation also met with NDP MP Svend Robinson and Alliance MP Gurmant Grewal.

There are a number of election-related anecdotes collected in the course of this report, but most cannot be substantiated – which is not uncommon in Canadian politics anyway. People who have worked as canvassers on political campaigns often imply that the Voters List is inaccurate, and that there is no way to ascertain that only Canadian citizens are voting. One author has heard NDP, Liberal, Conservative, and Reform/Alliance members wonder how, for example, 43 paid up party members can be living in a three bedroom suburban house in Markham during a hard-fought nomination fight; or how two people who arrived in Canada two months before a federal election (and those of 10 other people of the same background in their tiny apartment) are on the voter's list.

³⁵ "Get together of Inter-University Tamil Students", *The World Mirror*, January 23-February 5th 2002 edition. The World Mirror is one of the several periodicals associated with the Tamil Community in Toronto.

³⁶ "Dhaliwal campaigning to save Sikh terrorist"; *National Post*; 5 April 2003. Pg. A14, and Kim Bolan's original article in the *Vancouver Sun* (published on the same date) contains even more details.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Three

Are the supporters of the Tamil Tigers – or other major terrorist groups -- making inroads into the Canadian political system? Probably. Can it be proved? Not at present. However, it would certainly be useful – for a number of excellent reasons – if the Canadian political system became much more transparent.

There are supporters and members of many other terrorists groups in Canada who also engaged in political activism. But it is hard to take the Mujahedin e-Khalq seriously when their major campaign for 1989 featured a pair of members carrying a sandwich board with photos of Iranian atrocities while failing to get passers-by to accept some badly written pamphlets (this was seen on Sparks Street in Ottawa and Yonge Street in Toronto).

Likewise, it is hard to see FARC as having a serious Canadian political presence when their main support comes from the Communist Party of Canada. On March 4th 1999, the UofT Communists hosted a FARC speaker (one J. Romero), and the January 1999 edition of *People's Voice* offered “solidarity bonds” for sale to support FARC.³⁷ In December 2001, *People's Voice* also advertised a FARC benefit dance in Vancouver, while the National Action Committee on the Status of Women decided to support FARC in June 1999.

This is trivial support, but perhaps it does let FARC preserve the illusion that it is still a revolutionary organization. The trickle of overseas contributions coming in from undiluted (and overly optimistic) Marxists is unimportant to a group that commands billions in narcotics productions, but – as was the case with the IRA's “prisoner's penny” boxes – the value is that the insurgents can claim to having overseas supporters as a key source of funding.

Canada is vulnerable to political action by the supporters of terrorist organizations, and some ethnic communities of Canadians have these supporters attempt to dominate cultural and political life. This attempt has worked extremely well for the Tamil Community, with the result that they appear to be making inroads into our leading political parties – with the probable intention of neutralizing them. Moreover, we face this cancer in our body politic without having the means to examine ourselves for infection and seemingly without the will to excise it.

Our tolerance and sense of pride in the diversity of cultural life in our nation has also been used against us, repeatedly and successfully, in order to let this occur and to limit treatment. The long-term prognosis if this current state continues cannot be good.

³⁷ The Romero speech was advertised by fliers. *Peoples Voice* speaks for the Communist Party of Canada – a registered political party.

Chapter 4: Open Money, Open Power

*All rights and all wrongs have long since blown away,
For causes are ashes where children lie slain.
Yet the damned UDA and the cruel IRA
Will tomorrow go murdering again.
But no penny of mine will I add to the fray.*
-- Stan Rogers, "The House of Orange."

Saps and Sugar Daddies

Terrorist groups can raise money in any number of ways, but one of the best methods is to farm legal sources for legitimate money. It is hard to appear heroic and visionary if all of your funding comes from squalid criminal activities so, even if only for the sake of appearances, some income must come from legitimate sources. Moreover, whenever criticism comes in from outsiders, the terrorist and his apologist can brandish the contributions sent in from ordinary supporters and offer the argument that they could only survive through the will of the people they claim to represent.

Often, the pennies received through open sources can be used to conceal the dollars received through less legitimate means. For example, during the Cold War western Communist parties always denigrated "gold from Moscow" reports as a McCarthy-style myth, and claimed that their headquarters and newspapers were entirely supported by party members and lone citizens – a lie that was torn to shreds when Vasili Mitrokhin, the archivist for the 1st Chief Directorate of the KGB, defected with copies of their files in 1992. It turned out that Western Communist parties received the vast bulk of their funding from the Soviets, which explains why most of them had to engage in a post-Soviet fire sale of their assets.¹ Likewise, the Provisional Wing of the IRA has always preferred to explain that its money comes from open supporters in North America, and from "Prisoners' Penny" boxes, rather than from illegal bars, smuggling, and extortion rackets.

Freely donated money, besides camouflaging income from less savory sources and acting as a tangible symbol of 'popular' support, has another important benefit for many terrorist groups – being legally raised, it is much more secure than other monies. Among other things, it can often be openly banked and openly transferred to front organizations (often in another jurisdiction) before it slips out of sight and goes underground. It is hard to think of any major terrorist group that refrains from seeking donations from open sources.

¹ Christopher Andre and Vasili Mitrokhin; *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West*; The Penguin Press, London, 1999. Pages 373-374 are especially embarrassing to the Communist Party of Canada.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

The first rule in raising money is, inevitably, to ask someone for it. Terrorists are not very different from anyone else. Soliciting wealthy patrons, canvassing supporters in the community, and importuning the general public can raise money for any particular cause. Worse still, in Canada and other nations, it is even possible to create legitimate charities so that money raised for a terrorists' cause can be written off for tax purposes. If a terrorist group's political front is really well organized, they can even attract financial support from different levels of government.

At the lowest levels for fundraising for terrorist groups, one can occasionally find members of the MeK patrolling downtown streets of Ottawa and Toronto with a sandwich board showing purported photographs of Iranian government atrocities and presenting a tin-can to pedestrians in the hope of receiving pocket change.

As recently as 1996, it was possible to find the traditional "Prisoners' Penny" collection box on the counter at some Irish pubs in various Canadian cities – the last one spotted by one of the authors was at the bar counter at the Unicorn, a Toronto pub operating under a loose affiliation with the Canadian singing group "The Irish Rovers," in May 1996. Traditionally, these boxes were supposed to support the families of imprisoned IRA members and hunger strikers, with the proceeds normally being administered by Sinn Fein. Visits to a number of Irish-themed pubs in Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto in 2002 saw no boxes, and it seems that the custom has been discontinued.

At the other end of the scale, there have been wealthy patrons who have supported terrorist groups – often in the hope of reinventing themselves as terrorists as well. The wealthy Italian publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli succumbed to radical chic and transformed the Italian Red Brigades from a minor band of impoverished would-be revolutionaries to a dangerous well-armed terrorist group in the 1970s. The full spread of Feltrinelli's genius can be attested to by his 1972 death, when he blew himself up trying to dynamite an electrical pylon; he climbed up the tower with a dynamite charge that already had the detonators inserted – an extremely stupid undertaking. It later turned out that the one of the corporations controlled by the aspiring terrorist owned the land that the power line ran through.² *Sic semper ignoramus.*

Feltrinelli's modern, and more cautious, counterpart would be Osama bin Laden. He donated a large part of his own fortune to help establish al Qaeda, and has introduced a number of other wealthy Arabs to the organization. Bin Laden seems infinitely more careful about his personal safety than Feltrinelli was, and what remains of his own fortune apparently forms the core of the al Qaeda financial reserves.

While no major Canadian sponsor of terrorism on the scale of Feltrinelli and bin Laden has ever emerged, the majority of funds raised by the Sikh group Babbar Khalsa International initially came from donations made by usually wealthy individuals who were sympathetic to the hard-line message and goals of the movement. For example, financing for one major trip to Pakistan, in which Talwinder Singh Parmar met with the country's defence officials, was largely funded by a Sikh millionaire residing in the United States.³ The events of 1984, particularly the

² Claire Sterling; *The Terror Network*; Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1981 Chapter 2.

³ Mulgrew p. 125.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

Indian military operation in the Golden Temple of Amritsar, allowed the BKI's coffers to swell for a brief period of time, when hundreds of outraged Canadian Sikhs made contributions to the group.

Federal Court of Canada documents reveal that Iqbal Singh, a member of the BK, provided its leader in India with the names of prominent members of the Canadian Sikh community, who could be approached about contributing to the organization.⁴ This individual also provided thousands of dollars to cover the legal fees and immigration expenses of family members who had committed hijackings on the Indian subcontinent. Singh also housed the wife and children of the one time leader of the BK while she was here in Canada. A Federal Court Justice found that this act was prearranged with the BK in India.

Between collecting spare change in tin cans and finding a lucrative 'sugar daddy' there are a host of legitimate and quasi-legal fundraising techniques that terrorists and their supporters can engage in, and some of them are employed in Canada.

War Taxes and Donation Systems

"War Taxes," "Subscriptions," and "Donation Systems" are probably the oldest fundraising techniques used by terrorist organizations. The system is a simple one --all those who are supposedly going to benefit from the exertions of the insurgent are expected to make regular contributions to the group. However, very few rebel groups really enjoy genuine popular support and nobody enjoys paying taxes, let alone to both a legitimate government and to an insurgency.

Wherever it has been employed, the war tax system has operated in a simple manner, households and businesses are approached by the representatives of the terrorist organization or one of its front organizations, and invited to make a regular contribution to the cause. The payment is usually modest and only a small fraction of a household's income or business' gross revenues is expected. However, when 10,000 households and 500 businesses are regularly tapped, the revenue stream can become impressive.

The need for the terrorist group or front organization to administer their collection system with records, ledgers, and specifically tasked administrators makes disruption of such a network easy... sometimes. However, in the organized crime world, for example, Chinese Triads and the Sicilian Mafia have been able to keep systemic collection rackets running for decades without serious interference. It may also be that the lucrative appeal of their collection systems are what kept the Triads running long after their original purpose as anti-Manchu/anti-government rebels had faded.

⁴ Federal Court of Canada, Reasons for Order, Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration and the Solicitor General of Canada v. Iqbal Singh, August 11, 1998.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

Coercion is the engine behind any tax system, and terrorist groups can exercise it more readily than governments can. But regular donations and taxes are really only possible in a population where the terrorist and his political fronts have almost complete control, or exercise either strong sympathies or abject terror, within the community. Otherwise, the authorities can interfere with the collection of the tax system, and can expect to soon develop a network of informants. There are exceptions, and some people have been seen to readily accede to the collection of a regular tax system. Among these are the Sri Lankan Tamils of the 'Diaspora' outside of Sri Lanka.

Toronto police and Sri Lankan diplomatic officials maintain that a regular system of contributions and proceeds from extortion in Canada went to pay for the war in Sri Lanka. Paul Clark, of the Toronto Tamil Task Force, said that a million dollars a month was raised in Toronto through a combination of quasi-legal and illegal means.⁵ Predictably, the LTTE's front groups denounced the report. The head of the Tamil Eelam Society of Canada once remarked: "*I don't think there is even one instance of extortion... Every cent we collect is by donation*" when responding to a similar story.⁶ In 1991, an official of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (then led by a defector from the LTTE) claimed that Canadian Tamils were being shaken down for \$200,000 for an 'urgent war fund'. Sam Duraiswamy, then vice president of the Tamil Eelam Society of Canada, claimed to have no knowledge of any complaints or of any force that was being used to gather donations.⁷ Unfortunately, front organizations can often deliver statements filled with terminological inexactitude.

The regular subscription system may have also been surpassed when the LTTE was trying to launch a major offensive in 2000. As the Tigers readied for a key battle over Highway A-9 near Jaffna, it was reported that they were expecting every Tamil family in Australia, Canada, and the UK to contribute about US \$1,000 for the cause.⁸

LTTE fund raising operations are arguably the most sophisticated of any terrorist organization being undertaken on Canadian soil. They have mastered the techniques of collecting regular donations from the expatriate community, organizing regular "cultural" events, accessing public monies, and running numerous charitable organizations, to name but a few of the activities used to keep Canadians in the dark as to the true purpose behind these fundraising undertakings.

Donations, whether voluntary or coerced, make up a huge component of the Tiger war chest. The apparatus for the systematic collection of voluntary contributions by Tamils living internationally have their roots in Britain, and were triggered by the widespread anti-Tamil rioting of 1983 in Sri Lanka. In a London meeting, convened by an LTTE representative K. Balaskeram, under the name of the Eelam Solidarity Campaign, a presentation was made to British Tamils who were rightly concerned for the well being of their families still in Sri Lanka.⁹ Sympathizers who attended the meeting were encouraged to leave their names and telephone

⁵ "Tamils fund rebellion", *Toronto Sun* 9 June 1998, pg 5.

⁶ "Cop ticked by Tamils", *Toronto Sun*, 3 March 1996 Clark's estimate was probably a conservative one.

⁷ "Tamils fight for Canadian Cash", *Toronto Sun*, 18 July 1991, pg. 31.

⁸ "Tamil Tigers Raising Funds from Families in Canada"; *National Post*; 21 March 2000.

⁹ See Gunaratna, 1997, p.12.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

numbers. LTTE supporters then followed up on the lists, and created an apparatus that divided Britain into territories and expanded the lists of supporters.

The genius behind this approach was that Tamils were then acclimatized to donating to the Tiger cause, and were put into the habit of giving on a consistent monthly basis. Once the idea is accepted, it becomes legitimate and, with some repetition, evolves into becoming normal. The template formed in Britain has been transferred to all countries where there are large Tamil populations and is now supported by a rigid recording, accounting, and “compliance” process.

There is another element to the collections process that makes the LTTE unique. While the story of collections rackets for insurgent groups is an old one, there have been many examples over the years of terrorist groups (or their fronts) tapping income from emigrant communities elsewhere. Russian Anarchists in the 19th Century solicited funding from Russian émigrés living in Western Europe; the Provisional Wing of the IRA sought to harness the affections of Irish Catholics living in North America during the 1970s, and Middle Eastern groups certainly look for money from inside the Muslim communities that have been formed in recent decades inside the Western World. What makes the Tigers different is that they appear to have facilitated and encouraged the growth of ‘Diaspora’ communities of Tamils inside Western Europe, North America, and Australia – with the expectation that these communities could be harnessed to raise money for the cause.

A definite pattern exists in how the LTTE orchestrates the movement of Tamils worldwide, they look for two factors in deciding host countries: a liberal refugee policy, as well as a generous welfare system. The second factor is most important, as it allows the Tigers a means of accessing capital and diverting it to fund the movement. Merely putting Tamils abroad would not suit the Tigers’ purpose, as they need the hard cash that asylum seekers in certain western countries can generate. This is the reason that countries such as Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Canada were prime destinations for Tamils. Welfare recipients have been prime targets for LTTE donation-collectors and extortionists.

This pattern appears to have been followed at least once already, as tens of thousands of Somalis bailed out of their collapsing homeland in the early 1990s. Many came to Canada with prior knowledge of the social benefits here, in the full expectation of harnessing them both for personal advantage, and to advance the fortunes of their clans.

In the Tamil case, the Sri Lankan foreign minister reviewed some of the more interesting developments overseas when addressing their parliament on February 9th, 1996.¹⁰ He reviewed the need of the LTTE to have a “considerable population of asylum seekers abroad in order to generate sufficient funds...” and cited Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, the UK, Norway, Australia, and Germany in particular. Stories from inside Europe bear out some of his complaints.

In 1999, the Germans put eleven Sri Lankan Tamils on trial for running an extortion racket among Tamil refugees in the Ruhr area since 1985; families were expected to contribute between \$3 to \$60 US per month, and that those who failed to cough up their donations could

¹⁰ [Sri Lankan] *Parliamentary Debates*, 9 February, 1996, Volume 104 (1), pgs 126-127.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

expect intimidation either in Germany, or directed at their families inside Sri Lanka. The system was a lucrative one, one of the defendants was charged with transferring 3.3 Billion Deutschmarks (about \$1.95 Billion) to the tigers in a four-year period.¹¹ Another intimidation ring that was broken apart in Germany acquired about 200,000 DM a month by collecting at least 50 DM per family – although one must assume that they undertook other activities as well.¹²

On April 10th, 1994, Swiss police arrested 15 members of the LTTE for intimidating Tamils in the country, and beating and confining some of those who refused to donate around \$60 a month to the cause.¹³ Canada's own Immigration and Refugee Board acknowledged that Tamils inside Western Europe had to pay similar amounts as early as 1992.¹⁴

Understandably, a lot of ordinary Tamils are shy about coming forward to tell stories about what they have experienced. Being identified as a media source could be personally hazardous (perhaps more so in the early 1990s than today) while becoming a known critic of the Tigers and their activities could result in being cut off from much of Tamil community life. A few will nervously confide stories of their own experiences if they know that their information is strictly off the record – the interviews conducted under these conditions in the 1990s were contrary to accepted practices for the news media, academia, and other sources of research and authoritative comment, but consistent reports suggested that the pattern that was being seen in Europe was also being practiced in Canada.

In essence, several Tamil refugees implied that there was a systemic collection system operating in Canada soon after the arrival of the first Tamil refugees from Germany in 1980s. Those who refused to comply with the demand for about \$30 a month sometimes found it necessary to move to avoid visits from enforcers. However, if they contacted family members back in Sri Lanka, especially if their families were living in LTTE controlled areas, it became clear that the Tigers were monitoring them as well and would demand a cut if any money was sent home. Moreover, the family would be pressured into revealing the new address of their reluctant relative in Canada, and he would be expected to soon make good on arrears in payment.

The implication from both Europe and Canada is that Tamil organizers overseas remained in close contact with organizers in Sri Lanka, and that a system of checks exists to ensure that all overseas Tamils make contributions. This suggests a close level of coordination and an efficient administrative structure of some kind.

Is a systemic collection system still being run among Canada's Tamil community? It appears that one did, perhaps still does, and that the system might have easily collected between one to two million dollars a month in Canada alone in the late 1990s. However, the current ceasefire

¹¹ Reuters wire report, "Tamils extorted billions, German Court Hears" 12:09 pm, Jan. 20, 1999, Dusseldorf, Germany.

¹² Jayewardne & Jayewardne, pg.209.

¹³ Faxed story from *Jane's Intelligence Review* from late April 1994 (the precise date and volume number are not clear).

¹⁴ Research Directorate, Immigration Review Board; *Sri Lanka: Internal Flight Alternatives*; Ottawa, 1992.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

would make it much more difficult to collect regular payments from most Canadian Tamils, as the incentive to voluntarily cooperate with the system has become weaker. Additionally, as the Tamil community has grown in size it has become harder to control – which makes it more likely that some Tamils will eventually come forward to publicly denounce the collection system if attempts are made to perpetuate it.

At various times in the 1990s, sources within the Sri Lankan community stated that some Tamil owned businesses in the Toronto area might display a small 'license' on the premises that indicates that the establishment is a regular contributor to the World Tamil Movement. This report had been heard from three different sources, one of who was also a regular source of intelligence to the RCMP and Canada's Immigration services. A series of visits to Tamil owned convenience stores and shops in key neighborhoods in Toronto over 2002 noticed a small blue form in Tamil script only, by the cash register in about 15% of visited stores. This did not match earlier details of the 'license' (described as being a small plaque), and was found in too few stores to confirm earlier reports of the systemic taxation of Tamil business establishments.

Public Funding for Private Wars

“... *We are the proud subsidizers of terrorism by inadvertence.*”

-- David Harris, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the US House of Representatives, January 26th 2000.

Canada spends a lot of money on multicultural programs to encourage its diverse communities to express themselves, and there are a significant number of grants programs to encourage vitality here. Registered charities may receive government funding, and donors to them can write off a portion of their taxes for helping such groups out. Schools and houses of worship can find it fairly easy to win charitable status from the Federal Government.

Community newspapers often have a difficult time making ends meet without the occasional grant, and government advertising dollars are valuable. There are also charitable duties within some communities. Sikhs, for example, are expected to make major contributions to their Temples (a devout Sikh might donate 10% of his revenues on an annual basis). Muslims are directed to be charitable too – the *zakat* is a regular annual payment of 2.5% of one's total worth for the poor, and voluntary charity (the *sadakat*) is supposed to increase one's chances of reaching heaven, while *fitra* charitable donations are expected during Ramadan.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, there are government grants for immigration services and language services – which in the Tamil community have ended up in the hands of LTTE front groups. Other communities might experience the same problem.

Overall, with billions of dollars a year in both government and private funding being spent on charitable works and community organizations, there is much that can be diverted into the wrong hands.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

In the early 1990s, Revenue Canada (as it was then called) granted charitable status to an organization calling itself the Babbar Khalsa Society, located in Kamloops B.C. This was less than two years after Inderjit Singh Reyat was convicted of manslaughter in the Narita Airport explosion, the result of one of two bombs placed on Air India flights in 1985, the other killed 329 passengers, almost half of them Canadians, on flight 182.

Repeated inquiries regarding the Babbar Khalsa Society were made during Question Period in the House of Commons by the Official Opposition, and were often treated with contempt by the Liberal Party of Canada and its leading cabinet ministers. On May 4, 1995, Val Merideth (Reform Party MP for Surrey White Rock) was told by David Anderson, then Minister of Revenue, in response to her inquiries regarding this one specific questionable organization that *“The member is wrong to single out a particular organization of which there may be one or two individual members about whom I know nothing and attempt to blacken the entire status of all organizations dealing with immigrants.”* Essentially, he tried to portray her as a racist.

On June 5, 1995, Ms. Merideth again confronted the Liberal government with photos of Talwinder Singh Parmar (the lead suspect in the Air India bombing) surrounded by automatic rifles and RPG-7 anti-tank rockets and a quote in a Punjabi newspaper where he said that if anyone wants to commit suicide, they should board an Air India flight. Mr. Anderson's response was again offensive and inadequate: *“We are quite willing to accept the views of the hon. member that a picture of a member with guns surrounding him is evidence, but I suggest it is totally contradictory to the Reform Party's gun policy that the mere presence of a photograph with weapons causes one to be investigated and causes one to lose charitable status.”*

In 1996, the charitable status of the Babbar Khalsa Society was revoked. The Liberal government only issued a small announcement in the *Canada Gazette*, an obvious attempt to minimize the impact and significance of the decision, which was a departure from past Liberal policy.

There is some indication that Canadian authorities feared that Babbar Khalsa International had escalated the sophistication of their fund raising operations in the late 1990s. They began to look into the business activities of a close associate of Parmar, Pupiduman Singh Malik, who organized and ran both the Khalsa Credit Union and the Khalsa School in British Columbia. Malik now stands as one of the accused for the 1985 Air India Bombing. Ironically, he had earlier expressed open disdain for Canadian society and its values and stated that the reason for creating the Khalsa School was a means of isolating Sikh children from it.¹⁵ Both of these organizations run by Malik have been the subject of police investigation.¹⁶

The Khalsa School received \$2,000,000 annually in provincial government grants. In 1998, The RCMP Commercial Crime Squad raided the school looking for evidence of misappropriation of these funds. More disturbing was the allegation that a convicted hijacker

¹⁵ Mulgrew p.130.

¹⁶ Globe and Mail September 11, 1998.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

who entered Canada with a false passport was allowed to live at the school. The Khalsa Credit Union was served search warrants in an investigation surrounding the financial activities of the Khalsa School.

One of Malik's colleagues in the dock for the Air India trial; Ajaib Singh Bagri, is being aided in his defence by the Babbar Khalsa International operating behind a British Columbian non-profit group called Sikh Vision. Two members of the BKI are working at the public's expense on Bagri's legal team. Sikh Vision's mission statement is a touching one concerning peace and humanity, but their web-site has some very belligerent photographs of arms, armaments and Khalsa imagery on it.¹⁷

One of the ISYF's main targets for cash generation was the Sikh temples located in Canada. Sikhs are enjoined to contribute to their temples, and the proceeds are invested in temple funds that are usually invested locally for the benefit of the temple and the wider community. In a large and prosperous community, the interest from temple funds can become impressive. Militant Sikhs had hoped to divert temple fund income to armed groups fighting in the Punjab, but first they needed to get their supporters elected onto the temples' management committees. It was not unusual for considerable amounts of pressure, threats, and violence to be employed by these radicals, especially in the years immediately following Operation Blue Star and the assault on the Golden Temple in Amritsar.

The battle for control of Sikh temples began when radicals from India began arriving here in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Pro-separatist activists from various factions quickly targeted the existing management committees run by second and third generation Sikh-Canadians. The fact that many of these Canadian-born Sikhs fully accepted Canadian values was offensive to the newly arrived radicals. In 1978, foreshadowing the violence that was yet to come, Beant Dhalawi was found dead after a C-clamp was placed on his skull and slowly tightened. He had been involved in a dispute at the temple located in Clearbrook, B.C.¹⁸

The second phase began as pro-separatists fought each other over control of the temples. The most pronounced battles were usually between the ISYF and the World Sikh Organization. Canada's largest and most prestigious Sikh temple was the Ross Street Gurdwara in Vancouver. In 1985, the WSO won elections to control the management committee. The ISYF challenged them in another set of elections in 1990. Two shootings occurred during these latter elections, and are held by many Sikhs to have been tied to the contentious infighting.¹⁹ By 1992, the ISYF was in control of the Ross Street temple.²⁰

The latest phase of violence at the temples transpired as the radicals were pushed out of the management committees, and replaced by moderate elements within the Sikh community. In 1997, moderates who had recently won elections at the Ross Street Temple were attacked by knife and sword-wielding radicals who opposed the introduction of tables and chairs at

¹⁷ "Sikh youth group aids suspected bomber"; *Vancouver Sun*; 28 April 2003. Pg. B1. Also see www.sikhvision.com

¹⁸ Mulgrew, pp.104-5.

¹⁹ *Globe and Mail*, March 30, 1991.

²⁰ Tatla, p. 122.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

communal meals held in the temple. Fundamentalists always expressed contempt for this practice, which evolved in Canada. This most recent spate of violence seemed due more to the sense of frustration the radicals felt at losing control of the purse strings, and their ability to send cash to fuel violence in India than it did about interpreting Sikh doctrine.²¹ Episodes of violence and intimidation can still attend struggles over temple funds, although many more liberal Canadian Sikhs have learned to push back too.

Another source of influence and revenue for the ISYF was the ownership of various English and Punjabi language newspapers in Canada. Community newspapers, besides being businesses in themselves, are valuable tools for political and economic control within a particular ethno-cultural community, and ownership of them is a critical issue. The ISYF apparently operates two newspapers in the Vancouver area and another in Toronto.²² The 1988 attempted assassination of the publisher of the *Indo-Canadian Times*, Tara Singh Hayer, is allegedly tied to his criticism of the ISYF's advocacy of violence in the Punjab.²³ The cowardly attack left the journalist paralyzed from the waist down. In 1998, Hayer was murdered. He had never wavered in his criticism of the violence in the name of Khalistan, and refused to yield to further intimidation after being crippled -- including the planting of a bomb on his paper's premises.²⁴

The Sikhs are not the only community in Canada to see public and charitable funding go astray for the purposes of terrorism. In recent years, the Security Council of the United Nations and the US Treasury Department listed hundreds of organizations and individuals whose funds are to be frozen and assets seized in order to suppress terrorism. The list includes a startling number of charities and financial institutions -- including the informal Barakats and Hawalas that arrange casual money transfers throughout much of the Muslim world. A number of Barakats operated in Canada, but the larger ones have all been ordered shut down (smaller, even less formal ones, are reportedly still in operation).²⁵

The dozens of suppressed charities include (among many others) the Aid Organization of the Ulama, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Benevolence International Foundation, the Benevolence International Fund, the Global Relief Foundation, and many others. According to the UN Security Council and the US Treasury Department, these had been funneling money to Islamic terrorist groups in many areas.²⁶

The Benevolence International Fund was active in raising funds in Canada (from its offices in Ottawa, Waterloo, and Mississauga, Ontario) to send to its representatives in war zones in Bosnia, Chechnya, the Kashmir, and to Israel, and the West Bank -- all areas where Muslim fundamentalists are active. The group claimed in October 2001 that it did not issue tax receipts.²⁷ Alas, it was advertising that it could issue such on its website in 2002. In its Annual

²¹ *Globe and Mail* January 13, 1997.

²² Tatla, pg. 117

²³ *Globe and Mail*, March 30, 1991.

²⁴ *Now*, December 16-22, 1999.

²⁵ Author's Interviews with members of the Somali community in 2003.

²⁶ See UN Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000)

²⁷ *Kitchener Waterloo Record*, October 2nd, 2001.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

Return to Corporations Canada, it listed six governors, but only one was a Canadian resident (Mohamad Khatib), the rest were in Saudi Arabia, Bosnia, and the United States. One director, Enaam Arnaout (aka A. Mahmoud and A. Samia) was arrested in April 2002 and charged with perjury and supporting terrorists.²⁸

In its literature, the Fund advertised itself as a good place for Muslims who wished to meet their Zakat obligations. However, in the Muslim community, where fundraising is informal, very few Canadian Muslims have heard of the organization.

Ideally, *Zakat* obligations and other Muslim charities are supposed to go to widows, orphans, and the poor. The Holy Land Foundation in the United States was ordered closed by the US Treasury Department because the widows and orphans it was helping out included the families of Fundamentalist suicide bombers. Other Muslim charities are also suspected of using their funds to aid the families of Fundamentalist combatants, or of attracting refugees to places where they can be exposed to Fundamentalist indoctrination. An Ottawa gas station attendant and pizza delivery man, Mohamed Harkat, who is accused by CSIS of being a member of the GIA and al Qaeda, spent five years working in Pakistan as a relief worker before coming to Canada. He is thought to have been using his activities as a cover for Islamic Fundamentalist work in association with key members of al Qaeda.²⁹

The Benevolence International Fund is one of the defendants in a \$1 trillion lawsuit launched by the families of the dead from the 9-11 attack. Other defendants include the Islamic Relief Organization, the Muslim World League (MWL), International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and the SAAR Foundation – all of which have a Canadian presence. The Muslim World League was funded by the Saudi Government since 1962 as a Wahhabist-related site for supporting both the Muslim community and missionary work elsewhere (including inside the Western World). The IIRO was a charitable organization with appropriate tax status in many countries, and is an arm of the MWL. Members of the MWL have aided and abetted the travels of al Qaeda members as recently as 2000, and helped to establish the organization in the first place. The MWL and IIRO had offices in Ottawa, but these have been closed in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks.

The MWL and the Saudi government are also associated with another Muslim charity, SAAR International, whose Canadian office (located in Quebec) was closed in 2001. American authorities began to investigate SAAR International following reports that the group's US branch had passed money to Palestinian Islamic Jihad.³⁰

Like the Tiger Front Groups described in Chapter Three, the MWL placed itself at the centre of a number of Canadian organizations that declared their support and affiliation with it. These included:

- The Afghan Information and Rehab Bureau, Don Mills Ontario;
- Al Rashid Islamic Institute, Cornwall, Ontario;

²⁸ *National Post*; May 1st, 2002, pg A4.

²⁹ "CSIS links Ottawa man to Al-Qaeda"; *National Post*; 17 December 2002, Pg. A1

³⁰ "Quebec group tied to al-Qaeda money web", *National Post*; 21 March 2002, Pg. A1.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

- The Al Rashid Mosque, Edmonton, Alberta;
- The Albanian Muslim Society, Toronto, Ontario;
- Bader Islamic Association, Toronto, Ontario;
- Bosnian Community Mosque, Etobicoke, Ontario;
- Cambridge Islamic Centre, Cambridge, Ontario;
- Cambridge Muslim Society, Cambridge, Ontario;
- Croatian Islamic Association (and Bosnia Hercegovina Relief Fund), Etobicoke, Ontario;
- Halton Islamic Association, Burlington, Ontario;
- Hira' Arab Cultural Society, Calgary, Alberta;
- Imdadul Islam Centre, North York, Ontario;
- International Institute of Islamic Thought, no contact information;
- Islamic Association of Saskatchewan (Chapters in Saskatoon and Regina);
- Islamic Centre of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta;
- Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec, Ste Foy, Quebec;
- Islamic Education Society of BC, Surrey, BC;
- Islamic Information Centre, Halifax, Nova Scotia;
- Islamic Society of Niagara, Niagara Falls, Ontario;
- Muslim Association of New Brunswick, Saint John, NB;
- Muslim Community of Edmonton, Edmonton, Alberta;
- Scarborough Muslim Association, Scarborough, Ontario;
- Turkish Canadian Islamic Heritage Association (and Canadian Turkish Islamic Trust Inc.), Toronto, Ontario;
- United Canadian Muslim Association of Ontario, Toronto;
- Windsor Islamic Association, Windsor, Ontario.³¹

There are dozens of other groups in Canada associated with the MWL – often sharing the same addresses and phone numbers. Affiliation with the Muslim World League is certainly not a 'smoking gun' proving that the group endorses terrorism or supports al Qaeda. However, the linkage does imply sympathy with Wahhabi Islam – an intolerant variation of the Muslim faith – and perhaps a greater willingness to sympathize with al Qaeda than other Muslims do. In the aftermath of September 11th and the trillion dollar law suit directed against the Muslim World League, some of these groups have dropped their links with the group.

As was the case with the network of Tamil related organizations, many of these MWL-affiliated organizations have received government funding for immigration-related services and cultural activities; some have charitable status, and some have raised funds for activities in overseas areas where Fundamentalist insurgents are active.

Also worrisome is Human Concern International – a charity headquartered in Ottawa with programs in many Muslim nations. After the devastating African Embassy bombings in Kenya

³¹ The primary source for this list came from the annual *Directory of Associations in Canada* listings, paired to web-site searches and clipping files.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

and Tanzania (these attacks killed over 200 people and wounded over 5,000), a raid on the attackers' hideout in Kenya turned up the business cards of an executive with Human Concern International.³² This in itself could be innocuous enough, but Ahmad Said Kadr (sometimes spelled as 'Khadr') had also been Human Concern International's regional director in Pakistan when he was arrested for helping to facilitate an attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad Pakistan in November 1995. The attack killed 17 people. Released by the Pakistani government after a personal appeal from Prime Minister Chretien, Kadr (known as Al Kanadi - "The Canadian" -- in Al Qaeda circles) is believed to be among Osama Bin Laden's closer associates.³³

Human Concern International is a registered charity in Canada and lists 21 representatives throughout the country. The group severed its links with Kadr after his arrest. Although scrutiny was paid to the organization because of these connections, the group has not been listed as a supporter of terrorism on the UN Security Council List of Individuals and Entities, or by the US Treasury Department or the Canadian government. In short, it still has a good reputation.

After being released through Jean Chretien's intervention, Kadr returned to Canada before returning to Afghanistan and the al Qaeda circles there through another Canadian based Muslim charity, Health Education Project International. One of Kadr's sons was captured by Afghan Northern Alliance forces in Kabul in November 2001, and another one, who was only 16 years of age, was captured there in July 2002, after mortally wounding a US Army medic with a grenade.³⁴ Both the UN Security Council and the US Treasury Department have ordered that Kadr's assets be frozen.

Incidentally, the Health Education Project International is a project of the Salaheddin Mosque in Toronto. Among its members, this mosque has had two member of Ansar al-Islam (an al Qaeda member organization), the three al Qaeda members of the Kadr family, and a man who has been detained since August 2001 on the suspicion that he is a member of Islamic Jihad. For understandable reasons, the congregation, imam, and the building itself are of considerable interest to CSIS – and the members of the mosque clearly resent it.³⁵

Money has been raised from open sources in Canada for Hamas and Hizbollah as well. In 1993 the FBI secretly recorded the proceedings of a gathering of 25 Muslim Fundamentalists in Philadelphia. Part of the agenda for the meeting discussed fundraising to finance the Palestinian "Holy War" against Israel and to undermine the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO. The main fundraising mechanism was a Muslim charitable organization, the Holy Land Foundation -- which raised \$167,000 in Canada in 1992, and \$214,000 in the first half of 1993.³⁶

³² "Al-Qaeda cell used Kenyan Aid Groups"; *National Post*; March 13, 2002.

³³ "RCMP fears return of family with terror links"; *National Post*; October 5th, 2002

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ "Four terrorism suspects linked to local mosque"; *Toronto Star*, 15 March 2003, Pg. A.24.

³⁶ "Hamas Boasted of Canadian Fundraising"; *National Post*; August 14th, 2002.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

The Tamil Tigers do not neglect the charitable side either. Other tentacles of their international octopus are the purported “development” and “reconstruction” groups that gather funds for supposedly humanitarian purposes in northern Sri Lanka. The two largest organizations are the Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization (TEEDOR) and the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). Both are disguised elements of the LTTE, and it is no secret that large portions of the donations made to either of these fronts are used to buy weapons for the anti-government effort.³⁷

The long war in Sri Lanka has generated hundreds of thousands of internal refugees, most of who are too poor to be able to afford the fees necessary to get themselves sent abroad. For the Tigers, these internal refugees (almost all Tamil) serve several functions – their miseries can be used to illustrate the purported callousness of the Sri Lankan government (which cannot really afford to resettle them), plus the presence of tens of thousands of refugees who fled Sinhalese persecution by heading into Tamil controlled areas adds a much cited proof that Sri Lanka's government does have much to atone for.

Creating charities to raise money to care for these refugees has been useful for the Tigers. Motherland and Child Care of Sri Lanka Foundation was a registered Canadian charity operating from Mississauga Ontario – although it appears to have closed a couple of years ago. The TRO (which does not have registered charitable status in Canada) gushes with lists of its activities inside Sri Lanka, where it has cooperated with more legitimate NGOs like Medicins Sans Frontieres and CARE international. These organizations, however, hesitate to describe themselves as being part of a consortium with the TRO (although its Canadian Website implies that they are), but see cooperation with them as part of the price of doing business inside Tiger dominated areas.

The TRO serves a valuable function by legitimizing fundraising for Tamil Front organizations, but also provides the bulk of its services in areas where it does not have to account for expenditures. If aid money is diverted to the Tigers inside Sri Lanka, it is impossible to confirm, and one is only left with the impression that some diplomats and aid workers have developed: That the TRO is only a minor player inside Sri Lanka when it comes to the visible effect of charitable work.

Charitable works inside Canada can also add to the luster of the Tigers and their front organizations. The number of Hindus in Canada is growing rapidly, and the largest Hindu temple in the country is being built by the Toronto Tamil community. Construction is being undertaken under the name of the “Hindu Temple Society of Canada” (begging the question are the Tamils going to presume to speak for all of Canada's Hindus?), but this society shares the same phone number and address as the Ganesh Hindu Temple. The opening of this huge – yet unfinished -- temple in early September 2001 saw 20,000 Tamil Hindus being met by young men selling LTTE memorabilia and passing collection jars for the TRO.³⁸

³⁷ Gunaratna, 1997 pp.25 and 58-61.

³⁸ “LTTE using temple for fundraising”; Ajit Jain in Toronto for WWW.Rediff.com

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

Evidently, the normal staff of the Ganesh Temple are not enthusiastic supporters for the LTTE, as the rack of self-help pamphlets, business fliers, and ads for immigrant services inside the front door of the Temple does not normally carry anything related to the Tigers or their Canadian front groups. On Hindu holidays in the summer of 2002, it was evident that the arriving crowd of worshippers was being worked for donations to the TRO between the parking lot and the front steps of the temple.

Hamas and Hizbollah have also raised money in Canada for ostensibly charitable works like orphanages and hospitals although, again, it is impossible to determine if every dollar raised in Canada results in a dollar's worth of administration and aid in the West Bank or Lebanon. It would be highly surprising if this was indeed the case. It should also be remembered that terrorist organizations may try to establish alternative institutions in areas under their control in order to offer 'proof' to the population they purport to represent that the insurgents can take better care of them than the authorities can. In short, even if Hamas or Hizbollah runs an extremely efficient and capable orphanage, the institution is still a political statement in itself, and serves to support the prestige of terrorists. A school, however well equipped, would also serve as a tool for indoctrinating youngsters in the ideology of the group.

For any terrorist group, the excuse that they are raising money for schools, temples and other charitable sites cannot be allowed to stand under any circumstances. Such institutions may serve the basic function for which they are intended, but also have an equally vital role in securing insurgent leadership of the communities they claim to represent, add an underserved and unwelcome legitimacy, and heighten the status of the dysfunctional and violent people who create and lead terrorist groups. This is an argument that should never again be advanced by any government minister, nor ever accepted at face value by any journalist.

Passing the Bucket Again

"The support extended by you in attending this rally alone is not enough. You must prove your support by giving money. Your support should be converted into money. That money should be converted into arms for the movement."

-- An LTTE activist addressing a rally of Tamil Canadians in 1997.³⁹

Lectures, shows, and speaking engagements are a time-honored method for raising money. They also have the effect of providing a dual purpose of activating an audience to win their allegiance for a particular cause and affirming the loyalty of sympathizers for the cause. In the 19th Century, this was practically the only method available to the Irish Fenians to raise money and generate support. It is still a popular method.

In the angry aftermath of the Indian attack on the Golden Temple at Amritsar, The BKI heavily relied on individuals such as Talwinder Singh Parmar and other members to speak at

³⁹ Narration translated by David Jeyaraj, in "Tigers raising money in Toronto probed"; *Island*, Sri Lanka, 10th August 1997.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Four

various temples across Canada. At the end of the fiery sermons, they would call upon the crowd to make donations. They were most successful in gaining access for speeches to temples controlled by the ISYF – a rare instance of inter-organizational cooperation.

Passing around the collections bucket is a frequent occurrence in several Canadian cities. Sometimes, it is a real art form. The front organizations for the Tamil Tigers can stage fund-raising and cultural events in Toronto and Montreal that have featured members of the community parading in camouflage uniforms. Sometimes, youths or veteran Tigers will be on stage with dummy AK-47s as well, under the colors of the LTTE guerrilla formations. Then, after a cultural display, the awarding of prizes for various achievements, the showing of footage from the war, and a barn-burner of a speech, buckets (literally) are passed through the audience while they are enjoined to be generous.

The Tigers are perhaps the most assiduous terrorist group in the world when it comes to raising money, as there are few techniques they will overlook. At the back of the hall where the Tigers are preaching, the audience may be inveigled to buy more Tiger videos, t-shirts, their roaring tiger-head flag, and other items; with the proceeds going to the cause. The Tigers' supporters are also known to go door to door on a routine basis within the Tamil community with a cadre of well-trained fundraisers. In 1998, it was estimated that there were about 60 veteran WTM activists (in Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto) who would undertake this, and their lists of potential donors were said to be carefully annotated so that the reluctant might be later persuaded to be more generous through other means.⁴⁰

Multiculturalism has been held up as a Canadian ideal ever since the concept was first introduced in 1972. Somehow or other, it perhaps did not occur to the earnest backers of a multicultural Canada that the fullest expression of community life in a more diverse Canadian society would include the diversion of temple funds, the abuse of Canadian charity laws, and the selling of atrocity videos on our school stages to pay for other peoples' wars.

It is not generally understood – yet – by most of citizens that actions by the supporters of groups like Babbar Khalsa, al Qaeda, or the LTTE represents a devastating betrayal of our one-time hopes for a peaceful community of all peoples within the Canadian state. Even if money raised for terrorist groups never results in violence here (although this has already happened), the cultural institutions and self-identity of several of our component societies have been hijacked by the supporters of terrorist groups. These very same supporters have no interest in the peaceful acclimatization of the people they claim to represent within the Canadian polity ... so why should we continue give their likes any possible encouragement by continuing to tolerate the intolerant?

⁴⁰ Authors interviews with members of the Sri Lankan Community and the Tamil Task Force between 1997 and 2002.

Chapter 5: Terrorism and Crime

A Natural Partnership

“*Nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam.*” Marcus Tullius Cicero’s observation on the need for endless money to conduct war also applies to terrorists. They need lots of money, and both the political front and the actual terrorist group know this.

Sometime in late 1980 or early 1981, Sean O’Callaghan, one of the most important informants ever to be in the IRA, sat in on an illuminating conference about the finances of the long-running terrorist group:

“The meeting was chaired by Gerry Adams, who baldly stated that the IRA was in serious financial difficulties. He described how it cost £2 million a year to keep the organization functioning at its present level, and that it currently fell to Belfast to provide the major part of the funds required, money raised from the IRA’s interest in its many drinking clubs [unlicensed bars] – some of which made over £150,000 a year – and gaming machines in West Belfast. The Falls Taxi Association’s two hundred or so black taxis ... each yielded a weekly levy of £15, which also found its way into the IRA coffers. In addition, money came from other sources – extortion, tax swindles and social security fraud.

“The only self-financing region was South Armagh, and that was because of its position on the border and the smuggling opportunities that that afforded... the IRA were far more organized than individual operators. The local IRA dealt in anything that could be smuggled, from petrol to cattle. ... [The meeting] discussed many possible means of raising finance: everything from rock concerts to providing outlets for gaming machines.”¹

There is at once both a natural partnership between organized crime and terrorism, and yet it can be an evolutionary process too. For insurgents, defying authority costs money; for criminals, the authorities stand in the way of making money. Both parties have found co-operation (or fusion) to be exceptionally convenient in many instances over the years. The alliance has no real trap for organized criminals, but it holds mortal peril for a terrorist group.

While the individual motive to engage in terrorism is ultimately a selfish one and terrorism taints whatever ideology it attaches itself to, there have been causes that had some degree of righteousness behind them. Pity the cause that finds itself represented by terrorism, and pity it even more when the insurgents adopt organized crime to fund themselves, because they find themselves sliding into an inevitable conversion process.

At first the terrorist group heads into action, full of righteous zeal while its supporters proselytize with equal fervor. But guns cost money, even the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle normally sells for around US \$150.00 per weapon – in places like Albania,

¹ Sean O’Callaghan; *The Informer*, Bantam Press, London, 1998. Pgs 167-168.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

Pakistan's wild Northwest Frontier, or in an under-the-table deal in Russia or Ukraine. Moreover, even terrorists need to eat every day. The front organization will need office space, computer equipment, and nobody can work for free for too long. Soon, a reliable source of safe, and easy money is necessary and criminal activity seems like the easiest bet. However, once they engage in it, the trap kicks in and drags the erstwhile revolutionaries through a series of stages:

| | | |
|---------|-------------------------|--|
| Stage 1 | Exclusively Terrorist | Minor involvement in criminal fundraising (typically some 'revolutionary' bank-robbing and kidnapping for ransom) |
| Stage 2 | Mainly Terrorist | Increasing use of crime to support core and front activities, 'military' causes are paramount over funding activities. |
| Stage 3 | Increasingly Criminal | Terrorist resources are expended to protect and expand criminal activities. These are seen as increasingly vital. |
| Stage 4 | Criminal Side Dominates | The original cause is used to validate criminal activities, which are becoming the main focus of the group. |
| Stage 5 | Organized Crime Group | Almost all effort is expended on criminal enterprises, while the original ideology is all but forgotten. |

As examples, some of the original terrorist groups of the 1970s such as the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades or Action Direct stayed within the first stage for most of their existence. Al Qaeda, which apparently expects many of its cells to help support themselves through petty crime, could be considered as being at the second stage. The Provisional Wing of the IRA is well into the third stage and now threatens to cross over into the fourth stage, a point that the Colombian group FARC has definitely reached. The fifth stage is the preserve of ex-terrorist groups that have become wholly concerned with organized crime – such as the Triads or the Mafia.

The transition from start to finish can vary, it has taken the IRA generations to move forward, and the Basque ETA has taken decades to reach the third stage too. Other groups have taken much less time – the Mohawk Warriors Society took less than 20 years to go from start to finish, which is probably a record of some kind for a notional book of dubious achievements.

If the terrorist group takes another route and eschews criminal fundraising for state sponsorship, this limits the group's growth, makes it vulnerable to the demands of the sponsor state, and can leave the group stranded when the sponsor departs. The short and sorry history of most of the Western European Marxist groups that appeared in the 1970s provides a case in point. Almost all of them dried up once their Soviet sponsors (usually through a variety of proxies) spiraled into financial collapse. The same would be true of some of the sad remnants of such Palestinian splinter groups as the Palestine Liberation Front.

Notwithstanding the perils of turning to crime for fundraising, it is hard to think of any modern terrorist group that has refused to do so, and here is probably no aspect of organized crime that they neglect.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

Canada is a rich environment for crime – we spend about \$10 billion a year on law enforcement, but crime costs us about \$46 billion a year. Our annual appetite for narcotics comes to around \$18 billion, some \$5 billion can be made from telemarketing and securities frauds, and consumers will buy about \$1 billion in counterfeit documents.² Then there are the other indirect costs of increased security that arise out of intimidation, and the massive expenses resulting from people smuggling. How could any terrorist group resist getting a seat at this feast?

One last point should be made – the partnership between organized crime and terrorism is an especially dangerous one, especially when each can bring their own unique talents and opportunities to the table. Trans-national crime groups like the Russian Mafiya, the Chinese Triads, or the Sicilian Mafia have a potential for political corruption and influence gathering that exceeds that of any terrorist group, and can command far greater resources. When they lend their support and talents to major terrorist groups, they garner the benefit of the attraction of the insurgents' ideology and talent for generating murderous violence. The two in harness are the greatest threat to the modern system of nation states.

Narcotics and Terrorism

The global market for illicit narcotics is enormous, and this vast industry generates hundreds of billions of dollars in revenues every year.

The lucrative aspects of narcotics production have a strong appeal to both terrorists and criminal groups. Once opium and other narcotics became controlled substances in the Western world in the first decades of the 20th century, they became attractive to organized crime. However, this was a minor activity until the 1960s and the explosion in consumer demand among the post-war generation. The demand continued to grow into the 1970s and the annual market for narcotics has remained in the hundreds of billions of dollars throughout the Western World since then.

Narcotics are easy money: Production costs are low and the high profits are a perennial incentive for those who would engage in narcotics smuggling and distribution. A farmer in Southeast Asia might receive US \$1,500 for producing 10 kilos of opium (necessary to produce a kilo of heroin); street sales might bring \$1,000,000 in the sale of 10,000 'points' of end product to North American or European users. A Peruvian coca leaf grower could receive US \$750 for 500 kilograms of leaves: The end product, 1,000 grams of pure cocaine-hydrochloride might command a street price of \$130,000. A dollar's worth of hashish in southern Lebanon could be worth 450 times as much to users in Europe and North America.³

Refinement costs typically quadruple the costs of the base materials. The rest of the difference between source expenses and street costs reflect the enormous profitability of

² "Police handcuffed in fight against crime"; *National Post*, 17 April 2002; Pg. A10.

³ The cited prices are an average of the estimated costs for narcotics garnered in a series of interviews with police intelligence officers between 2001 and 2003

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

illegal narcotics. The money involved in narcotics is incredible, 21 tons of cocaine captured in a 1989 raid in Los Angeles had a street value of over \$6 billion dollars – more than the entire gross domestic product of many of the nation states in the world.⁴ Money on this scale can corrupt a lot of officials and buy a lot of guns.

The narcotics industry is a conventional one in many ways. It needs raw resources, must refine them into its end product, must ship them to its market, must pass on the product to its distributors, who in turn must ensure that the sales people can do their work.

Terrorists (or their front groups) seldom have the time and inclination to work at the distribution and sales end of the narcotics industry. Pushing coke or heroin is time consuming, potentially risky and a little too sordid for men and women who fondly imagine themselves to be world-changing revolutionaries. It is far easier, in both the practical and psycho-political senses of the word, to be operating behind the scenes – by supplying services to the resource producers, refiners and shipping departments.

The relationship between narcotics traffickers and terrorism is common wherever insurgents have managed to create a sanctuary or “no-go” area where outside authority cannot or will not enter. Part of the growth of the cocaine industry in southern Colombia during the 1970s was based on the immigration of Chilean cocaine chemists and traders after the overthrow of the Allende government in 1973.⁵ These criminal entrepreneurs were attracted by the instability generated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Movimiento 19 de Abril (M19). Later in the 1970s and ‘80s, sharp vicious internal wars would erupt between the guerrillas and Colombia’s criminal factions, but in the end the insurgents have outlasted and overmastered the cartels.

At present, all of the World’s coca leaf production comes from Peru (where growing areas have come under the protection of what remains of the Sendero Luminoso), Bolivia, and Colombia. Some Canadians who have been in Kosovo in 1999-2000 have said that the Kosovar Albanians are now making attempts to expand the cultivation of coca there and in Albania.⁶ Most of the refining of cocaine from coca paste takes place inside southern Colombia in areas under the control of FARC.

It can be safely assumed that any cocaine consumed in Canada results in a net benefit to FARC and – to a lesser extent -- to other groups in Latin America. FARC is incredibly wealthy and has no lack of funding for ammunition, uniforms and other gear (often to the point where its members are often much better equipped and more heavily armed than their police/military counterparts). One of the most important intelligence hauls of the Colombian military were the radio logs for a high-level FARC headquarters, it holds records of the routine transfers of huge sums of money derived from narcotics and other criminal activities.⁷

⁴ Jamieson, Alison; “Global Drug Trafficking”, *Conflict Studies* 234, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism; September 1990.

⁵ The early role of the Chileans and Allende in the cocaine industry is mentioned by Rachel Ehrenfeld in *Narcoterrorism*; (Basic Books, New York, 1990)

⁶ Author’s interview.

⁷ “Bandit Broadcasts”; *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, November 1998; Pgs. 41-43

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

Likewise, the almost total lack of a central government in Afghanistan following the exodus of the Soviet Army in 1989 attracted individuals who had been involved in opium production in eastern Turkey in the 1970s and 80s. Afghan opium became a mainstay of the Taliban/al Qaeda economy and proved to be one of their primary sources of income.⁸ However, poppy plants grow well in a variety of places, including southern Mexico and in the 'Golden Triangle' of Southeast Asia (specifically in Burma, Laos and parts of Thailand). According to the RCMP's November 2001 intelligence brief *Narco-terrorism and Canada*, relatively little Afghan heroin makes it into Canada as most of our supply comes from southeast Asia.

Much of the world's hashish comes out of the Bekaa valley in Lebanon, an area that is under the control of Hizbollah (who supplanted a variety of Palestinian groups in the early 1980s). Most of the rest comes from Afghanistan and Pakistan, or out of Mexico. According to *Narco-terrorism and Canada*, a large portion of the \$20 million dollars in hashish that is successfully smuggled into Canada every year comes from the Middle East and South Asia. The net effect is, again, that Canadian hashish consumption helps to feed terrorism.

Marijuana and meta-amphetamines are the other large money making products of the Drug World. Canadians can feel both appalled and patriotic as they learn we are a net exporter of marijuana, and that ours is a high-grade product that is much in demand among the discriminating consumers of California. Best of all, our production largely comes from a terrorist-free collaboration in the world of organized crime, in that outlaw Motorcycle club members (mostly Hell's Angels) put up the money for hydroponics labs and guarantee their security, while letting Vietnamese take the risks of actually growing and packaging the stuff. Then the bikers move some of the product into the US and exchange it for cocaine to return to Canada – thus indirectly working terrorism back into the mix anyway.⁹

Terrorist involvement in drugs can be quite extensive in other parts of the World. The annual reports of the US Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement frequently cite the involvement of terrorist groups. For example, the PKK not only restricted itself to 'taxing' narcotics traffickers and refiners who ran through their controlled areas in southeastern Turkey, but they were also directly involved in transporting hashish and heroin themselves through the Balkans into Europe, and that their supporters were marketing drugs inside Western Europe.¹⁰ Police in Hamburg arrested a group of 11 year-old Kurdish children who had been smuggled into Germany from Turkey in order to sell drugs for the PKK.¹¹ Children and teenagers who have been moving drugs for the Kurdish terrorists have been caught throughout Europe on

⁸ Bach, William; Director, Office of Asia, Africa, Europe NIS, US Department of State. "The Taliban, Terrorism and Drug Trade: Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources." October 3, 2001. Another witness, Thomas Lantos (a congressman from California) stated at the same hearings that the Taliban raked off 30% of the profits on opium that was grown, processed and transported inside Afghanistan.

⁹ Author's interviews with Canadian police intelligence officers in May and September 2002.

¹⁰ US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; *The International Narcotics Control Strategy 1992*; Also see the 1996 and 1998 reports.

¹¹ German television news story cited by the Website for the Assembly of Turkish American Associations.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

numerous occasions in the 1990s and as recently as 2000. PKK couriers have also been arrested in transit from Latin America with significant quantities of cocaine on their persons.

A similar pattern emerged in Canada (on the West Coast during the mid-1990s), although it is not known if the importation of minors from Central America to move drugs is intended as a direct benefit for any existing terrorist group. Increasingly, narcotics distributors prefer to use children under the age of 12 -- thus usually below the age where any criminal action would be taken against them if caught -- as the point contacts between dealers and customers in urban areas. Behind them are 16-17 year-old minors who dispense the bags of drugs and receive the money handled by the youngsters who operate under their eye. Using minors in this role means lesser penalties in almost all Western nations. Thus the real dealers operate two levels removed from the point of sale, behind these two levels of children and teenagers (who are easy to catch and can be easily replaced) -- which greatly increases their safety.¹² In the Canadian case, there are no known connections to terrorist groups, but some observers suspect that FARC may be recruiting and training under-age pushers in Central America to work our streets.

The Turkish government insists, with much justification, that the proceeds from PKK narcotics activities pay for most of the group's weaponry (some smugglers make shuttle trips -- drugs into Europe and explosives back into Turkey). While the PKK has been using children to support its pusher/activists in Europe, no cases of this behavior appear to have surfaced in Canada, yet, and the community of their supporters appears to be small so far.

If the PKK isn't flogging drugs in Canada, the same cannot be said for some erstwhile members of the Tamil Tigers. They have a history with narcotics that goes back to the late 1970s when Tamil smugglers (a group from which the LTTE leader and some of his key lieutenants originally emerged) started carrying heroin into Sri Lanka from India.¹³

With the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Fundamentalist revolution in Iran, the traditional smuggling routes used by many Afghan/Pakistani opium and heroin producers became severely disrupted, and the Sri Lankan Tamils soon provided a new way of getting their drugs to markets elsewhere in the world. Additionally, the insurgent trick of running drugs into the society they are fighting against also appeared -- and Sri Lanka (despite fierce penalties -- including execution -- for drug trafficking) found that the number of heroin addicts on the Island was growing rapidly. Between 1983 and 1993, the number of addicts there grew to 50,000.¹⁴

Tamils also began running heroin into Western Europe by 1984. Some significant incidents include the arrest of 204 Tamils in Italy during an investigation into a heroin smuggling ring -- and some of the prisoners claimed special treatment as they were

¹² This pattern in drug distribution techniques has been discussed with Canadian police intelligence officers and personally witnessed by one of the authors; thanks also goes to Art Hanger, MP who first brought this to our attention in 1998.

¹³ Ratnatunga, Sinha; *The Politics of Terrorism: The Sri Lankan Experience*; Belconnen, Australia; International Fellowship for Social and Economic Development, 1988. Also see Edgar O'balance; *The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-1988*; Brassey's, London, 1988.

¹⁴ Xinhua General Overseas News Agency, April 18th, 1993.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

“political prisoners and revolutionary fighters”, while several other prisoners had their tongues cut out to prevent them from talking to authorities.¹⁵ In 1984, Swiss police had found that Tamil refugees carried some 20 percent of the heroin brought into their country.¹⁶ By 1988, Italian police had broken up four rings of Tamil heroin smugglers. Another route for Tamil-related heroin smuggling was found in Poland in 1984, where authorities in the then Warsaw Pact nation (unlike those in Bulgaria) were unwilling to ignore narcotics smuggling just because the intended market was inside the capitalist West.¹⁷ One LTTE operative who was jailed in France for two years for heroin smuggling later became the chief of their international operations.¹⁸

From 1985 until the early 1990s (when China White Heroin from southeast Asia's Golden Triangle overtook heroin from Central Asia in Canadian consumer preference), the RCMP's annual *National Drug Intelligence Estimate* indicated that heroin from Pakistan and Afghanistan had risen from 20 to 65% of the Canadian market. Tamil traffickers had a part of that market and one ring was mentioned in the 1991 edition of the RCMP's report. One Tamil trafficker, Veeravagu Velmurugu, who entered Canada in 1984 as a refugee from the United States (where he had arrived in 1983 after fleeing Sri Lanka) had been jailed in Canada for life for heroin trafficking. While in Collins Bay penitentiary, he hatched a plan to escape that would have involved an aerial assault on the prison with helicopters armed with heavy machine-guns.¹⁹

As the 1990s wore on and heroin from Southeast Asia picked up in volume again, the Tigers also positioned themselves to be able to take advantage of that source too. They have established a naval base for themselves on the Island of Twante, off Burma – the world's leading source for heroin from that part of the world. The LTTE also owns its own shipping line, and have reportedly used their own merchant ships to smuggle heroin into Europe.²⁰ The American government is also aware of LTTE involvement with heroin in and around southern Thailand and Burma, but in the absence of any direct threat to the US from the Tigers, the resources of their Drug Enforcement Agency are focused elsewhere.²¹

However, there is an important point to make. While various Canadian police forces are convinced that the LTTE is making money inside Canada through a number of legal and illegal means, they have yet to make a positive connection between drug trafficking in Canada and the Tigers, although individual Tamils have been caught smuggling heroin

¹⁵ Jayewardene & Jayewardene, Pgs. 227-229 – which discusses many aspects of Tiger related narcotics smuggling into Europe at this time.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.* and Reuters, June 28th, 1984.

¹⁸ Peter Chalk; “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organization and Operations – A Preliminary Analysis”; Canadian Security Intelligence Service Commentary No. 77; 17 March 2000.

¹⁹ *Globe and Mail*; March 20th, 1991, Pg. A6.

²⁰ Rohan Gunaratna; “The Tiger Movement of Sri Lanka”; a 1996 draft for the *The American Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Vol II*; 1996.

²¹ See the prepared statement of Frank Cilluffo, Deputy Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies to the Subcommittee on Crime, Committee of the Judiciary, US House of Representatives; 13 December 2000. As an aside, perhaps one of the most useful surveys of criminal activity across the World can be found in the prepared statement of Ralf Mutschke, the Assistant Director for the Sub-Directorate for Crimes Against Persons and Property, Interpol General Secretariat, which can also be found in the same day's proceedings.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

into Canada.²² Another Tamil (Velupillai Pushpanathan) was arrested with \$10 million in heroin in 1987, attempted to sell heroin to an RCMP officer (three times), and managed to make a refugee claim while behind bars thanks to our Supreme Court.²³ However, Pushpanathan is slated for extradition after the Federal Court of Canada ruled that there was “*very strong evidence demonstrating the applicant’s involvement with the trafficking of heroin in a Tamil Controlled drug-dealing operation.*”²⁴ While the direct link between the LTTE and Canadian addicts is not definite, as far as the IRB and the Federal Court are concerned, the proof in this case seems good enough.

Human Trafficking and People Smuggling

One of the fastest growing criminal enterprises of the 1990s concerns the twinned activities of human trafficking and people smuggling. This is a field of activity that might rival narcotics as the top money-earner for the insurgent and criminal cartels of the world.

People smuggling is the more common activity and essentially consists of circumventing or bypassing conventional controls on immigration and international movement. A typical example might involve a paid agent, perhaps making \$40,000 per head, arranging for a dozen would-be immigrants boarding an international air flight with fraudulent documents, so that they might make carefully coached refugee claims upon landing in a Western nation.

Human trafficking is a similar activity except that smuggled people will be deprived of their liberty by the traffickers (or his real customers) on arriving in a new jurisdiction, and will be coerced into an unexpected fate. Examples could include a Russian woman who finds herself working as a prostitute after the “model agency” that promised her employment turns out to be a brothel, or where Chinese boat people are diverted to a sweatshop to work off their ‘debt’ to the smuggler as illegal aliens who are paid less than minimum wage. Approximately 700,000 – 900,000 people a year are subjected to this fate.²⁵

According to the US Department of State, Canada plays a role in the trafficking of people, and police in Toronto alone laid some 700 charges for offences related to trafficking during 2000. While Canada is sometimes a destination for trafficked people from China, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, Korea, Russia, and Central America, the greater part of the flow consisted of people being smuggled through Canada in transit for the United States.²⁶ Terrorist involvement in this activity in Canada is minimal, but the same cannot be said for people smuggling.

²² For example, see “Hero in haul worth \$9 Million”, *Toronto Sun*; 6 February 1996, concerning the interception of one mule – a Toronto area jeweler.

²³ “Top court overrules refugee board”; *Globe and Mail*; 5 June 1998 Pg. A1.

²⁴ “Sri Lankan to be extradited for ‘narco-terrorism’”; *National Post*; 5th October 2002.

²⁵ See US Department of State; “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report”; July 2001. Pg. 1

²⁶ *Ibid*, Pg. 17

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

The problem of people smuggling is an enormous one, and many organized crime groups are involved. It is not in the scope of this study, however, to discuss the purely criminally motivated aspects of people smuggling – such as attends that run by Asian or Eastern European criminal societies.

According to one of Canada's more prominent critics of our current immigration policies, Martin Collacott, we have essentially developed two parallel immigration systems – the conventional system and the 'refugee' system. Few of the people who traveled here through the conventional system should be regarded with suspicion (although this system is in desperate need of sweeping reforms), while the refugee system is subjected to considerable abuse.²⁷

Before the immigration system is dismissed altogether, it should be pointed out that the system is swamped. There has been the strong whiff of corruption sometimes from among frontline workers in Ukraine and Hong Kong, and Canadian officials are seldom able to query the medical documentation of applicants, or investigate anomalies in their applications. There might be cursory checks on the backgrounds of some applicants, but it would still be easy for potential terrorists or their supporters to beat this casual scrutiny -- particularly if local authorities in the source country have been coerced into assisting a doctored application or are sympathetic to a particular cause. Student visas are another area where considerable work needs to be undertaken to ensure the safety of Canadians, and of our national reputation. It should be pointed out that many of the al Qaeda terrorists who entered Western Europe and the United States did so as "students", and that Canada is no better than our closest allies in both screening applicants or tracking down those who have outlasted their permitted stays here.

Canada currently has a generous refugee system, but it was designed in the 1980s with the expectation that very few refugees would actually make it to Canada. Refugee applications had little to do with previous Canadian immigration policies, most of which were concerned with the demographic and economic growth of the country. While Canadians played leading roles in the formation of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees and the establishment of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951, this had little effect on our own policies. Moreover, these UN measures were intended to deal with the leftover refugees of the Second World War (of whom there were still a great many), and Canadian immigration officers were already avidly combing this population for conventional immigrants anyway and some regulations were relaxed out of humanitarian considerations.

The 1951 UN Refugee Convention essentially defined a refugee claimant is someone who is supposed to have a well-founded fear that they will be persecuted for their beliefs

²⁷ There are three highly informed critics of Canada's current immigration/refugee systems: Martin Collacott was a Canadian ambassador to three different nations (including Sri Lanka and Vietnam) before retiring. Another former Canadian ambassador, Joe Bisset, is the chief architect of our immigration and refugee policies in the 1970s and 1980s. Charles M. Campbell spent 10 years on the Immigration Appeal Board and is the author of *Betrayal and Deceit: The Politics of Canadian Immigration* (Jasmine Books, Vancouver, 2000). The expertise of the first two was consulted on several occasions during the research for this paper, and Campbell's book has been mined extensively. Errors in fact are the author's alone. Some frontline workers in Citizenship and Immigration and the Refugee Review Board also have much to say – mostly off the record-- and it is hard to find a more dispirited group of Federal employees.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

if they are returned to their original home. The 1951 Convention was expanded in a 1967 Protocol, but Canada did not start to implement a coherent refugee policy until 1969. This did not mean that we refused all refugees: An average of 3,002 were allowed into Canada every year from 1960 to 1978. All of them were Convention refugees. However, in the 20 years between 1979 and 1998 an average of 24,956 claims have been accepted every year.

This vast increase originally resulted from two major crises – one being the huge numbers of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees out of the continuing wars in Southeast Asia, and the destabilization of Lebanon after the outbreak of the civil war there. To help with the problem, Canadian authorities (like those in many other Western nations) relaxed their understanding of the UN Convention's definition. We have had little reason to regret the decision to allow so many of those displaced by these conflicts from entering – the great majority of them have become fine citizens. However, once the Convention guidelines were relaxed, a precedent had been established and it has subsequently proven difficult to shut the floodgate again.

If an opportunity presents itself, there are opportunists who will take advantage of it, and Canada's entry points were soon jammed with people who were using the relaxed guidelines (and some broad interpretations about the 'persecution' they faced) to bypass the immigration system. Worse still, the Supreme Court made one of its worst rulings ever in the 1985 *Regina vs Singh* decision (a case concerning a Sikh militant who had arrived in Canada and faced deportation); when it determined that anyone who arrived in Canada was entitled to the same full legal rights as any Canadian citizen. First off, this meant that every case -- no matter how flimsy -- had to be heard and, since most refugees could claim indigence, they would be able to call on public funding to meet their legal costs. Almost overnight, a new legal industry was born – one that probably costs taxpayers at least \$1 billion a year.

One other consequence of the decision that should be considered is that Canadian citizenship has taken on far less value: Some 2,265,000 immigrants and refugees landed in Canada between 1990 and 1998, but only about 1,00,040 'new Canadians' have bothered to become citizens.²⁸ This questions the commitment of many of the people who have arrived here.

Now that the gates were wide open, there has only really been one attempt to partly close them again. According to James Bisset, who helped to design it, a generous new system of benefits was created for refugees in 1988 by Immigration Canada, with the expectation that we would return to earlier principles and would only accept claims where Canada was the first county of asylum. In short, anybody who made it directly to Canada from their homeland could claim status, anybody coming by way of another country (particularly a liberal-democratic one) would have to be diverted into the immigration system. As it happens, the decision was partly over-ruled by the Mulroney Government; we would keep the benefits system, but the First Asylum principle would not be recognized... the rest is history.

²⁸ The notes on the differing citizenship and immigration/refugee rates were drawn from Citizenship and Immigration figures published in the *Canadian Global Almanac 2000*. (Macmillan Canada, Toronto, 1999)

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

Canada does attempt to scrutinize the backgrounds of some of the refugees that arrive here (with often poor results – the case load is enormous and CSIS has often faced enormous backlogs), but national security requirements are one of the few grounds for which a refugee can be refused. Although, the Refugee Review Board still refuses about 40-45% of all claims, thousands of deportation orders could not be executed as the subjects of them cannot be located.²⁹ Moreover, the first priority for Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration officers charged with hunting down refused cases tends to be violent criminals – a priority that only shifted (somewhat) after September 2001.

Although thousands upon thousands of refugee claimants arrive normally and are honest enough in their declarations, people smuggling taints the whole system.

In the case of the Tamil community, it is often not always clear that the Tigers directly benefit from people smuggling into Canada – except that the Tamil community in Canada can be milked to their indirect benefit. Normally, it costs somewhere between \$10,000 and \$40,000 for a Sri Lankan Tamil to be brought to Canada illegally, with the usual cost running around \$20-25,000 dollars. Most of the smugglers tend to be known to their clients, or come from the same community, but in many cases, the 'agency' making the arrangements will be operating with the permission of the LTTE.³⁰

Also, for those who are leaving Sri Lanka from areas controlled by the Tigers, a few hundred dollars will be necessary for an "exit visa" from the LTTE.³¹ In some cases, people with special skills or a greater wealth than ordinary Tamils may have to pay thousands of dollars to be entitled to leave.

It is not known, and seems unlikely, if Babbar Khalsa or al Qaeda demands similar 'exit visas' from people living under their thumbs, nor that they directly profit from encouraging the smuggling of anyone else other than their own members and key supporters. No doubt they would if it was possible.

The essential act in people smuggling is to bring the would-be refugee claimant onto the national territory of Canada. An applicant for refugee status at an overseas Canadian embassy or consulate might be considered; but in this case, the applicant would really have to be a bona fide Convention refugee. Anyone else would be shunted into the immigration pipeline. Hence, the demand for smuggling services.

People smuggling and human trafficking often rests upon the creation or alteration of travel documents. These are necessary to be able to transit other countries on the way to Canada, and to board aircraft bound here. Usually, a group of 5-7 people will be escorted by a 'minder', though many people travel on their own after having bought false or doctored documents. The usual passports and visas are necessary to board an aircraft bound for Canada, but once on board the aircraft, it is necessary to get rid of them. Usually, the aspiring refugees will transfer their documents back to the smuggler (who

²⁹ "Alarm raised over missing would-be refugees"; *The Globe and Mail*; 16 January 1999. One Immigration officer told me that her department has issued 40,000 orders for deportation, but only has a handful of officers charged with attempting to deliver them.

³⁰ Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board; "Sri Lanka: Alien Smuggling"; May 1996. Pg. 13.

³¹ *Ibid* Pg. 7

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

will re-use them later) during the flight, and declare themselves to be undocumented refugees on arrival in Canada.³²

Others will seek to arrive in Canada with a false identity and might only declare themselves as refugees if the document is discovered while passing through Customs or Immigration. A number of terrorists have been caught entering Canada with false passports -- Mokhtar Haouari and Ahmed Ressam both did so in February 1994 (Ressam had arrived in France with a fake Moroccan passport to the name of Nasser Resam in 1993, arrived in Montreal with an altered French passport to the name of Tahar Mejadi, and traveled to Afghanistan for terrorist training under a Canadian passport to the name of Benni Noris). Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, a Toronto area convenience store clerk who is also suspected of being a senior 'fixer' for Islamic Jihad came to Canada with a doctored passport. Aynur Saygili, a PKK member, who came here to take over a Kurdish cultural organization also had a doctored passport when entering Canada. BKI member Iqbal Singh arrived in Canada in 1991 as an undocumented refugee (after hopping through several countries with false documentation).

Passports and travel documents are so valuable, that smugglers often re-use them again and again. One Tamil ring cracked by the RCMP in 1996 took about five years to be uncovered, and was producing hundreds of forged "counterfoil" pages with which to alter Canadian passports. (The counterfoil page is the one containing a person's biographical information, and would have to be slipped into a real passport -- blank counterfoil page go for about \$100 each).³³ Another ring was broken in 1994 with a series of six arrests, but not before the Tamil smugglers had brought thousands of people to Canada -- netting a profit of about \$10,000 per head on some 50 people a month.³⁴ Besides acquiring 20 forged Canadian passports, the RCMP also recovered blank OHIP and Citizenship cards and phony exit and entry stamps from a number of countries.

A 1990 case of passport forgery was the first one ever to result in a Canadian conviction. Again, the perpetrators were Canadian Tamils, operating out of an apartment in Toronto. They had produced something like 1,000 doctored travel documents before being caught.³⁵ Another forger, whose lab for doctoring passports was uncovered in 1991, was found to have the World Tamil Movement of Ontario's phone number listed under 'LTTE' in his date book.³⁶

An alternative to flying into Canada or the US and making an undocumented refugee claim is to come by ship. The first mass wave of 155 Tamil refugees arrived this way in 1986, in two lifeboats off Nova Scotia. At first they tried to imply that they had come directly from Sri Lanka, but it turned out they had done so via India, the USSR, East Germany and Hamburg, West Germany, before taking ship across the Atlantic. Curiously, as Canadian authorities started to investigate their claims, a fire in a Hamburg police station destroyed much of the documentation associated with their earlier travels

³² One of the more recommended newspaper articles on contemporary techniques is "Human-smuggling ring cracked."; *The Globe and Mail*; 10 September 2002; Pg. A2.

³³ "RCMP crack counterfeit passport ring"; *The Globe and Mail*; 5 September 1996, Pg. A2.

³⁴ "Smashed: RCMP break up human smuggling syndicate"; *Toronto Sun*; 1 July 1994.

³⁵ "Fake passport scam uncovered"; *The Toronto Star*; 13 December 1991. Pg. A6.

³⁶ "Police investigating if passport forgers linked to terrorists"; *The Toronto Star*; 18 December 1991, Pg. A2.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

and entry into Germany.³⁷ In 1987, another 174 “Sikhs” arrived in much the same way; their Dravidian faces and general lack of knowledge about the Sikh religion raised some suspicions, but most of this group of Tamils was also given refugee status anyway.

By and large, shipping oneself to North America is cheaper than flying, but it is much more uncomfortable and hazardous. In 1998, a group of 190 Tamils surrendered – most in poor health – off Senegal after paying \$14,000 each to be smuggled to North America.³⁸

One interesting datum about refugee claimants from Sri Lanka. In 1992 – a time when all parties in the Sri Lankan conflict were committing atrocities -- some 8,452 Tamil refugee claimants showed up at the Sri Lankan High Commission in Ottawa to apply for travel documents for a return visit to Sri Lanka, the nation they claimed to have fled because of a well-founded fear of persecution by a supposedly genocidal government.³⁹ Business remains brisk at the High Commission, and the Sri Lankan government opened a consular office in Toronto in 2000 to help handle the continuing high volume of requests for visas.

Al Qaeda members are also keenly interested in acquiring and doctoring false passports and documentation. One of the reasons why Canada started to pay attention to Ahmed Ressam and the Montreal Salafist cell was because of a French investigation into the provision of black market Moroccan passports to a group of Turkish Islamic Fundamentalists who were planning to assassinate the Turkish President on a trip to Belgium. A French court determined that Adel Boumezbeur, Karim Said Atmani, Mustapha Labsi and a Canadian citizen, Fateh Kamel (all from Ressam's cell) had provided these documents. Once a thread from a carpet of deception becomes unraveled, it is interesting to see where it leads... all the more reason why any instance where fabricated passports or travel documents appear should be closely investigated.

Prostitution and War

Prostitution and related sexual enterprises probably rival narcotics as the leading revenue earners in the World's underground economies; but the sex industry is shy when it comes to filing reports about its annual revenues. Prostitution, as an industry, has considerable overhead expenses too -- it requires a lot of workers, most of whom have living expenses to meet, there may be advertising costs and the need to maintain commercial premises. As a result, the sex industry may be less attractive to the supporters of terrorism than many other criminal activities. This does not mean that they ignore the field completely.

For most terrorist or insurgent organizations, aspects of the groups' popularity and ethno-cultural background play key roles in determining the role of prostitution as a fundraising mechanism. For example, the limited number of supporters available to conventional Marxist groups inside Western nations largely debarred them from making

³⁷ Author's interviews with former CSIS and Immigration officers.

³⁸ “How Canada thwarted a people-smuggling plot”; *The Globe and Mail*; 16 January 1999, Pg. A1.

³⁹ “Refugee scam ripped”; *Toronto Sun*; 7 January 1993. Pg. 7.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

use of prostitution. Likewise, Islamic groups, or those with a strongly nationalistic ethos are also likely to refrain from using prostitutes to raise money for the cause (although many reports from Afghanistan and Algeria have demonstrated that Islamic Fundamentalists have offered every possible sexual abuse to Muslim women whenever it suited them to do so).

It is possible that some Ulster-based groups have linkages to prostitution, and at least two British Army officers with recent experience there believe this may be the case.⁴⁰ Ulster's underground economy – betting shops, unlicensed bars and smuggling activities already provide the bulk of the income for the Protestant Paramilitaries and the Provos, so it is not too much of a stretch for them to believe that both groups dabble in prostitution as well.

Sometime in the mid-1980s (according to unsubstantiated gossip in the Intelligence community) a senior IRA man was discovered in Toronto after one of the two call-girls who had accompanied him to take care of the terrorists' living expenses was arrested by the local police. This led to an expedited deportation of the IRA member back to waiting authorities in Great Britain.

Most prostitutes have to advertise and this makes the industry easy to monitor at times. Most Canadian phone books carry advertisements from escort agencies, and advertisements for prostitutes can be found in many community papers. In Toronto, most such advertisements can be found in two weekly papers, *Now Magazine* and *Eye Magazine*. Starting in mid 1995, some of the advertisers offering negotiable affection began to describe themselves as East Indians, Sri Lankans, Tamils, or as having freshly arrived from Jaffna (the main Tamil city in Sri Lanka). These ads can still be found, but in all fairness they were only a few in a sea of similar ones for women of many different backgrounds.

In 1998, a pair of sources in the Tamil Community told one of the authors about "Camilla", a madam for a Tamil hooker ring in Toronto. The story was that most of the clientele were Tamils, but the thinking about Camilla's organization was that a man who could afford a few hundred bucks for an hour or two of pleasure could also then be fingered as someone who could afford to increase his donations to the Tigers' cause. The story was impossible to confirm for several reasons, but Camilla does still advertise in the 'Adult Personal' section of *Now Magazine*.

One additional datum about prostitution and the Tigers arises out of people smuggling activities (another key industry for the LTTE). In the mid 1990s, it was not unknown for some Sri Lankan women to be abused or raped while being smuggled towards Canada, and some were deliberately stranded in Thailand and forced into prostitution there.⁴¹ In all fairness, the risks of this happening to Tamil women are much lower than they are for women being handled by human traffickers from Eastern Europe and the Far East.

⁴⁰ Author's interviews with British Army officers in October 2001, and March 2002.

⁴¹ Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board; *Sri Lanka: Alien Smuggling*; May 1996. Pg. 12.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

Frauds and Scams

In 1996 'Gord' – a sometime artist who found that a subsidized life on Ontario welfare rolls was sufficient to maintain his Bohemian lifestyle – saw that change was looming. The new Harris government was threatening to reform the welfare system and it was quite probable that he might have to work for a living again. Then a middle aged Tamil couple gave this young man an opportunity that was too good to be true. Any good scam demands that a victim who hasn't quite figured out that there is no such thing as a free lunch, and Gord certainly fit the bill.

Some scams, such as the incessant 'You are recommended as a person of good character and I need your help to get \$400 million out of Nigeria' spam messages that bombard most internet users, are simple enough. This one was a bit more complex.

Gord was asked if he would like to have a free room in a house that had been converted into a series of rental accommodations. In return, he would collect the rent from the other tenants; he would also be registered as the owner of the house as far as the bank was concerned. The pair explained that for 'tax purposes' they couldn't be seen as the owners of the house, so they needed him to act as an agent. The rental payments would be forwarded to the pair, who would then pay the mortgage in Gord's name. Once Gord accepted this argument, he was easily talked into accepting a fake letter of reference and other documentation from a fictional software company indicating that he was making something like \$90,000 dollars a year.

The realtor was another middle-aged Tamil, and together they arranged the purchase of the house and the mortgage from a prominent Canadian bank. Gord moved in, as did a number of other tenants and all seemed well. Three months after the deal was struck, the mortgage holder called – in that polite way they have – to inquire as to the whereabouts of this month's payment. Startled, Gord called the realtor and the couple who arranged the purchase in the first place, but neither telephone was in service and, as he now realized, he had no idea of what their addresses – or real identities -- were.

The bank that was involved in this case has refused all comment, and Gord – who cooperated fully with their investigation – is now a chastened and wiser man. However, several points stand out: If the realtor and the deal's instigators were operating with false identification, but they did pay the mortgage for a two months, it suggests that the scam probably involved several houses before it was time to leave with the profits (Gord was asked if he knew other people in his situation too). Moreover, the scheme might have only been truly profitable if the legitimate owners of the house -- or houses -- had been a party to it, and also used fake identification.

Canadian banks, like those everywhere, are truly reticent about those times when they have been deceived in the ways outlined above, but they will admit to losing a very conservative \$1 million a year to cons and scams outside of credit card counterfeiting. The actual figure is probably somewhat higher than that. In discussing the housing scam with another Canadian bank branch manager, we were told of a small business loan his branch had been robbed of. The applicant had full documentation from Sri Lanka that detailed a successful mercantile career there, and now hoped to translate this experience

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

to Canada. His credentials withstood scrutiny, his business plan was sound, and his credit rating seemed excellent. He was lent \$40,000 and promptly disappeared – all of the client's identification and past history turned out to have been fictional.

In both cases, we have only single source information about fraud, although it does seem reasonable to conclude, given the LTTE's long experience with counterfeiting, that the proceeds were for their benefit. In any event, few criminals would work so hard for such returns without repeating their successes as often as possible, and so being eventually caught; while the resources displayed in these two instances strongly suggest that a larger network exists. Moreover, the supporters of the LTTE have a long history in document fraud and counterfeiting where people smuggling is concerned.

The ways of committing fraud are legion: Stolen and/or inferior goods can be substituted under well known brand-names and sold at a substantial discount, credit cards can be counterfeited, and sale coupons can be collected for redemption from producers by fraudulent outlets – all techniques that have been used in recent years by North American supporters of al Qaeda, Hizbollah and Hamas.⁴²

Stolen credit cards and debit cards have limited utility nowadays, as most consumers are quick to report their loss within a day or two. What has become more lucrative is the creation of forged cards – tied to an existing account – that can be used for up to a month before discovery becomes too likely. The tools and knowledge necessary to forge cards are not too difficult to acquire: What is more necessary is gaining access to account numbers and PIN numbers from existing cards.

The easiest way to get this data is to work in store where it is possible to use the cards of large numbers of consumers, and occasionally make a second swipe of a card and keeping the sales slip so that the account number can be copied and used for counterfeiting (a method that does not work for very long before being noticed by card providers). More sophisticated techniques can include installing a second camera near an ATM to read cards and pin numbers over the shoulders of users, installing digital taps (known as 'CC Grabbers') which intercept card data being sent over telephone lines when vendors seek payment authorization, or acquiring a 'skimmer' or 'swiper' – a handy pocket sized magnetic card reader that can acquire all the essential data on a card with a quick swipe.

It is difficult to engage in these techniques in many commercial establishments, but gas-bars -- where a clerk can operate with little supervision and often out of sight from a customer inside his booth – are ideal places to pirate data. Restaurants where the waiters also handle payments can be useful if the waiter has a skimmer. Small businesses where all of the staff may be involved in copying data are also useful. There are tens of thousands of gas bars, restaurants, and small stores where a consumer cannot see every aspect of the transaction being made with his card, and all of these could be potentially misused if the retail clerk is sympathetic to a terrorist organization.

Skimmers, CC Grabbers and other techniques for stealing credit card information have been often used in Europe and the United States. Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups

⁴² See the W-Five Documentary aired by the CTV network in Canada on November 25th, 2001.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

have been commonly associated with this activity. Part of the core training for al Qaeda members in Afghanistan is alleged to have been in counterfeiting techniques.⁴³

Once a forged card is made, it is possible for the counterfeiters to inflate its value by sending in a forged check to inflate the balances in the real account it is based on, and then to use it to buy goods for resale – or even launder it in a casino by buying chips and cashing them in later.

Terrorist supporters have attempted to steal credit card information inside Canada. The Algerian Salafist terrorists Samir Ait Mohamed, Mokhtar Haouri and Said Araar were in the same Montreal-based al Qaeda cell as Ahmed Ressay. The group had many plans and ideas, only a few of which ever got close to fruition, but the trio proposed two ideas: Opening a store in Montreal to collect credit card information from buyers which could be used to finance other Fundamentalists in the area. They also attempted to find a Canadian passport office worker who could be induced to obtain genuine passports.⁴⁴ Ressay was also advised by Haouri to help open a store that could be used for the same function.

A former LTTE assassin and member of the Tamil VVT street gang, Narinjan Fabian, was also arrested in October, 2001 as part of a multi-agency investigation into credit card forging.⁴⁵ The raid on his apartment netted hundreds of cards – which could have cost banks more than \$20 million had they entered circulation. Fabian's set-up included CC-grabbers in combination with pinhole video cameras in a gas bar, and data from both was transmitted by wireless technology to a receiver hidden inside a parked car behind the gas bar.

A crackdown in 1993 on stolen and phony credit cards that had been used for bogus gasoline charges by Tamil and Somali gas station attendants resulted in 18 arrests. This was a simpler scam, and most of the cards had either been stolen from a mail sorting plant or from apartment mailboxes.⁴⁶ The ploy was all gang related, and the plan had been to steal hundreds of thousands of cards eventually. It should be noted that at the time, Somali gang members in Toronto were also raising money for their clans in Somalia's chaotic civil conflict.

Counterfeiting currency is another ideal terrorist moneymaker. As with involvement in narcotics, the terrorist can involve himself in this activity both to generate immediate capital for his own operations and also to undermine the economy of the nations he strives against. Probably the biggest and best-documented terrorist counterfeiter is Hizbollah, who have a long history of producing fake US dollars. The normal techniques of counterfeiting documents and currency – such as the use of scanner copiers with a resolution of 300 DPI (dots per inch) or more, or the use of digital press printer are becoming increasingly common, and are responsible for most of the forged currency usually seen in Canada. However, this is the sort of stuff that normally fools corner store clerks and will not survive a trip to the bank.

⁴³ Authors interview.

⁴⁴ Details are in two front page stories from the *Globe and Mail*, November 30, 2001

⁴⁵ "Man guilty in fraud linked to Tamil Tigers": *National Post*; 8 March 2002.

⁴⁶ "Gas card scam busted"; *Toronto Sun*, 22 September 1993; Pg. 32.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

What makes Hizbollah's currency special is the use of high quality Intaglio Presses – large, expensive machinery whose use is normally monitored by law enforcement and whose sale is normally restricted to national governments.⁴⁷ These presses are normally used to print banknotes and high quality documents with all the highly refined features that used to guarantee real currency from being copied. Iran and Syria smuggled Itaglio Presses that had been bought for their own use into Lebanon for Hizbollah.

So far, Hizbollah had largely restricted its attentions to US currency, but Canada has been used as a conduit for counterfeit dollars from the Middle East to enter the US.⁴⁸ In the mid-1990s, counterfeit US \$100 bills would appear in the hands of members of the Lebanese underworld in Montreal, and would enter the US via the Akwesasne Reserve – which was then a pipeline for a massive two-way flow in contraband over the US-Canadian border.

The same printing and copying techniques used for currency can also be used for passports and key identity documents.

Three suspect Islamic Fundamentalists were arrested in northern Alberta and extradited to the United States in December, 2001; the trio faced charges for a variety of offences related to forgery and fraud. Emad Jamal Hassan, Yousef al-Amleh and Mohammed-khair Salah were wanted for US \$1 million in fraudulent food-stamps claims after forging baby-formula labels and selling substandard products instead, while claiming to have sold the higher quality bogus product to needy consumers in return for foodstamps. One of them had also been convicted by a US court for defrauding a bank of US \$63,000 in forged cashiers' cheques.⁴⁹

The case of Michael John Hamdani is also instructive. While not a terrorist, Hamdani acted as an informant on terrorism in order to win a plea bargain for numerous counterfeiting offences in Canada and the US. In seven years since arriving in Canada from Pakistan in 1994 (predictably making a refugee claim, a tactic repeated some five times since in Canada and the US), he has repeatedly been arrested while in possession of false or blank US, Canadian, Indian and Pakistani passports, fraudulent drivers' licenses, traveler's cheques, and other identity papers. Predictably, most of his information was fabricated and of little use.⁵⁰ What makes his case interesting is the ease with which he was able to set up sophisticated counterfeiting operations with openly available equipment. It is also worth remembering that authorities in two countries have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in investigating and deporting the man, only to see him successfully return to North America time and again.

Canada, to our shame, is also home to a number of telephone and internet fraud operations that plague consumers in our own country as well as throughout the US and Europe. Apparently, the industry is large enough to generate billions of dollars in annual

⁴⁷ See "Forging Terror", by Paul Kaihla in the December 2002 issue of Business 2.0 at www.business2.com, an excellent summary of contemporary techniques in counterfeiting.

⁴⁸ Thompson, John; *Misfire: The Black Market and Gun Control*; Mackenzie Institute Occasional Paper, May 1995.

⁴⁹ "Former Terror Suspect's Refugee Bid Rejected"; *National Post*; 15 December 2001. Pg. A10

⁵⁰ "Accused fraudster ignored deportation"; *National Post*; 10th January 2003, Pg. A4

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

profits and has attracted a wide variety of criminal elements.⁵¹ So far, it is not known if any of these operations are being run by the supporters of a terrorist group, but given the lucrative nature of the business, it is probably just a matter of time.

In Western societies that offer full social support for the unfortunate and indigent, it is inevitable that the welfare system will be abused. Like many other nations, Canada offers a full package of social services, including welfare, to those who have claimed refugee status here. Opportunism was inevitable: In one recent case, Sudanese and Pakistani students in US were getting dropped off on the approaches to Canadian customs posts, so that they could make an undocumented refugee claim here, become entitled to welfare and get the cheques forwarded to a Canadian address which would cash the cheques and wire the money (less a fee) back to the US.⁵² While these students are not terrorists – although it is quite likely that some approve of al Qaeda – terrorists have been known to abuse our welfare system too.

Large numbers of al Qaeda members in Europe have lived on welfare, often while also running criminal activities or establishing business enterprises of their own. Mohamedou Ould Slahi, an al Qaeda member who was recruited as a student in Europe, lived in Montreal for two years after fleeing Germany where he was wanted for welfare fraud after receiving 7,500 DM even while drawing a salary of 40,000 DM from an electronics company.⁵³ Ahmed Ressay received welfare payments, while also living as a petty criminal, in Montreal during the 1990s.

Perhaps one of the most spectacular Canadian uses of the welfare system to fund other peoples' wars came as a result of the Somali civil conflict of the early 1990s. Canada soon became a destination of choice for Somalis fleeing the country, and Canadian immigration officers and social workers in the Toronto area were often to find that many of them had a precise knowledge of all their entitlements before they landed in Canada. Moreover, at that time, the Province of Ontario (then under an NDP government) was operating with a very relaxed attitude towards new claims, accepting most of them at face value.⁵⁴

It soon turned out that many Somalis soon started making multiple claims, usually by traveling into the United States and then turning around and making a new refugee claim under an assumed name on re-entering Canada.⁵⁵ However, few of these multiple claims were for personal benefit, as money from social welfare payments was diverted to Africa to buy arms and supplies for clan militias back in Somalia.⁵⁶ To compound matters, the favored wife of the most notorious Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed (who was already working with al Qaeda in 1993), was living in London, Ontario with four children on welfare, when not traveling back to Africa to accompany her husband on 'state' visits.

⁵¹ An excellent summary of the size and nature of the problem can be founded in "Dial T.O. for Rip-Offs"; *Toronto Sun*, 27 January, 2002, Pg. 35.

⁵² "Foreign students pull welfare scam"; *Toronto Sun*; 8 November 2001, P.16.

⁵³ Vermaat, Emerson; *Bin Laden's Terrorist Networks in Europe*; Mackenzie Institute Occasional Paper, May 2002. Pg. 31.

⁵⁴ Authors interviews in 1993-95 for an unpublished work.

⁵⁵ "Why is cheat here?"; *Toronto Sun*; 7 September 1994 – an excellent profile of one case.

⁵⁶ "'Secret' reports allege Aideed funded by drug, welfare money"; *The Toronto Star*, 4 March 1994.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

When challenged on this, she predictably accused the Canadian reporters who were trying to interview her of being racist.

Intimidation

One of the signal characteristics of organized crime is a willingness to coerce those who must deal with them into inactivity. Perhaps one of the baldest statements of the concept comes from the cocaine cartels of Colombia, where local police forces were offered the choice “lead or silver”; in short accept the silver or receive the lead. It does not take much to demoralize police officers, witnesses, or politicians under these circumstances as numerous historical examples illustrate.

A starker choice is offered to those who would provide testimony against organized crime figures; if you talk, you must accept the consequences. In societies where entrenched criminal institutions have survived for a long time, people can be terrified into codifying their behavior. The Southern Italian code of ‘omerta’ is an example of this, and it has taken a large number of dedicated and courageous police officers and judges (many of whom were murdered in the process) to convince the citizens of Palermo in Sicily that it was right and safe to break the traditional cultural code of silence and non-cooperation with authorities.⁵⁷

Similar processes have occasionally been observed in North America – as can be attested by the many clients of the FBI’s “Witness Protection Program” in cases concerning the Mafia or outlaw motorcycle clubs. Over the years in Canada, it has become necessary to occasionally guard Crown prosecutors, key witnesses, and even – at times – the jury. This has been especially true in cases related to bikers, but also in cases related to terrorism.

Intimidation became a feature of Sikh life in the early 1980s for several reasons. The brutality employed by the Khalistan militants in seeking control of Canadian temples was impressive, as was the 1982 shooting inside an Ontario Supreme Court, when Kuldip Singh Samra killed two men and wounded another (Samra was one of the few Canadian Sikhs to violently oppose the militants) when a case went against him.⁵⁸ Tensions rose inside the Sikh community when it became clear that both sides were capable of committing violence, and it became clear that voicing a public opinion could be dangerous. Added to this is a traditional cultural reticence in dealing with non-Sikhs over troubling issues – an instinct developed when the Sikhs were a much-persecuted minority during the time of the Gurus who shaped their faith.

Intimidation is still a part of life for those offering to act against the BKI in Canada. In December, 2002, Sukhminder Singh Cheema decided to withdraw from the case against the Air India Bomber after reporting that he had been receiving threats ever since offering to testify against them. The Sikh journalist also decided not to cooperate with another

⁵⁷ For more on Omerta and how it was finally dispensed with, see Claire Sterling; *Octopus: The Long Reach of the Sicilian International Mafia*; Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990.

⁵⁸ Mulgrew, Pg. 107.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

investigation into the 1988 attempted murder of the late Tara Singh Hayer for the same reason.⁵⁹

Some of the Police officers who have worked on the Tamil Task Force in the 1990s have wondered about their safety. One RCMP officer in a hospital for heart surgery was surprised to receive a cheeky 'get well' card from one of the subjects of his team's investigations. Metro Toronto police officers were surprised to see a couple of other Tamils strolling through their police station parking lot, writing down the license plates of the cops' own automobiles – an act that did not seem so much as an act of intelligence gathering as a means of saying 'We can find where you live'.⁶⁰

Two of Canada's leading reporters that have specialized on particular terrorist groups; Stewart Bell of the *National Post* and Kim Bolan of the *Vancouver Sun*; have been threatened with physical harm because the quality of their work. Bell, who has done a superlative job in reporting on LTTE activities, was also subjected to a series of smear attacks from anonymous 'sources' inside the Tamil community – who invented and passed rumors that the reporter had availed himself of child prostitutes while visiting Sri Lanka. While the LTTE has yet to launch any lethal attacks in Canada, Bolan is well aware of the much deadlier reputation of the Sikh militants here – although this has not prevented her from continuing her excellent coverage of their activities.

While the Tamil Tigers had, until the September 11th attacks and the recent version of the Palestinian intifada, launched more suicide attacks than the combined total of all other terrorist groups in the world, they have never launched such attacks outside of Sri Lanka and southern India. However, two VVT gang members doused themselves with gasoline outside a Toronto court in 1996, with the intention of entering the court, embracing a veteran Toronto police officer of the anti-gang squad, and setting a match. Fortunately they were stopped before kindling their plan.

Robbery and Auto Theft

Banks, armored delivery trucks, and payrolls have been irresistible targets for generations of terrorists. Joseph Stalin made a reputation for himself as a young Bolshevik with a series of bank robberies; Latin American "revolutionaries" of the 1960s frequently engaged in it, and one of the last actions of the US "Weathermen" was to hit an armored car in a holdup. One of the biggest bank robberies of all time was staged as a joint operation by two unlikely partners – the PLO and the Lebanese Christian Phalange – called a halt to their fighting to stage a break-in in the vaults of the British Bank of the Middle East in Beirut in January 1976. The robbery may have netted as much as \$100 million (records were destroyed as the job was finished). It is also interesting that an expert team of safecrackers, presumably from the Sicilian Mafia, were also called on for their particular talents.⁶¹

⁵⁹ "Key witness in Air India Case withdraws"; *Vancouver Sun*; 12th December 2002.

⁶⁰ Anecdotes collected from authors' interviews with police officers.

⁶¹ James Adams; *The Financing of Terror*; Simon & Schuster, New York, 1986. Pgs. 93-5.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

Bank robbery is not unknown in Canada, but none of it appears to have been committed on behalf of a terrorist group. Yet the threat always exists. According to an indictment from the US Attorney's Office in New York released on November 16th 2001, Ahmed Ressam and Samir Ait Mohamed also planned to commit a series of robberies while armed with hand grenades and submachine guns, in order to finance acts of terrorism in North America. While Ressam had eked out a living with petty theft in Montreal in the 1990s, this would have been far beyond his usual activities of swiping luggage from tourists.

Terrorists have also had a long history of stealing cars – usually commandeering them for their own purposes. According to the much traveled-American columnist P.J. O'Rourke (in an essay on Northern Ireland subsequently reprinted in his 1991 tour de farce *Give War a Chance*), the most common reported crime in Londonderry was automobile theft. The first task of the police was to determine if the theft was for 'political' reasons or was the work of 'ordinary decent criminals' instead. If the theft was for political reasons, it usually meant that the car would turn up in a few days after having been used by either the Protestant or Republican groups for a quick reconnaissance on a potential target or a fast smuggling run. Criminals were more likely to strip the car down for its parts or sell it somewhere else.

Organized automobile theft can produce respectable profits, and some terrorist organizations have been quick to capitalize on this industry as well. One new activity is to steal luxury automobiles and SUVs, and then ship them overseas. Hizbollah leaders, according to the RCMP, ride around in vehicles that have been stolen from North America by Middle Eastern criminal groups that contribute about 10% of their earnings to the organization.⁶² Stolen cars might be stripped for parts in 'chop-shops' in southern Ontario or Quebec, or they might be transferred to a shipping container under a false passport and sent overseas from the cargo container port in Montreal and Halifax. Other stolen cars – and missing construction equipment – get sent to Asia by way of containers from Vancouver, but Asian gangs service this market and are without known connections to any existing terrorist group.⁶³

Blackmail and Protection Rackets

It is difficult to separate 'war-tax' subscription systems and other quasi-legal fundraising mechanisms (discussed in Chapter Four) from blackmail and protection rackets. For a start, when terrorists evolve into organized criminal societies, one of the primary motives for doing so may be the attractiveness of the collections system. Any attempt to separate a 'war tax' from a straightforward protection racket could be doomed if attempted in a courtroom, as the exact boundary between the two could be extremely difficult to define. However, the questions of motive and intent leave some room for inquiry.

⁶² "Supporting Hezbollah"; *National Post*; 15 February 2002, Pg. A15.

⁶³ Author's Interviews.

Other Peoples' Wars -- Chapter Five

*“Saudi businessmen and wealthy Palestinians [and members of the Saudi royal family] have reportedly made large contributions to various terrorist groups. Unlike Bin Laden’s voluntary contributions, these contributions appear, at least in some circumstances, to have been given in response to blackmail or as a subtle form of protection payment.”*⁶⁴

The feeling that some Saudi figures have made contributions to al Qaeda for ‘protection’ for themselves and their businesses was repeated by Vincent Cannistraro, a former chief of Counter-terrorism operations for the CIA, in his testimony to the House of Representative Committee on International Relations on October 3rd, 2001. Cannistraro believes that most of the contributions from these sources were voluntary, but it may be that it is a convenient and polite diplomatic fiction to describe the money paid to al Qaeda by members of Saudi Royal family as “protection money.” The Saudi Royal family apparently donated as much as \$300 million to bin Laden’s organization.⁶⁵

While the ‘War Tax’ system was operating in Canada until 2002 in the Tamil Community, at times the system did have the flavor of a collections racket. Not all contributors volunteered their payments and there was a strong hint of coercion. If the peace process does continue to stumble forward in Sri Lanka, it will be interesting to see if the War Tax system outlasts the conflict that created it. The easy money generated by such a system appears to be one of the most powerful inducements to the perpetuation of a terrorist movement after the cause that allegedly created it has vanished.

⁶⁴ Stefan Leander, “Cash for carnage: funding the modern terrorist”; Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1998, Pg 42.

⁶⁵ “Kingdom denies funding bin Laden”; *National Post*, 26 August 2002.

Chapter Six: Veterans of Other People's Wars

Someone to Worry About?

Police Intelligence officers concerned with the Tamil Tigers believe that 8,000 veteran LTTE guerrillas now live in Toronto.¹ Other estimates believe that there are as many as 10,000 ex Tigers in the country. Some of the al Qaeda members living in Montreal in the 1990s were members of the vicious Fundamentalist insurgency in Algeria – a conflict where over 120,000 people have been murdered in the last decade. Others had taken a part in the fighting in Bosnia, and in the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan. Members of the Sikh Fundamentalist insurgency inside the Punjab have made it to Canada and taken up residence. Nor are such people alone. Former combatants from the catastrophic clan wars in Somalia; ex-government soldiers from the Sudan, from along both sides of the Green Line in Beirut, and from numerous other squalid conflicts have made it to Canada.

Could an ex-guerrilla who lined up surrendered Sri Lankan soldiers, machine-gunned them and hoisted their heads on stakes be working as a computer salesman in Toronto? Did the clerk at a Montreal convenience store enter into an Algerian village and rape a 13 year-old girl in front of their dying disemboweled father? Did the owner of a popular Punjabi restaurant in Surrey rip the children of an Indian police officer to shred with shrapnel from a command-detonated mine?²

It is entirely possible.

Some former combatants present a danger to Canadians. Some of the guerrillas from the LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka have gravitated into the Tamil street gangs in Toronto. The ex-GIA insurgents from Algeria were contemplating actions in Montreal, and one of the ideas they mulled over was the detonation of propane tankers in the middle of a downtown neighborhood. Ex-PKK guerrillas were evidently among the rioters who injured policemen in Ottawa in February 1999 – engulfing one police officer with the flames from a Molotov cocktail.

It is just as true that hundreds (if not thousands) of other former terrorists and guerrillas have settled in Canada, with every intention of living here quietly. There are a number of factors to consider in determining the danger that former insurgent combatants present to Canadian society.

¹ Author's Interviews.

² There have been numerous press stories about the willingness of LTTE insurgents to murder surrendered Sri Lankan soldiers – and the LTTE itself has produced videos depicting such actions. Un-attributed sections of two such tapes were screened for one of the authors in 1998. Both sides in the ongoing civil war in Algeria were known to stage massacres in the villages of people deemed sympathetic to the other side, and such massacres were often accompanied by gang rape and the abduction of women, which is often the ultimate indignity to commit on an enemy in Arab societies (and many others as well). In 1991-93, Sikh Fundamentalists undertook a campaign to murder the families of policemen in the Punjab; but this ploy backfired when police returned the favor with an even greater intensity.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

Soldiers versus Warriors

Homicide is the central act in warfare of any kind, but it is not necessarily a natural act for most people. Those for whom killing is easy are seldom welcome in any society, and it usually takes some conditioning to turn ordinary men into killers. There are two such approaches that usually work. One is the way of the Warrior (which may be how people fight naturally), the other is the way of the Soldier. Terrorists, like most guerrillas and organized criminals, tend to be warriors.

An attempt to detail all the distinctions between the Warrior and the Soldier would be a book in itself. Moreover, that book has already been written in sections by many others – including Victor Davis Hanson in *The Western Way of Warfare* and more recently in *Carnage and Culture*; by Martin van Creveld in *The Transformation of War*; and by John Keegan in *A History of Warfare*.

Essentially, a soldier is someone who has placed himself under discipline, often voluntarily, and – as Hanson frequently describes – as much or more for the benefit of his civil society as his own personal gain. The soldier is fundamentally a tool of a state and only really appeared in history with the arrival of the Greek city-states of Classical Times. Even a mercenary-soldier works for a state employer; and when he is not, he is under a great risk of devolving into a bandit or pirate.

Additionally, the soldier is expected to inflict violence only under directions and – the most critical distinction of them all – is also expected to receive violence. The soldier's assumption of risk is one of the main reasons why his homicide is tolerable, and this distinction separates the soldier from all other forms of combatant.

A terrorist, or some other insurgent, may believe that he is working for the benefit of a society (which he hopes to amend or re-design to his own notions), and may accept discipline – as indeed many terrorists are disciplined. However, the assumption of risk, and the willingness to place oneself in real danger, does not belong to the vast majority of terrorists or guerrillas. Essentially, the terrorist will not climb out of a trench and advance in the open under the lash of concentrated machinegun fire, and will not live for months under shellfire in a muddy hole. The distinctions outlined earlier between the sheep dog and the coyote (in Chapter One) still stand.

Additionally, the soldier also belongs to an environment with a much more sophisticated and robust psychological infrastructure than the terrorist or guerrilla ever experiences. He has been trained, learned about internal and external discipline, is subject to a code of military laws, is linked in a fundamental manner to his fellows through an organization that innately recognizes the value of small group dynamics in a stressful environment, and belongs to a sub-society that operates with a unique ethos which emphasizes ties of loyalty and respect, both horizontally between peers, and vertically between leaders and subordinates.

Furthermore, if the soldier belongs to a real elite unit, or is a combat veteran (or is both,) there is a sense of élan and common experience that usually strengthens his sense of self-worth and self-respect. The usual ideological/ethnic motivations that inspire

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

insurgents and terrorists are present in the soldier, but are usually of less importance – particularly after being exposed to battle.

The terrorist has his own internal motives that attract him to an ideology that will allow him to attempt to meet them. The many factors that strengthen a soldier's ability to withstand violence and which constrain his behavior might be present, but not all of them, and are never as focused and powerful.

In dealing with the aftermath of a conflict, the soldier is far more likely to return to a stable and productive life than the terrorist.

During the course of the Vietnam War, American psychiatrists who were opposed to American involvement in the conflict began to piece together an idea that any American veteran of the conflict would be a ticking time bomb on his return.³ The theory took on a life of its own, sustained in large part by movies such as *First Blood* (the first of the idiotic Rambo series), and once Veteran's Administration funding became available for those who were supposedly stressed out by the war, sure enough, patients began to appear – many of whom were never in the US military, let alone Vietnam.⁴

One can compare *First Blood* with the much more realistic appraisal of returning servicemen offered by Hollywood in the 1946 film *The Best Years of Our Lives*. This is not to say that veteran soldiers can seamlessly cope with the effects that combat has had on them – many do have considerable problems. But the vast majority of veterans from Western societies settled back into civilian life quietly, without exploding into violence. However, things can be very different under other circumstances.

Soldiers whose cause has been decisively beaten may opt to become involved in violent ideological movements – such as the original KKK in the Post-Civil War American South, or the Freikorps and their left-wing opponents in Germany in the years immediately after the First World War. In both cases, their home society had also bankrupted itself during the conflict, and there was little to hold returning soldiers to their former lives.

Things are even worse for former insurgents.

The Unending War

According to Victor Davis Hanson, one of the reasons why the Western World's inclination for violent battle had developed in the first place was to ensure that wars were short and decisive – with a clear winner and a clear loser. His original thesis in *The Western Way of War* pointed out that the Greeks had no real liking for extended and purposeless conflict with unending years of petty raiding and vandalism – their agricultural resources were too slender to support this.

³ For a detailed history of this development and its consequences, see B.G. Burkett and G. Whitley's *Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation was Robbed of its Heroes and History*; (Dallas 1998).

⁴ *Ibid.* The phenomenon of "wannabe" vets and Veterans Administration claims are discussed extensively.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

Ever since the Hoplites of Classical Greece, the idea of war in the Western World has been to seek a decision about the issue through rapid and intense violence. For insurgents and terrorism, their resources and conditioning mitigate against rapid resolution. A minor war, like the 1982 Falklands war between Argentina and Great Britain, took about 10 weeks to conclude; the 1991 Gulf War was over in six weeks; and Israel's pre-emptive 1967 assault on its looming neighbors has been known in history as the Six Day War. Major wars such as the First and Second World Wars, or the American Civil War took four to six years to conclude, but in each of these wars, weeks (or months) sped by without any notable fighting as the combatants were confining themselves to assembling resources for the next decisive clash.

In comparison to this, a terrorist group might strive for years without any real results at all. The current sectarian violence in Ulster has dragged on for 35 years, the Basque ETA has been active for even longer. Even a minor group, like the Red Army Faction in Germany, managed to stay active for about 16 years. Canada's FLQ (a very minor group by the standards of other terrorist groups) was active for over eight years. This is a long time to 'fight', especially without achieving any concrete results.

Eric Hoffer understood terrorists and revolutionaries (and thought of them as 'fanatics'). He wrote of the deepest, most concealed, impulse that drove them – "*Chaos is his element. When the old order begins to crack, he wades in with all his might and recklessness to blow the whole hated present to high heaven. To hell with reforms! All that exists is rubbish and there is sense in reforming rubbish.*"⁵ But the urge to dramatic destruction, the vision of leading the army that storms the gates of heaven, slips away and year by year, the petty struggle goes on without result.

Socrates is said (by Plato) to have said that the unexamined life is not worth living: Yet most human beings find it difficult to examine their lives and assess what they have done with it. It is worse for Hoffer's and Koestler's true believer, and stark reality is his most terrible enemy. To look back at twenty years in the Provos, or as a White Supremacist, or Tiger, and realize that every self deception and every atrocity meant nothing – or less than nothing – is too much for them to bear. So the examination remains undone, only the struggle remains and excuses are found to explain its failure.

Yet there are many terrorists who turn their backs on their cause – particularly if they feel that the original needs that motivated them have not been met. The gunman who joined to achieve peer-respect, and found that a life of disciplined solitude awaited him may have drifted off and gone elsewhere before being drawn too deeply into the organization. There are leaders who have found that with the maturity of their organization, they have gained wealth and status they craved and can move on to other things. For the rest, there is no way to peacefully settle down.

A number of former Afghan guerrillas (from the war against the Soviet occupation) have settled in Canada, as have many militiamen from various factions in the Lebanese civil war, former Eritrean insurgents, and Somali clan fighters.⁶ However, these were

⁵ Eric Hoffer; *The True Believer*; HarperCollins, Perennial Classics Edition, New York, 2002. Pg 143-144.

⁶ A sampling of all the above – while working as taxi drivers in various North American cities -- have been informally interviewed by one of the authors over the last few years. As an anonymous interview (in a fare to driver chat) these have afforded considerable candor on a variety of subjects.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

guerrillas rather than terrorists per se, and they can point to the conflicts they were engaged in and claim a victory of sorts: The Soviets did leave Afghanistan, the Lebanese largely fought each other to a standstill, Eritrea is independent, and no clan was wiped out in Somalia's agonies. These wars appear to be closed.

A clear, unequivocal defeat is also a way of declaring a war to be closed. The American South never rose again, and there is no sign of a renaissance for Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan. But these were wars fought by soldiers, and defeat was clear. Insurgencies can go on seemingly forever, but even the guerrillas of the Malaysian Communist Party came in out of the damp in 1989 – thirty years after most of their combatant cells had been destroyed. But, for these one-time Marxist guerrillas, it was also clear in 1989 that Communism was a failing force; without that failure of the ideology, there was no reason to accept 'military' defeat in their struggle.

At the core of al Qaeda and its constituent organizations are the "Arab Afghans," the ideologically motivated Sunni-Wahhabi Fundamentalists who joined together in the late 1980s on Pakistan's Afghan frontier – 15 to 20 years later, there is little sign of any of them giving up their struggle. The tiny Spanish Maoist group GRAPO (and who else could be so lost to reality as a Maoist in a Western industrialized democracy?) and the newly rekindled cell of Italy's Red Brigades show how many Leftist groups simply cannot abandon their cause and face the facts.

Because so many terrorists define themselves by the conflicts they have created, peace becomes a real threat to their self-identity. In Israel and the West Bank, any progress towards a Palestinian-Israeli rapprochement (however limited and fragile such might be) sees a rush by groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – and even by members of the Palestinian Authority's own militia – to immediately derail it through violence designed to provoke a response.

Without a clear victory, a well-established defeat, or success of any kind, there has been (and probably never will be) 'closure' for those who fought for an independent Khalistan, to create a new Caliphate of the faithful, or to build a new Tamil homeland. The hazards of this lack of closure are best illustrated by the IRA. Driven underground in 1922-3 by the very government they put into power, the IRA still managed to periodically resurface in the 1930s and 1950s, and many of the old men of the 1920s were ready to embrace the re-birth of the 'troubles' at the end of the 1960s.

Manufacturing Suicide Attackers

It is not easy to become a killer, and it is not easy for many people to live with having become one. Because killing is so difficult, it makes it more difficult for those who have done so as terrorists to ever question their actions. What is even more unnatural is becoming a suicide attacker.

Nobody is born to be a suicide attacker, and while there are some people who can be talked into throwing their lives away for a cause, where numbers of suicide attackers have appeared, it is because somebody has manufactured them. The complete

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

militarization of Japanese society in the 1930s made it possible to imbue a whole generation of school children with the Imperial Rescript and its resolution to die rather than accept defeat or surrender.⁷

The result was a military where hundreds of thousands of starving and ragged soldiers preferred to die fighting rather than surrender, where drowning sailors would refuse rescue, and where thousands of newly minted aviators deliberately sought immolation as Kamikaze pilots. Despite these measures, Japan was decisively defeated – although hundreds more (if not thousands) of its most dedicated warriors committed suicide on being told of the surrender. The legacy of this conditioning, and of the atrocities committed by its brutal – and brutalized – warriors are probably why Japan still refuses to fully acknowledge much of its guilt for the war years.

It is difficult to create suicide attackers without creating the conditions where complete propaganda becomes possible. As Jacques Ellul points out in *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, propaganda is only really truly effective if its targets are preconditioned to accept the message, remain isolated from dissenting influences, and become repeatedly saturated with the message from every possible source of information and comment.

Palestinian Media Watch, the Middle East Children's Association (a joint project of some Israeli and Palestinian Educators,) L'Arche, and other organizations have been watching the educational material provided to Palestinian children in the West Bank and Gaza with considerable dismay. What is one to think when an exercise for 8-year-old children tells them to incorporate "... dies as a Martyr" into a sentence, or when 11-year-old Palestinian children are told by their teacher: "*Jesus called the Israelites to embrace the religion of Allah, and they replied by calling him a liar, by attacking him. What does their behavior indicate?*"⁸

The indoctrination of Palestinian Children for *Shahada* (Martyrdom for Allah) includes television spots, textbooks, lectures from their political and religious leaders, and music videos and songs celebrating *Shahids* (suicide attackers). Excerpts in Palestinian media include interviews with proud parents of Shahids – "*Praise to Allah, I gave birth to heroes*". Even children's games are pressed into service.⁹ Here is a textbook case to watch how the manufacture of suicide attackers can be accomplished.

As an aside, one of the more baffling aspects of human behavior is the willingness of so many people to ignore the fact that those yelling "Die for the revolution! Forward brave comrades!" usually do so from behind the best cover they can find.

⁷ The development of Japan's military ideology and its spread throughout society is discussed extensively in Meirion and Susie Harries *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*; (Random House, New York 1991); by Edwin P. Hoyt in *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict*, (Cooper Square Press, New York, 2001) and its effect on individuals comes through most vividly in George Feifer's *Tennozan*; (Tickner & Fields, New York, 1992).

⁸ Culled from "Palestinian Children at the School of Hate"; a report prepared by L'Arche in collaboration with B'Nai B'Rith. Some Christians might be surprised at the use of Jesus as a Muslim prophet, but this is how Islam prefers to see him.

⁹ "Ask for Death! The Indoctrination of Palestinian Children to Seek Death for Allah"; Itamar Marchs, Palestinian Media Watch; Special Report #40, April 2003.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

Nor are the Palestinians alone in conditioning children to kill and die. Numerous African warlords have kidnapped children to turn them into killers. Tamil educators in Sri Lanka have bitterly complained about Tiger attempts to turn their schoolrooms into propaganda centres for the LTTE, and the group is notorious for using children as terrorists. Children are easier to isolate from other influences, and lack the experience, self-confidence, and maturity that provide most people with their defences against psychological conditioning – it is also easier to turn them into killers. LTTE “ethnic cleansing” activities in northeastern Sri Lanka often involved using machetes and hand weapons to butcher people, and a particular touch was to deliberately inflict a powerful slash into the skull of massacred children.¹⁰ West African child-soldiers have also been known to be especially brutal.

Such conditioning at a young age will probably never be completely overcome – even if full psychological support was available. Otherwise, one is left with someone who has been indoctrinated to believe that killing an “enemy” really means nothing, or an aspirant suicide attacker who believes that their life will be unfulfilled.

Many of the Left-Wing terrorists of the 1970s were mature adults, usually in their late twenties and early thirties. It had taken most of them some years to reach the point where they were ready to attempt to take human life, and most of them contented themselves with indirect attacks – time bombs particularly – which demand much less of the killer than shooting another human being at point blank range. Terrorists like “Carlos” (who seems to have exhibited some sociopathic traits), who could shoot people with a pistol without any sign of remorse or hesitation, were very rare.¹¹

The conditioning such terrorists undertook largely seems to be internal or from within a small, politically and psychologically isolated group of peers; though many did undertake some paramilitary training inside Yemen, Libya, or elsewhere among the USSR’s circle of friends in the 1970s and ‘80s. Once away from this background, the ability to commit terrorism seems to have dwindled quite quickly. There were hundreds, if not thousands, of Westerners who passed through these camps, and very few ever became active.¹²

It would appear that the mental conditioning to kill is easier for terrorists from outside of Western societies. Although the Tamil Tigers arose out of a criminal subclass and recruited many children, the Babbar Khalsa militants arose out of a society with a strong martial tradition and a religion with a robust attitude towards self-defence, and had the outrage posed by the attack on the Golden Temple to motivate them towards violence.

With al Qaeda, however, it appears there is a rapid and comprehensive ability to make killers out of young Muslim -- or even Western -- adult males. Richard Reid was a troubled criminal who made a rapid conversion to Islam before attempting the “shoe bombing” attack. Zacarias Moussaoui and Ziad Jarrah came from well-off secular families yet seem to have been converted within months into would-be suicide

¹⁰ Authors interviews, backed by a Tamil/Sinhalese pamphlet with photographs of massacre victims.

¹¹ A description of some of Carlos’ murders can be found in Claire Sterling’s *The Terror Network* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1981), Pages 131-149 specifically concern him.

¹² *Ibid*, there are frequent references to training camps in North Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and North Korea.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

attackers.¹³ This ability to recruit and rapidly indoctrinate its new members has yet to be explained, although one can hope that the al Qaeda and Taliban combatants who have been interned by the US might be able to provide insights into this soon.

Street Gangs as a Legacy of Violence

One un-remarked phenomenon of political violence and unrest comes can be seen with the third generation to follow a particular catastrophe or event. The generation of Irish nationalists that finally achieved independence were the grandchildren to those who survived the famines and related catastrophes of the 1840s. It appears as if the third generation of Palestinians born after the creation of Israel is the most violent yet. The grandchildren of the survivors and exiles of the Armenian massacres during the First World War generated the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. The grandchildren of those who lived through the complex Yugoslavian civil war that attended the German occupation in 1941-44 were the combatants who did so much to tear Yugoslavia apart fifty years later.

Perhaps if the first generation experiences a catastrophic political event, both it and their children are directly shaped by it. They witnessed the event, survived it, and constructed new lives afterwards. However, the third generation cannot directly share in the event that so closely affected their grandparents and parents; so they become the ones who seek to settle the old scores, right the wrongs, and somehow become involved after all. If this phenomenon is generally true, then any resolved conflict or outrage may never truly end.

There is another legacy of terrorism to consider, and perhaps sometimes we need not even wait for the third generation.

Immigration has always brought an increased risk of criminal activity among the young – especially when societal dislocation is combined with poverty, unfamiliarity with the conventions of the new society, and when one (or both) parents are missing from the family. Cities that attract a lot of immigration can often point to new elements in organized crime whenever the pattern of immigration shifts – as the history of crime in New York City can amply demonstrate. Despite this, the vast majority of even the most demoralized new immigrants go on to build peaceful lives for themselves and – more importantly – for their children.

When the homeland society from which immigrants arrive has been convulsed in violence (or some other catastrophe), the risks are even higher. The Germans and other Europeans who arrived in the United States in the 1840s and '50s were largely quiet. The Irish who emerged from the aftermath of the Potato Famine soon created some of the most violent and corrupt criminal societies New York City and Boston had ever seen – with consequences that endure to the present day. While traditional criminal societies always had existed among immigrants from Asia, many of the isolated young men from Southeast Asia who had survived the war, and a terrifying refugee experience, became far more violent and much wilder than any who had come before them.

¹³ Vermaat.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

Accordingly, many of the young immigrants to Canada who have come out of Sri Lanka have become dangerous street criminals, and seem almost uncontrollable. Added to the normal risk factors that have allowed the VVT and AK Kanon gangs to become dangerous are some new considerations that the Tamil community does not dare to closely analyze.

The recruitment of children for its fighting arm may be coming back to haunt the LTTE. Those who survive their “tour” are often allowed to go on to other things, and make their way into the dispersed Tamil communities in Western Europe and North America – as restless and unfulfilled young adults. Worse still, the many young Tamils who were not brought into the LTTE’s forces have been repeatedly told that violent guerrillas and suicide attackers are “heroes” and worthy role models.

Also, the LTTE, like so many insurgent organizations, has violently split its home culture by trying to subordinate everything to their war, their leadership, and cause. Previous ties of caste and community have been eclipsed, and the Tigers attempted politicization of traditional Tamil community institutions has weakened them. This has further exacerbated the risk factors for their young and the results were inevitable.

Of the two major Tamil youth gangs, the VVT is more traditionally oriented towards the Tigers and their cause, while members of AK-Kanon have tended to be opposed to the group (often for caste and local reasons stemming from differences within the Tamil community inside Sri Lanka). The gang members contain a mix of older members, many of whom are veterans who fought with the Tigers in Sri Lanka, and younger kids who tend to be caught up in the exciting violent lore and images of the LTTE’s war. By not being able to go fight themselves, they have found a surrogate outlet. VVT has somewhere between 350-500 members while AK-Kanon has about 300.

The two groups have fought with each other inside Toronto on a number of occasions – often in violent melees between dozens of supporters with machetes and handguns, and automatic weaponry has sometimes been used in drive-by shootings. In contrast to, for example, the Biker War in Quebec, the body count has been low but several young Tamils have been killed and dozens have been injured. One of the main points of contention between the VVT and AK-Kanon has concerned drug distribution areas.¹⁴

It should also be noted that the gangs have branched into other activities and will fight with lethal intent over girls, soccer games, access to donut shops (a favorite hang-out) and a variety of other causes. Gang members can still be seen hanging around in the early afternoons in some Tamil neighborhoods – a source of discomfort and anxiety to many older Tamils -- and cruising around in white Cherokees and Toyotas in the evenings.

Leaders from the WTM and FACT have been acutely embarrassed by the notoriety the gangs have generated, and have striven to reduce gang fighting. However, it was perhaps predictable that they attempted to capitalize on cooperative efforts with Toronto police as ‘evidence’ of the overall lawfulness and civic spirit of the community. According to members of the appropriate police task forces, the Tiger Front group leaders were told

¹⁴ See “Tamil Turf War: Citizens at Risk”; *Toronto Sun*; 31 July 1996, Pg. 24; “Tamil’s gang war takes to the streets”; *Toronto Star*, 4th August 1996, Pg. A13 There have been numerous local news stories since.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Six

that cooperative efforts would be curtailed if Tiger Flags and symbols were displayed at community meetings on the problem.¹⁵

The Tamil community isn't the only one to have created violent street gangs among their youth. The same process is at work among young Sikhs, particularly in British Columbia. Again, gangs of youngsters now fight over girls, perceived insults, and over sundry criminal enterprises with an eagerness that dismays their community. Yet it is the older generation – particularly the Pro-Khalsa militants – who are the most to blame for creating the situation.

Thus the young have become involved in, and become the direct legacy of, the conflicts their parents created and pursued.

While the great majority of ex-insurgents who come to Canada will live here peacefully; many have been conditioned to kill without the controls placed on soldiers; have fought in wars that will not or cannot end; have no "closure" for their own actions; and may have infected their own children with the passions of their homeland conflicts.

There is no easy to ensure that such people will be safe, but allowing the front groups that supported these conflicts to continue to openly function in Canada is not a healthy practice. Citizenship and multicultural grants agencies should exercise much more caution than they currently do. Failure to do this will make it easier for supporters of terrorist groups to pass on their misshapen passions to a younger generation.

¹⁵ Authors interviews.

Chapter Seven: The Security of the Nation

The Will to Defence

The threat of substantial terrorist violence in Canada seems low, although it is by no means remote. So far, when terrorists have killed Canadians in the last 30 years, it has largely been as a result of attacks on other targets – whether in Canada or abroad. Even the deadly Air India bombing was directed against one aircraft of India's national airline. The 27 Canadians that were killed (so far) in al Qaeda attacks have largely died because the citizens of other Western nations were the immediate targets.

This seeming lack of direct malevolence does not guarantee our safety. Osama bin Laden has promised that Canadians will pay for being a Western ally in Afghanistan in 2001/2002, and al Qaeda is dedicated to the downfall of the entire Western World, not just America.¹ Hizbollah has also snarled that Canada will suffer for adding the organization to the list of terrorist groups to which our *Criminal Code* will apply inside our country.² While the United States, Israel, Britain, France, Singapore, and Australia seem to have attracted more of the hostile attention of these groups than we have, a major action against Canada is inevitable at some time.

There are two indirect – but still vital -- threats to our safety that result from terrorism. Human misery is not just caused by direct death and destruction; lost influence, damaged trade, political decay and corruption are just as deadly to a society in their own way. Moreover, these are threats that make an indirect approach on our consciousness, and their danger might not be fully recognized until it is too late.

It is almost too late now.

Our reputation as a full partner in protecting our friends and allies from terrorism has sometimes been called into question – with the net effect that our closest ally and trading partner has occasionally constricted our commerce with them (costing us billions of dollars in trade) through tightened border security, and our reputation and influence abroad has diminished accordingly. A reputation takes a long time to be built, and an even longer time to be repaired if damaged. We have repair work to do.

The most profound threat that terrorism presents is one that goes to the very heart of Canadian society. We have opened our gates to the world with the full expectation that those who come here would share our ideals, and join in providing a living model to the rest of the world that it is possible for all people to live together in peace.

Instead, we have allowed the agents of the violence experienced in other nations to come here, mercilessly dominate their fellows from their home societies, and preach an Orwellian message that we must tolerate their intolerance, and that it is racist and condescending to question their motives and actions. Worse still, some of our political leaders have accepted this message.

¹ Bin Laden's threat was issued on a taped communiqué from hiding, and was aired by Al Jazeera on November 12, 2002.

² "Canada has committed a grave error"; *National Post*; 13 December 2002; Pg A4.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

George Clemenceau, the French President at the close of the First World War, remarked that “*War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men.*” This is true, but so is General Charles de Gaulle’s later remark that “*Politics are too serious a matter to be left to the politicians.*” The same observations are valid when considering Canada’s responses to terrorism.

International Obligations and Canadian Laws

In 1999 and 2000, the UN undertook a lead role in countering terrorism when it passed Security Council Resolutions (SCR) 1267 and 1333, requiring member states to freeze the assets and finances of a list of people and organizations associated with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. People on the Security Council list are to be banned from international travel, and UN members are prohibited from selling arms to them. The list was expanded in 2002 with SCR 1390 – which incorporates all members of the al Qaeda network, and lists numerous other terrorist organizations as well.

Ottawa has fully agreed to meet the demands of these Resolutions, but has sometimes been slow in meeting its obligations. In December 2002, the UN quietly discussed a report that complained of this slowness, when we failed to file the names of three Canadian al Qaeda members with the Security Council.³

Other UN and International Conventions and Protocols on terrorism of which Canada is a signatory include:

- The 1963 Tokyo Convention, which permits nation-states to act against those who threaten civilian airliners while on board (which we ratified in 1970);
- The 1970 Hijacking (Hague) Convention, which outlaws aircraft hijacking;
- The 1971 Civil Aviation Safety (Montreal) Convention, which expands on the 1970 Convention by outlawing additional man-made threats to airline safety;
- The 1973 Internationally Protected Persons (New York) Convention; essentially declaring that diplomats and the like are off-limits for terrorist attacks. This reaffirmation of the protected status of ambassadors has not been much respected;
- The 1979 Hostages (New York) Convention; outlawing the taking of hostages;
- The 1980 Nuclear Material (Vienna) Convention; asking all nations to criminalize a number of offences that involve nuclear material;

³ “Ottawa fails to identify terrorist for UN list”; *National Post*; 13 December 2002, Pg A19.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

- The 1988 Civil Aviation (Montreal) Protocol, which adds new offences to civil aviation – including attacking people, facilities, and aircraft on the ground at airports;
- The 1988 Maritime Safety (Rome) Convention; outlawing a number of offences against civilian shipping and navigation;
- The 1988 Sea Platforms Protocol --- extending the Maritime Convention to platforms, such as oil derricks, which are sited at sea.
- The 1991 Plastic Explosives (Montreal) Convention; this calls on signatory nations to “mark” explosives with trace elements that let it (or its residues) be clearly identified – so that sources of explosive used by terrorists can be identified.
- The 1997 Terror Bombings (New York) Convention; this calls upon member states to cooperate with each other in the suppression of terrorism, and to include new measures in their domestic legal codes.
- The 1999 Terrorist Financing (New York) Convention -- this essentially demands that UN members debar fundraising for the purposes of terrorism within their own countries.

Canada has signed and ratified all of these agreements. We have been generally faithful to them, and the appropriate laws and regulations needed to comply with them have been enacted. We are having problems complying with the latest one.

Our Federal Government has expanded on the *Criminal Code* to produce a formidable series of new offences related to terrorism. Canada's new anti-terrorism laws are largely incorporated in Bill C-36 -- one of the most complex, multi-jurisdictional pieces of legislation ever passed in Parliament. These new laws came into effect in 2002. Of particular interest are some of the new sections now in the *Criminal Code*:

1. Section 83.02: This declares that providing property for a terrorist group or act (at home or abroad) is an offence with a maximum sentence of 10 years. An example of an offence might be the purchase of night vision goggles and GPS receivers for Hizbollah to use in Lebanon.
2. Section 83.03: Fund-raising for terrorism – directly or indirectly – is also an offence with a maximum sentence of 10 years. Shaking a tin can on the sidewalk for MeK, or wiring funds to a Pakistani bank that backs al Qaeda, is now illegal.
3. Section 83.04: Holding property that is to be used in a terrorist attack is now an offence. Keeping a pair of Molotov cocktails in your backpack for a friend to throw at the RCMP in a protest for the PKK comes under this section of the *Criminal Code*, but – alas – doing so for some masked anarchist at another Anti-Globalization/Anti Capitalism staged riot does not.
4. Section 83.08: Anyone in Canada, or any Canadian abroad, may not knowingly provide any direct or indirect services, property, or money for the benefit of a terrorist group. A summary conviction on this offence can result in a \$100,000

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

fine and a year in prison, and an indictment may result in 10 years in prison. Technically, lobbying an MP to read a petition denouncing the arrest of a terrorist front leader or passing the bucket at a rally on behalf of a terrorist group comes under this law.

5. Section 83.1: Canadian Banks, trust companies, insurance agencies, and other financial institutions must report to the RCMP and CSIS on the financial assets of any individual or group listed by the UN, and must make monthly reports to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). A summary conviction on this offence can result in a \$100,000 fine and a year in prison, and an indictment may result in 10 years in prison. So far, this seems to be working in some cases – groups that are off the Federal Government's list might still be exempt.
6. Section 83.13: This clears the way for the freezing and seizure of terrorist assets by the federal and provincial governments.
7. Section 83.18: Participating in a terrorist activity or organization (even a Front organization) is punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment. An al Qaeda recruiter who travels to Montreal from Pakistan, recruits new members, accepts offers of help from sympathizers, and trains his recruits in some basic techniques will have violated just about every sub-section of this law. A Tamil Tiger member who does the same is still exempt at the moment.
8. Section 83.19: Facilitating a terrorist activity (by, for example, photographing a potential target, or getting black market passport counterfoils) can get the offender up to 14 years imprisonment.
9. Section 83.2: Committing an offence for a terrorist group can get one a life sentence. While violent acts have always been covered by the *Criminal Code* in one way or another, this adds a much greater weight of punishment that may be applied to actions in which nobody was killed or injured.
10. Section 83.21: Giving instructions (such as the floor plans to a laboratory or the schematics of a security system) to a terrorist group – whether or not they actually use them in an attack – can get the offender a life sentence.
11. Section 83.23: Harboring or concealing a terrorist group member can result in a 10 year sentence.

These are impressive and useful laws, but they hang on one key point -- whether or not a terrorist group has actually been listed as one. However, unlike allied nations that are taking more of a blanket approach to place all terrorist groups under the aegis of their new laws, the Canadian government has opted to be selective by listing only those entities recommended for inclusion by Federal Solicitor General to the Governor in Council. To be listed, the Solicitor General must have "reasonable grounds" that a group has either engaged in terrorism, or has supported a terrorist group (in short, front groups can be in serious trouble).

It does appear that part of the rationale for not declaring a group to be a terrorist organization is the ability of its front organizations and supporters to influence our parliamentarians. Instead of immediately adopting the Security Council list, Canada has

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

listed various groups over many months. Of the terrorist groups operating in the world, the following are listed for the Criminal Code (as of June 18th, 2003):

1. The Abu Nidal Organization (aka *Black September, Fatah Revolutionary Council*);
2. Abu Sayaf Group
3. Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (but not its parent group, the PLO)
4. Al-Gana'at Al Islamiyya
5. Al-Ithhihad Al-Islami
6. Al Qaeda Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
7. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
8. Asbat al-Ansar
9. Aum Shinri Kyo
10. Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International (counted as two groups by the Canadian Government)
11. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (aka Jihad Group, Egyptian Islamic Group, Vanguard of Conquest – which is banned in its own right as well)
12. Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA. Basque Homeland and Liberty)
13. Hamas
14. Harakat ul-Mujahidin
15. Hizbollah (aka Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, etc)
16. International Sikh Youth Federation
17. Islamic Army of Aydin
18. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
19. Jayesh-e-Mohammed
20. Jemmaah Islamiyyah
21. Lashkar-e Jhangvi (a group with which the authors were unfamiliar until it was listed by the Canadian government)
22. Lashkar-e Tayyiba
23. Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK)
24. National Liberation Army (ELN)
25. Palestinian Islamic Jihad
26. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
27. Salafist Group for Call and Combat:
28. Sendero Luminoso
29. United Self Defence Forces of Colombia
30. Vanguard of Conquest (see entry 11. above).

There are groups that are conspicuous by their absence. Almost among them were Babbar Khalsa (BKI) and the some related Sikh groups – listed on the day (June 18th, 2003) this paper was due to go into print, and some 25 years after they murdered their first Canadian citizen on Canadian soil. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are still not on Canada's list of banned terrorist groups, despite being banned in the UK, being described by the US as a terrorist organization (and are suppressed there), and being included on the UN Security Council's list of terrorist individuals and entities.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

Among the many other groups that have escaped being listed are the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the Animal Liberation Front (which, to be fair, has also escaped the UN Security Council's attention too,) and dozens of others.

Instead of applying the new laws to all terrorist groups in Canada, the use of a government "list" of selected groups is embarrassing. As partners in the "War on Terrorism" we seem slow, timid, and unsure of ourselves. What is even more embarrassing is the failure of the Federal Government to lay charges based on any of its new laws at the time of writing.

With the recent addition of the BKI and ISYF to the list of banned groups, it becomes possible to see if Ottawa is serious about its new laws. Members of these two groups have built temples and schools, run businesses, and have been quite open in many of their activities for years. It is not enough to pass laws, they have to be used; and an unused law is worse than no law at all.

Securing our Borders

The late 1999 arrest of Ahmed Ressam at the Port Angeles ferry crossing in Washington State threw the Americans into a state of alerted panic. As the calendar ticked over to 2000, it was thought that the global celebrations would be marred by a wave of terrorist attacks, and perhaps by catastrophic computer failures too. As it was, the world celebrated without any notable cybernetic hiccups or militant party-crashers. However, this was not the first time that the US worried about security threats coming from within Canada, nor would it be the last.

The first attempt by al Qaeda to topple the World Trade Centre in New York came in February 1993, when a large truck bomb was detonated under one of the towers in the hopes of collapsing one into the other. Six people were killed and over 1,000 were harmed by smoke inhalation, but the buildings remained intact until the 2001 attacks. The perpetrators of this 1993 attack were swiftly caught before they fled overseas, but the planned exit route for one of the attackers, Mahmud Abouhalima, would have taken him through Canada – where his brother Sherif had purchased a ticket for him.⁴

Some of the first press reports after the September 11th 2001 attacks stated that some of the 19 hijackers had entered the United States through Canada. They easily could have done so, although all of the attackers had directly entered the US with visitor or tourist visas in 2000 and 2001.⁵ It did not help Canada's reputation when Nabil al-Marabh was arrested while attempting to illegally enter the US from Canada with \$45,000 in cash and jewelry a week after the 9-11 attacks.

As the United States clamped down on its borders, one of the first effects was chaos at the Canada US crossing sites – and this was horrible news for the Canadian economy. About 33% of the entire Canadian GDP results from trade to the United States; it is the

⁴ "Canada and Terrorism: Programmed to Receive"; *National Post*; 24 November 2001; Pg A20.

⁵ See "The plot comes into focus"; *Time Magazine*; October 1st 2001, and "Pieces of the Puzzle"; *U.S. News and World Report*; 15 October 2001.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

lynch pin to our national prosperity.⁶ Some estimates place the daily traffic both ways over the US-Canadian border at 500,000 individuals, about 50,000 trucks, and around \$2 billion dollars in goods and services. The disruptions caused by extensive security checks at border crossings restricted business travel, threw off production on both sides as 'just-in-time inventory' deliveries failed to arrive as scheduled, and severely limited tourism, shopping trips, and much more.

Neither country can afford such disruption for very long. However, the enormous economic damage wrought by the September 11th attacks – in terms of lost production, insurance claims, higher premiums, cancelled travel, and new security expenses – has been staggering. The direct costs of the attacks alone will probably reach \$100 billion dollars, and the indirect costs are higher still. One can imagine what the financial fallout of a worse incident will be. Moreover, a large part of America's industrial capacity in the northern states has been idle or under-utilized for some time, and if security issues were to continue to disrupt trade, many of the manufacturing jobs attracted by Canada's cheaper dollar might head back south.

Reassuring the United States by enhancing border security is a vital concern, and some excellent progress has already been made to this effect by the US and Canadian governments. The Smart Border Initiative may be the most practical program undertaken by any Canadian government in the last decade. It will preserve the economic advantages we have in our trade with the US, and will also go far to making the border more efficient and much more secure. However, there may be some unintended consequences...

The Action Plan for border security includes a number of measures that will severely restrict people smuggling, and international travel into Canada and the US with forged documents. Abusing the refugee system will also become much more difficult. Among the 30 points for the plan are:⁷

1. Permanent resident cards for Canada and the US, which will include biometric data. This would allow a check to see if the card holder is the same person to whom it was issued, by using something like an iris or fingerprint scan and a reader to look at the data on a magnetic strip on the document;
2. Jointly developing common biometric identifiers for US and Canadian travel documents so that, for example, American and Canadian scanners can reliably read identity documents from either country;
3. Reviewing asylum/refugee practices to ensure that all applicants are screened for security reasons, and to share information on such claimants in the future;
4. Negotiating a safe-third country agreement (by agreeing that a number of countries are safe for would-be refugee applicants – and that there is no need for either Canada or the US to entertain applicants from there);

⁶ See Fred McMahon's "The High Cost of Waffling"; *Fraser Forum*; March 2003.

⁷ A summary of the "Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border" can be found at www.canadianembassy.org/border/actionplan-en.asp

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

5. A joint US-Canadian review of visa waiver lists (e.g. agreeing on those countries and persons for whom visas would be necessary or unnecessary to enter our two countries), and sharing look-out lists at Visa Offices. This would limit the ability of, for example, a people smuggler who has been deported from Canada to China from getting a visa to the US in the future;
6. Joint Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record programs will explore means to identify risks posed by passengers on international flights arriving in each other's nation. Ideally, this could mean that both American and Canadian officials would be aware of the passenger list of any flight to either nation (or between them) well before the aircraft lands. This should also cut down on the old "undocumented refugee" ploy as passengers will be firmly identified before departing;
7. Joint Passenger Analysis Units in Canada and the US allowing officers from both nations to be present to share data and information on passengers on incoming aircraft are already undergoing trials in several international airports;
8. Canada and the US will develop compatible immigration databases – not so much as a way of keeping track of individuals (although this could happen for some cases), but as a means of improving the sharing of intelligence and analysis of new trends;
9. Both countries will also post more immigration officers overseas (particularly at airports) and will improve joint training with airline personnel;
10. Both countries will look for means to overcome legal and operational challenges to joint deportations, and to explore ways of encouraging 'uncooperative' countries to accept the repatriation of their nationals.

Effectively, these measures will result in a major overhaul of our immigration system, particularly with respect to refugees, without triggering a major debate on the issue until it is too late to prevent their implementation. Linking these reforms to our trading relationships with the United States is correct – as the Americans will simply not tolerate a continuing threat out of Canada – and will preserve Canadian prosperity.

In a conference in Calgary, in February 2002, James Bisset, the architect of our refugee system, argued that the way it works now costs Canadians about \$5-7 billion dollars a year (an estimate based on administration expenses, social benefits, and legal costs). By clamping down on the system, people smuggling will become less attractive to criminals, the risks of importing terrorists and their supporters will be reduced, and we could realize a 'Refugee Dividend' that can be diverted to foreign aid or infrastructure development in our more overstrained cities.

Other aspects of the Action Plan are already speeding trade over the border by deploying 'smart' technologies to protect shipments of goods (like 'just in time' inventory shipments of automobile parts) over the border, better controls over the contents of cargo containers arriving at seaports, pre-clearing some shipments and travelers away from the border, and by working on harmonized commercial processing protocols.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and their marine counterparts are doing much to hamper smuggling efforts over the Canada-US border. The sharing of data on commercial fraud and smuggling techniques will enhance policing efforts in both countries. These will all go far in reducing the ability of organized crime (and by supporters of terrorist groups) to utilize another easy money-maker.

The willingness of Ottawa to progress on those portions of the Action Plan that pertain to limiting people smuggling and illegal immigration will be another key indicator of our fitness as a partner in the security of our closest ally.

Assets and Liabilities

Success or failure in any campaign to reduce the potential of terrorism coming from within Canada rests with the individuals who work its frontlines – officers from CSIS, the RCMP (and virtually all other Canadian police forces), customs agents, immigration officers, diplomats, and many others. As individuals, many are not that distinguished or capable, while some are outstanding in their conduct and the performance of their duties. Taken as an average, they know what they are doing and are performing as well as they can in the face of some considerable handicaps.⁸

There is much praise for our police and security services among their counterparts in the United States. Generally, in the State Department, in the Pentagon, in the FBI, and elsewhere, Americans involved in homeland security and counter-terrorism tend to respect their Canadian counterparts, value the relationships they have with them, and admire their professionalism. However... the next comment is usually something along the lines of “Why can't you [in the collective sense] get your act together?”

Indeed. While no democratic nation can expect to have a 100% effective system for countering terrorism, there are some areas where Canada could stand major improvement.

Before the 9-11 attacks, low morale often plagued Canada's counter-terrorism efforts. It was difficult to maintain professionalism when one's efforts are often unappreciated and one's department is perennially under-funded. For example, in 1993/94, the RCMP's actual spending was \$1,241.6 million, and their planned spending for 2000/2001 was \$1,200.6 million – with eight years of an inflation rate of 1 to 2% nibbling away at capabilities while new responsibilities were being added.⁹

A prolonged period of nibbling funding cuts will affect an organization's capabilities and morale. Experienced officers tend to find that their motivation suffers; some will leave to seek private opportunities or take early retirement. Those who stay will either be tremendously motivated (certainly true in the case of many RCMP and CSIS officers) or

⁸ This section is a result from dozens of conversations with serving and former members of the RCMP, CSIS, sundry Canadian police departments, and former civil servants within the appropriate departments. Specific interviews will not be cited, particularly as many sources were more candid than would be safe for their careers.

⁹ Figures derived from the RCMP's “A Report on Plans and Priorities” 1998/1999 – 2000/2001.

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

will be those who really don't care any more than they have to – and such people can be all too common in all walks of life. In any event, turnover increases and newcomers enter an organization whose overall levels of skill and experience have diminished year by year.

For the RCMP and for CSIS, this situation changed with the new “security” budget implemented in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks. Lost funding was quickly restored and was speedily invested in new capabilities. This led to new problems. CSIS, long hampered by a shortage of officers with particular language and cultural skills, has brought in hundreds of new officers since 9-11. However helpful this influx is, most of the new officers are a long way from being seasoned – which means that mistakes will be made. After all, good judgment comes from experience and experience comes from using bad judgment.

Canadians have often heard stories about rivalries between CSIS and the RCMP (even though both organizations report to the same boss, Canada's Solicitor General). It is true that there is a small measure of institutional rivalry – CSIS was created out of the RCMP's Security Service. However, it must be remembered that the two organizations largely provide different functions and must produce different standards of proof. Intelligence agencies look for enough information to be confident in their assessments; police agencies need enough information to secure convictions. Different functions and priorities will always mean that the relationship between CSIS and the RCMP can never be smooth – and it is natural that this situation will continue.

If not always easily cooperating with CSIS, Canadian police forces have become much more used to cooperating with each other. In the last decade, there have been numerous multi-jurisdictional taskforces (often with involvement from Customs and Immigration officers) in dealing with organized criminal societies and other situations. This has eased some of the agency rivalries that used to exist between police forces, but some elements of tribalism will always remain.

In the main, Canadian police officers are professional, well trained, and those who have been dealing with issues of terrorism and organized crime are very well informed. However, the main weaknesses that police forces and crown prosecutors face also result from funding problems. Major investigations are expensive, and prosecutions are even more so (especially when the public purse is paying for both sides of a case). There can also be a reluctance to lay charges when the law is not yet widely understood, or has yet withstood a *Charter of Rights and Freedom* challenge. Notwithstanding Ottawa's tough new laws on terrorism, no Canadian police force or Crown prosecutor is sure they will actually make it through the Supreme Court.

Canada's Immigration officers and Customs officers are also a major component of our defences against terrorism. The latter work for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) and can usually expect good support from their superiors for their efforts – especially if there are revenues to be collected.

Many of the officers in Citizenship and Immigration do not feel that they receive the same support, and morale tends to be lower in the Department. While there are many experienced and professional front-line workers and administrators, there has been a high-turn over in key positions. In the past, there have been major communications

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

problems within the department itself, let alone without outside agencies. These problems are being worked on, but the main problem cannot be tackled at present: There is little or no real willingness to reform the Immigration system in the Government, and the current system is partly the creation of a powerful lobby of immigration lawyers and consultants.

Many immigration and refugee lawyers and immigration advocates also find their way into the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB).¹⁰ An alert officer who earmarks a case to be heard by it can have little confidence that a suspicious applicant will be turned down. The experienced Refugee Hearing officers (independent professional civil servants who sometimes acted much like crown prosecutors in IRB hearings) have been diminished both in numbers and authority. Moreover, even if the IRB finds reason to turn down an applicant's bid to stay in Canada, there is little guarantee that this is the end of the story. Most refused applicants are expected to voluntarily deport themselves – and few personnel and resources are spent to ensure that they do. There are tens of thousands of people in Canada who are not supposed to be here, and we have no idea where many of them are.

Canada's ability to track the illicit flow of money has improved markedly over the last five years, with the creation of Fintrac – which was created in response to G-8 and G-20 agreements to restrict the ability of international organized crime to move cash around. However, many American officials (where there are much stricter laws about the illicit flow of money) sourly regarded Fintrac as being somewhat limited in its scope. One former official with the Clinton Administration, and an expert on international terrorist money laundering, remarked that Canada was slow to create the organization and only gave the group “rubber teeth instead of real fangs”. In 2002, Fintrac's funding was raised from \$22 million to \$35 million.

Emergency measures organizations are vital in mitigating the damage and casualties from natural and man-made disasters – including terrorist attacks. The old adage about a penny's worth of prevention certainly applies, as millions of dollars invested in planning, training emergency response organizations, and stockpiling material can literally save hundreds of millions in claims and secondary damage later on. In short, EMOs literally do pay for themselves. Preparation for a major terrorist attack can also yield dividends in handling the routine disasters – floods, chemical spills, major storms, etc.

Emergency preparedness is being boosted at all levels of government throughout Canada, with a greater emphasis on training and readiness for a major terrorist attack. However, the results have been spotty, with vast variances between the EMOs of different provinces and cities. Some of the most significant problems still lie with the absence of common standards of training, differing communications protocols, and low levels of automation in headquarters.

One important weakness that is being addressed is the low level of readiness for a terrorist incident with biological, chemical or radiological weaponry; and training has been provided for ambulance services, police and fire departments from across Canada.

¹⁰ See “Canada and terrorism: Programmed to receive”; *National Post*; 24 November, 2001.. Pgs. A20-21. Christie Blatchford's piece echoes many of the comments made over the years by Bisset, Campbell and Collacott

Other Peoples' Wars – Chapter Seven

The recent outbreak of SARS in Toronto and the Mad Cow Disease episode in Alberta were able to provide a limited assessment of our improved abilities – and it seems that Ontario still has work to do.

In general, Canada's ability to react to terrorism has much improved since the 9-11 attacks, and although there is much to do, most of Canada's police and intelligence services are aware of their needs and priorities. Yet all of this is for naught if the political will to fight terrorism is absent. Even in Canada political will stems from the citizenry, and fundamentally, being ready for terrorism is the business of every citizen. This is the most important asset of them all.

Ever since Confederation, and even before 1867, it has been a dream of many Canadians that our society can be an example to the world; a place where many peoples can come together and live with peace, order, and good government. The reality we hope to achieve is possible, and so many of those who come here are fully prepared to participate in this.

Those who seek to dominate others inside Canada through fear and violence, or those who see it as a place to milk resources for terrorist struggles elsewhere, undermine our hopes and sully our reputation. We have no reason to tolerate their presence here, and owe it to our friends and allies to swiftly reduce the number of terrorist groups and front organizations that have established themselves inside Canada in order to perpetuate other people's wars.

Appendix: A List of Canadian Terrorists

The following list includes a variety of terrorists and key supporters who have lived in Canada while on the run for terrorist actions in a homeland conflict, or who have acted on behalf of an overseas terrorist organization after establishing a Canadian residence. Naturally, the list is far from being definitive.

Almrei, Hassan. Born in Syria, this Ontario resident is suspected by CSIS of being an al Qaeda member.

Amhaz, Ali Adham. A Hizbollah operative who immigrated to Canada, he helped to launder hundreds of thousands of dollars through Canadian banks for the terrorist group and used some of the proceeds to purchase demolitions material, night vision goggles, new computers, and camera equipment for the group. He lived in Burnaby BC.

Ayub, Fauzi Mohammed. Detained in Israel as a leading Hizbollah operative, he appears to have been recruited by the group in Canada in the early 1990s. After training in Lebanon, he entered Israel in 2000 to set up stores sites for weapons and explosives. He arrived in Canada in 1988 and has a family here.

Atmani, Karim Said. A Moroccan who fought in Afghanistan and became a Bosnian citizen, he has also been convicted in France for charges related to passing fraudulent passports to al Qaeda members in Europe.

Bagri, Ajaib Singh. A BKI member from British Columbia, he is on trial for the 1985 Air India Bombing. The ISYF is fervently backing his defence.

Bhullar, Davinder Pal Sing. A one-time leader in the Khalistan Commando Force, he is fighting extradition from Surrey BC to India, where a death sentence awaits him for a bomb attack that killed nine people.

Boumezbeur, Adel. A Montreal Salafist and Algerian, he has also lived in Vancouver and has been convicted of terrorist-related offenses in France.

Boussora, Faker. A wanted al Qaeda member believed to be hiding in Montreal in 2002. Born in Tunisia, he was trained in Afghanistan and was unknown to Canadian authorities until a videotape in which he pledged commitment to martyrdom turned up.

Daher, Kassen. A suspected al Qaeda member, he lived in Canada before being arrested in Lebanon.

Dahoumane, Abdelmajid. Originally from Algeria, and a member of the Salafist cell in Montreal. He also lived for a while in Alberta.

Dbouk, Mohammed Hassan. A Hizbollah member in British Columbia, he was the brother in law and partner to Ali Amhaz. He has fled to Lebanon and taken up another role within the terrorist group.

Farahat, Hassan (aka Abdul Jaber). Accused of being a senior member of Ansar Al Islam, and has been arrested by Kurdish guerrillas in northern Iraq, he was the Imam of the Salaheddin Mosque in Toronto from 1997 to 2002.

Haouari, Mokhtar. An Algerian who arrived in Canada via France, he supported Ahmed Ressay's attempts to get false documentation and was a member of the same Salafist Cell in Montreal in the 1990s. He also lived in Surrey, BC.

Hardeep, Singh. A leading member of the Khalistan Commando Force, he was deported from Canada in 1995 – the same year the KCF was mounting a major recruiting campaign here and in the UK.

Harkat, Mohamed. Arriving in Canada from Pakistan (via Malaysia) with a fake Saudi passport, he lived quietly in Ottawa at a variety of menial jobs, after winning his refugee claim in 1997 and marrying a Canadian citizen. A CSIS investigation has accused him of being involved in the GIA, and having worked for al Qaeda before leaving Pakistan.

Al Hussein, Mohammed Hussein. An alleged hijacker and Hizbollah member, he provided valuable insights on the group to CSIS before being deported in 1994 after living on welfare in Montreal. Part of his role was to coordinate reconnaissance for the group on potential targets inside Canada.

Ikhlef, Mourad. A refugee who had been involved in the Algerian GIA, he was involved in the Salafist cell in Montreal.

Jabarah, Mohamed Mansour. Raised in St. Catherine's Ontario, he led an al Qaeda cell in Singapore that was planning a mass bomb attack (with 21 tonnes of improvised explosives) before he was arrested while passing through Oman in 2002.

Jabbalah, Mahmoud. Accused of being tied to Islamic Jihad, and had worked for Osama bin Laden's construction and development projects in the Sudan in the early 1990s, this Toronto resident has been jailed since August 2001, after being deemed a national security risk. He arrived in Canada as a refugee claimant.

Al-Jiddi, Al Rauf bin Al Habib bin Youssef (aka Abderraouf Jdey). A wanted al Qaeda member believed to be hiding in Montreal in 2002. His involvement in al Qaeda was unknown until videotape of his pledge to martyrdom turned up in a cache of intelligence materials in Afghanistan.

Kadr, Abdul Rahman. A son of Ahmad Said Kadr, he was captured by Northern Alliance troops in Kabul in November 2001 while fighting for al Qaeda.

Kadr, Ahmad Said (also spelled as 'Khadr'). A one-time Toronto resident who arrived in Canada from Egypt in the 1970s, and was involved in Human Concern International, before becoming involved in al Qaeda. His current whereabouts are unknown. Two of his sons have fought for the group in Afghanistan.

Kadr, Omar. The teenaged son of Ahmad Said Kadr, this under-educated boy killed a US Army medic in Afghanistan in 2002 with a grenade while fighting as a member of al Qaeda.

Kamel, Fateh. Born in Algeria, and a one-time member of the GIA, he was the leader of the Montreal Salafist Cell in the 1990s. He has been convicted in France for passing black-market passports to Islamic militants.

Labsi, Mustapha. An Algerian, he came to Montreal as a part of the Salafist cell there.

Mahjoub, Mohamed Zeki. A Toronto area convenience store clerk, he is also suspected of being a senior ‘fixer’ for Islamic Jihad. He came to Canada with a doctored passport, and is fighting deportation .

Malik, Ripudaman Singh A BC resident and senior fundraiser for the BKI in the province. He is being tried for his involvement in the Air India Bombing.

Al-Marabh, Nabil. A Toronto area resident (a sometime welfare recipient who also worked in his uncle’s photocopy shop) from Kuwait, he is suspected of being involved in a support role for the 9-11 attacks. Arrived in Canada as a refugee claimant, he was convicted by the US of conspiracy to enter the US illegally. When arrested in the US in September 2001, he was carrying \$20,000 in cash and \$25,000 in jewelry.

Marzouk, Hessem Mohamed Hafez. An Egyptian al Qaeda member, he once lived in Surrey BC, and was arrested in Azerbaijan before facing charges in Egypt.

Mohamed, Samir Ait. Lived in Vancouver, Montreal, and Toronto, and is currently awaiting extradition to the US. In 1996, he facilitated Ahmed Ressay’s acquisition of a silenced pistol, and helped to provide him with fake ID and a counterfeit credit card in late 1999.

Muhammad, Saeed Sobrhatolla Accused of being a member of Ansar Al Islam, and has been arrested by Kurdish guerrillas in northern Iraq – he arrived in Canada in 1995 and maintains a family here.

Nadarajah, Muralitharan. A senior fundraiser for the LTTE, and possibly involved in an assassination cell, he arrived in Canada as a refugee claimant from Switzerland in 1998, and was ordered deported in 2002 – but is still fighting that decision.

Nawar, Nizar Ben Muhammed Nasr One of some 1,300 Tunisian students who entered Montreal in 1999 (and one of 100 who dropped out of sight after the WTC attacks), he appears to have recruited there and delivered a suicide attack on a historic synagogue in Tunisia in early 2002 that killed 19 people.

Ouzghar, Abdellah. Born in Algeria, he was an associate of the al Qaeda Salafist cell in Montreal in the 1990s, but also lived in Hamilton. He was convicted of passport fraud *in absentia* by a French court.

Ressay, Ahmed A member of the GIA in Algeria, he arrived in Canada in 1994 and was a member of a Salafist cell in Montreal. After acquiring a Canadian passport under a fake identity, he was trained in Afghanistan and was arrested in December 1999 when attempting to enter the US with a car trunk full of explosives and sophisticated timers.

Reyat, Inderjit Singh. A BKI member and one of the defendants in the Air India Bombing trial. Normally a resident of BC, he has already been convicted in the UK for charges related to the incident.

Sabanayagam, Loganathan. One of the six founders of the LTTE, he had been involved in their 1975 assassination of the mayor of Jaffna, and is a first cousin of the organization’s founder. He was convicted in 1994 of a number of fraud related charges pertaining to passport forging. He entered Canada from the US as a refugee claimant in 1988.

al-Sayegh, Hani. A Saudi who is suspected of being involved in the murder of 19 US personnel in a 1996 truck bombing in Saudi Arabia (an al Qaeda operation,) he was arrested in 1997 as he tried to settle in Canada.

El Sayed, Omar. A Hizbollah member caught living in Edmonton with a false ID (after entering Canada in 1998 with a fake Dutch passport,) he was arrested after the RCMP determined that Germany wanted him to face charges related to heroin and cocaine trafficking, selling firearms and threatening a police officer. An Alberta judge ordered him released on bail in 2002, and he has since disappeared.

Saygili, Aynur. A PKK member, she entered Canada under a false name and helped to take over a Kurdish cultural organization. She was arrested here in 1996 as a threat to national security.

Shanmugam, Tharmalingam. The chief weapons buyer for the LTTE. He travels around the world on a fake Canadian passport, but has probably never lived in Canada.

Singh, Iqbal Arrived in Canada in 1991 as an undocumented refugee (after hopping through several countries with false documentation,) he was a member of the Babbar Khalsa International and the Sikh Students Federation. He was deported to Belize from Toronto in 2001 as a threat to Canadian security after a lengthy legal battle.

Slahi, Mohamedou Ould. An al Qaeda member who was recruited as a student in Europe, he also lived in Montreal for two years after fleeing Germany (where he was wanted for welfare fraud). In 1999, he carried a message from Bin Laden to Ahmed Ressay, ordering him to prepare an attack on Los Angeles International Airport.

Suresh, Manickavasagam. A senior LTTE leader who arrived in Canada in 1990 to take command of their front organizations here, he has been fighting deportation since 1995. The case has set a number of important legal decisions, including a ruling that refugees can be deported to countries where they face torture if there is a serious risk to Canadian security, and a dismissal of arguments that fundraising and propagandizing for terrorist groups in Canada is a form of free expression and free association.

Tobbichi, Adel (aka Mezbar, Amine). An Algerian, he was extradited from Montreal to the Netherlands in 2002 to stand trial with six al Qaeda members who were planning a series of attacks in France and Belgium.

Vignarajah, Kumaravelu. A one-time LTTE combatant, he also worked for the RCMP as a wiretapping translator, before the Mounties discovered he had concealed his part in the murder of Indian troops in Sri Lanka and suspected he was stealing intelligence documents. He entered Canada as a refugee in 1989.